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Abstract 
Typically, educational research considers how teachers are ethically accountable 
to learners, their families, teacher colleagues and society as a whole. But this 
thesis set out to explore the extent to which teachers are also morally accountable 
for their pedagogical acts. My route to such insight drew upon the notion of moral 
answerability (Bakhtin, 1993), which invites dialogic processes of meaning-
making between (my) pedagogical acts from multiple standpoints across time and 
space. As an infant teacher myself, I selected a self-study method aligned with 
dialogic methodology in order to connect (my) self, others and pedagogical 
practices in consideration of infant practice. This thesis is therefore based on the 
premise that teacher pedagogy is an act of moral answerability.  
My self-study took place in a community based early childhood education and 
care (ECEC) service.  Initially, I video recorded my practice engaging with infants 
which I took to separate staff meetings where footage was analysed by my teacher 
colleagues in dialogue with me. Subsequently, I analysed the staff meeting 
dialogue. Bakhtin’s notion of moral answerability was applied as the unit of 
analysis in order to analyse pedagogy as an act of moral answerability.  
Insights from (my) dialogic self-study have revealed that as an answerable self I 
have numerous accountabilities to different selves in relation to others. These 
accountabilities were evident in the way I exposed (my) answerable self in the 
dialogue, upheld the best interests of infants, ensured infants’ perspectives were 
taken into account, and was aware of not denying my subjectivity. The discovery 
that as a teacher I am an answerable self in relationship with others, summons a 
re-conceptualisation of professional identity as a plural concept. This challenges 
the traditional conceptualisation of professional identity as singular, in ownership 
of a defined set of assets valued by the teaching profession.   
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Chapter one: Introduction ─ A Study of the Self  
 
As an infant teacher I am a member of a profession. As such, I have been 
introduced into a social practice with its own code of conduct, standards and 
values that are shared. I chose teaching as a profession because of a fundamental 
moral commitment to make a positive difference in the lives of children, to give 
back to society and to help others learn those things that are judged to be 
worthwhile. The moral commitment that drew me to teaching has deeply 
implicated me in all that I do as an infant teacher because of the potential for my 
actions to alter the lives of the very children that I teach. Because of the close and 
intimate nature of working in an early childhood education and care (ECEC) 
teaching team, my actions also implicate me in the pedagogical practices of the 
teachers with whom I work. I found few areas for guidance in this regard, in 
research or professional guidelines. Yet, how people morally respond to one 
another in dialogue shapes the meaning that they come to know and value. It has 
been my deeply held view that research pays little attention to the moral 
accountabilities of infant pedagogy, it is the ethical accountabilities of the teacher 
and how they are applied in practice that is typically illuminated.  
As a teacher it seemed to me that far less attention was focused on moral 
accountabilities and responsibilities because of externally mandated prescriptions 
and standards that tended to neglect fundamental moral aims in education. I was 
often confronted in my practice with making pedagogical decisions, that I 
distinguished as either ethical or moral acts as I strove to ‘do the right thing’ in the 
context of my work as an infant teacher.  What was highlighted for me, as an 
issue, was what I ironically describe as ‘doing the right thing’, when applied to 
infant teacher practice, could mean a raft of different things depending on the 
particulars of a situation, the personalities present, time and space. The moral 
value and judgement that I expressed in these everyday pedagogical practices as I 
responded to and for infants and teachers could not be prescribed by an ethical 
code or practice. These were moral moments which I was personally responsible 
and accountable for, which have the form shaping potential to alter the lives of 
others.  I realised the importance of evaluating the self because of moral 
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implications that derive from practice. It is therefore my assertion that infant 
pedagogy is comprised of moral acts for which I am answerable. 
Throughout the thesis I employ the phrase ‘doing the right thing’ ironically. I 
understand that the employment of the phrase ‘doing the right thing’ is 
underpinned by the implication that there is a singular or universal ‘right thing’. 
Indeed, in systems of ethics (such as Kant’s, which I explore critically in chapter 
two of this thesis) it is anticipated that everyone will essentially ‘do the right 
thing’. However, from the methodological stance that I employ it is my 
understanding that there is always an alternative way of viewing the situation ─ a 
loophole ─ which means the meaning I take from a particular situation may, 
indeed, be different to the meaning that you take from the same situation. Viewed 
in this way, understanding what it means ‘to do the right thing’ will depend on the 
meaning that is created in the moral reality of the here and now that anticipates the 
future and is shaped by the past. This thesis, therefore, renders the phrase ‘doing 
the right thing’ as problematic.    
This thesis speaks to the moral imperative of being self-aware, as an infant 
teacher, of how my acts imbued with moral meaning and consequence, implicated 
me as I strove to ‘do the right thing’ by infants, their families, teacher colleagues, 
centre management, society as a whole and (my)self. As a study of the self this 
thesis was a moral act in itself because it constituted that set of my internally held 
truths (beliefs) and understandings which are evaluative in nature ─ distinguished 
between what I and others considered to be and not to be ‘doing the right thing’ 
pedagogically. 
1.1 ‘Doing the right thing’    
If everyone chose to ‘do the right thing’ there would be no need for a police force 
(Snook, 2003). But what does it mean to ‘do the right thing’? In my endeavours to 
articulate my own understanding of what I mean by morality and the moral, I 
would like to emphasise that this effort is not a finalised understanding. How 
morality and the moral are seen, from my perspective, continues to alter 
depending on those with whom I come into dialogue. This thesis does not explore 
moral education or teaching morality but rather attends to the value-infused 
nuances and moral complexities of teachers’ pedagogical acts that enrich and 
sometimes muddy the waters of teaching. For that reason, throughout this thesis I 
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make a deliberate distinction between morals and ethics. Ethics refers to codes of 
ethical conduct and practice (Buzzelli & Johnstone, 2014). In this light, teachers 
as members of a profession have universal codes, principles, standards and often 
core values imposed on them by a collective teaching body which they are 
obligated to follow. Ethics have direct impact on human conduct and activity and 
are designed for this purpose.   
My orienting conceptualisation of morality draws from the writing of Mikhail 
Bakhtin, a Soviet Russian philosopher. Bakhtin was an experienced and much 
loved teacher amongst other things, who according to Holquist (2002), was 
interested in how people interpret and experience the world. I employ Bakhtin’s 
theory of dialogism as the methodological approach for this study. Like many of 
Bakhtin’s concepts, dialogism is difficult to define. In the words of Hirschkop 
(1999, pp. 4–5) dialogism: 
 is indeed about the two-sided aspects of meanings, but not in any 
sense necessarily about two people. Rather it refers to what other 
writers would call the intersubjective quality of all meaning: the 
fact that it is always found in the space between expression and 
understanding, and that this space ─ the “inter” separating subjects 
─ is not a limitation but the very condition of meaningful utterance.  
 
A primary focus of Bakhtin’s dialogic work was the understanding he built on 
relations between the self and other which was dependent on the interaction 
between: i.) how the ‘self’ and ‘other’ shape one another in dialogue, and ii.) the 
sensation of self in dialogue or how the self “looks and feels to its own 
consciousness in action” (Sullivan, 2007, p. 106). It is through dialogue that 
people come to know themselves, other human beings and the world (Haynes, 
2013). Dialogue in Bakhtin’s view is conceptualised as a way of being in 
relationship with others, whose ideologies, perspectives, cultures and pedagogical 
practices are often different (Shields & Edwards, 2005). According to Bakhtin 
(1986) meaning is always generated out of the interaction in the place of in-
between-ness of different voices and different points of view.  
When considering a Bakhtinian dialogic perspective people are compelled to act 
in ways that are determined by the meaning that they come to know being in 
dialogue with others. As participants in dialogue people are morally answerable 
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for the meanings that they create. For Bakhtin people’s ontology is relational and 
therefore thoroughly intertwined with their morals (Sidorkin, 2002a). From a 
Bakhtinian (1990; 1993) viewpoint what people value is at the very centre of 
meaning and people give one another shape and value in dialogue as a moral act 
(Bakhtin, 1990; 1993). The learning and the meaning that is conceived in dialogue 
will affect past, present and future answerable acts or deeds alongside ways of 
morally being and becoming for participants in the dialogue.  
1.2 Moral answerability, a pedagogical act 
 I have to answer with my own life for what I have experienced and 
understood in art, so that everything I have experienced and 
understood would not remain ineffectual in my life.  
(Bakhtin, 1990, p. 1)   
Moral answerability underpins Bakhtin’s (1990;1993) moral philosophy that 
speaks about lingering lovingly and intently in relationships with others in an 
endeavour to understand them (their ideologies, views of the world) outside of 
ourselves. I take this to mean that a teacher can endeavour to ‘do the right thing’ 
by others as others, without ceasing to be her or his self.  
For Bakhtin (1990; 1993), being in the world with others involves social 
encounters that place extreme importance on the moral responsibility a person 
carries towards relationships ─ what Bakhtin termed answerability. Bakhtin’s 
moral philosophy focuses on the significance of responsibility understood as 
“answering to and answering for the other without alibis” (Ponzio, 2008, p. 292). 
Answerability and non-alibi-in-Being are attitudes of consciousness (Zubeck, 
2004). Central to Bakhtin’s (1990, 1993) concept of answerability is the notion of 
non-alibi-in-Being which means people cannot remain inactive or abstain from 
action in life altogether. As such non-alibi-in-Being implicates people for how 
they act, respond and participate in all aspects of life, regardless of what comes 
their way (Holquist, 2002). A person’s non-alibi-in-Being affirms and 
acknowledges “the uniqueness” of their “participation in Being” (Bakhtin, 1993, 
p.41).  
When applied to teacher practice moral answerability implicates me as personally 
responsible for the decisions I make in encounters with others and their 
implications in practice. This means how I respond to others, or if I choose not to 
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respond, will potentially alter the other’s subjectivities and experience in terms of 
all aspects of their learning i.e., relationships, communication, contribution, sense 
of belonging and their well-being. In the context of this thesis, ‘others’ refers to 
all the people connected to the ECEC setting such as teachers, infants, and their 
families. In this regard, infants, teachers and families are viewed as joint learners.  
An answerable act for Bakhtin (1993) is one that  a person takes ownership of 
through their moral answerability to the other person/s involved in the event of-
Being and for the way they interpreted the response and  intonated or shaded it 
with both their “own meanings and those compelled by the other”  (Hicks, 2000, 
p.230). The ‘other’ for Bakhtin is not always physically present but can also relate 
to those people who are figuratively speaking sitting on a person’s shoulder from 
past, present and even future.  Applied to my dialogic self-study moral 
answerability implicates me to reflect openly on what it is that I value that 
underpins my views in relation to infant pedagogy.   
My Bakhtinian view acknowledges that as an ethical teacher I am bound by a 
code of professional ethics and standards, that there are rules and regulations 
stipulated by a series of external authoritative bodies to whom I must comply. 
However, Bakhtin (1990, 1993) does not advocate for a person to passively 
submit to the external voice of authority such as a professional code of ethics. 
Bakhtin (1993, p. 37) asserts: 
 it is an unfortunate understanding (a legacy of rationalism) to think 
that truth [Pravda] can only be the truth [istina] that is composed of 
universal moments; that the truth of a situation is precisely that 
which is repeatable and constant in it. 
From a Bakhtinian perspective, it is only in relation to the answerable act that 
universal codes, principles and standards (e.g., code of ethical conduct) are 
properly understood.  Bakhtin advocates for people to consider the particulars of 
the situation that they are encountering with its distinctive demands, when actions 
are performed in relation to codes, laws and standards. Bakhtin, did not imply any 
moral relativism:  
… it should be noted that both relativism and dogmatism equally 
exclude all argumentation and all genuine dialogue, either by 
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making them unnecessary (relativism) or impossible (dogmatism). 
(Bakhtin, 1973, p. 56)  
Bakhtin, therefore, viewed relativism and dogmatism as not conducive with 
authentic dialogue. Bakhtin (1990, 1993) explains that every moment of living 
involves a choice of response and people have the freedom to decide whether to 
act in any particular situation. Viewed in this way, a Bakhtinian (1990, 1993) 
conceptualisation of morality informs that people are not obliged to act morally 
based solely on abstract principles, rules or imperatives. Instead, a Bakhtinian 
approach to morality claims that a person’s moral position or attitude (ought) is 
embedded in their decision to act in a particular situation for which the person 
accepts personal responsibility and is accountable for their actions. As such, a 
person “understands the ought of his performed act, that is, not the abstract law of 
his act, but the actual, concrete ought, conditioned by his unique place in the 
given context of the ongoing event” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 30). From a Bakhtinian 
perspective the self is a plural concept, hereafter described in terms of an 
answerable self. 
1.3 Infant teacher pedagogy is an act of moral answerability  
Infant pedagogy has been increasingly described as deeply emotional and values-
laden work in the research because of the presence of infants in ECEC (Brennen, 
2014; Elfer & Page, 2015; Elfer, 2012). Research has explored infant pedagogy in 
relation to love (White, 2016a), relationships (Degotardi & Pearson, 2014; 
Recchia, Lee & Shin, 2015) as an intersubjective act (Jung, 2013). However, very 
little has been said about infant pedagogy as a deeply moral act that infant 
teachers are answerable for. When infant teacher pedagogy is viewed as an act of 
moral answerability a means is provided for me as the teacher to gain a better 
understanding of the pedagogical decisions I am making in relation to my practice 
because this notion pays particular attention to how I evaluate my axiological 
position (value laden basis of one’s moral judgements and responses) from the 
perspective of others.  
From a Bakhtinian (1990) perspective I recognise my need for others to give me 
value because I do not possess an autonomous value-oriented self-consciousness. 
It is only in relation to moral answerability that the Bakhtinian subject is 
autonomous (Steinby & Klapuri, 2013). Bakhtin (1990) explains “I myself cannot 
be the author of my own value, just as I cannot lift myself up by my own hair” 
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(Bakhtin, 1990, p.55). This authoring takes place with others in dialogues that 
place moral answerability for any response given to others on the self in the 
course of co-authoring lives (Gardiner, 1996). It is in dialogue, that what people 
value is heard, as judgements are expressed in the many forms of language as 
people respond to one another. It is in the dialogue that what is valued is born 
between participants. From a dialogic stance morality is therefore never just about 
the self.  When viewed through a Bakhtinian lens it is through emotions that I 
bestow a form and a value upon others ─ my emotions and values are therefore 
implicated through the act of authorship. These values are evident, for instance, in 
the tone of our speaking voice. As such, authoring the other is a morally charged 
act “that is emotionally responsive to the needs of the other” (Sullivan, 2007, 
p.110). We can never be outside our own experience, only outside the experience 
of the other.   
The moral answerability carried by infant teachers toward others is subjective, and 
specific to context. A New Zealand ECEC community based service is the context 
for this self-study (see section 4.6.1). According to Clark and Grey (2010) ECEC 
is not compulsory in New Zealand, however numbers of children, notably infants, 
receiving an early years education have increased over the years. For many infants 
spending the majority of their day with non-familial adults at an ECEC service is 
a daily occurrence. According to Clark and Grey (2010), it is not unusual for 
infants ranging in age from three months to 18 months spending 40-50 hours per 
week in an early years setting. Many infants will spend a considerable amount of 
time attending an ECEC setting until they transition to school (Clark & Grey, 
2010). It is therefore not difficult to understand the importance of the role of an 
ECEC teacher, particularly an infant teacher, because of their influence on the 
lives of very young children ─ emotionally, relationally, physically, pedagogically 
and morally.  
From a Bakhtinian theoretical perspective it is not only the influence of me as the 
teacher on the learning of others but also the influence of others’ responses (i.e., 
infant, teacher, parent, members of society) on my subjectivity and all aspects of 
my learning and understanding too. Each person’s moral answerability although 
always already entrenched in a person’s relations with another (others from past, 
present and future), remains essentially “answerability for my own uniqueness, for 
my own being … that which can be done by me can never be done by anyone 
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else” (Bakhtin, 1993, pp. 40-42). As such, moral answerability for an act arises 
out of the individual’s “unique center of value” (Bakhtin, 1993, p.59) which is 
continuously being shaped by evaluative responses in dialogue with other unique 
human beings. Ideas for Bakhtin are more than merely theoretical constructs. 
Lived exchanges of ideas, are imbued with values and judgements (Sullivan, 
2012) which in Bakhtin’s eyes, reflect the shape of human consciousness and flow 
out into events (Zubeck, 2004). Viewed in this light, infant teacher pedagogy is an 
act of moral answerability that is incredibly values-laden, as my pedagogical 
practices reflect those approaches, ideas, strategies and other constructs that I 
value. This thesis argues that infant teacher pedagogy is an act of moral 
answerability. Seen in this way infant pedagogy is not only an ethical act but a 
deeply moral act for which I am answerable.   
1.4 An example of an answerable act 
As an infant teacher I am faced with making moral choices that derive from 
practice every day. I am required to respond to each infant ─ whose 
communication differs from my own ─ and work to meet their needs as group 
members, within a team of other (qualified and unqualified) teachers. I believe it 
is imperative that I have an awareness of the significance of my acts as a result of 
the choices I make because my acts have the potential to alter the learning, 
development and well-being of all others in the dialogic space of an ECEC 
environment. Often these acts create inner and outer emotional turmoil if they 
challenge personal values or core values shared with others. In these situations, I 
am often faced with the struggle of how to be accountable to and for multiple 
others.  
Moments of “doing the right thing” can bring about much personal challenge as 
infant teachers struggle with the inner turmoil of “doing right” by ALL others 
including self because of pedagogical differences in what is valued. I see these 
kinds of moral challenges infused in the pedagogical practices of teachers, 
particularly in a teaching team environment, where teachers are moving in and out 
of one another’s interactions with children and one another as they shape practice 
and are shaped.  For example, on one particular day I walked outside, and instead 
of being greeted by the happy sounds of children, was taken aback by the sound of 
an infant sobbing in the distance. As I approached to see why she was upset and to 
comfort her, a senior teacher cautioned me to ignore the infant because in her 
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opinion the infant wanted to be picked up all the time. The senior teacher who I 
held in high esteem further explained that she had “told the infant off” and the 
infant did not like it. For me in that moment wrapped up in the senior teacher’s 
words and in the expression on her face was an unspoken message directed at me 
about how infants do not have to be picked up all the time ─ this was how I 
interpreted the meaning that was being born in that dialogue. What should I do? In 
this moment I was torn between the accountability I felt toward this teacher as the 
voice of authority, and the accountability I felt toward the infant as her teacher. 
The relationships I valued with each one of these human beings was hanging in 
the balance. Every moral fibre in my body wanted to respond in a way that was 
true to the moral values that were and are significant to me as a teacher and a 
human being. Values that were and still are important to me were compromised in 
that moment, such as responding to, rather than ignoring others.  
Obeying the voice of authority in the form of the senior teacher, a feeling of 
helplessness washed over me, as I resisted picking up the infant. Instead, I 
responded to her with a look that I hoped communicated in its expression how I 
understood her pain but was powerless in that moment to do anything. The infant 
looked at me. In her eyes I saw my own sense of disappointment and disapproval 
reflected at me. I felt sick! What had I done? How could I rewind time by just a 
few seconds? I knew I had to put things ‘right’ between this infant and me. The 
infant turned away from me and walked toward the sandpit, continuing to quietly 
sob. Moments lapsed. The personal and moral responsibility I felt toward my 
relationship with this infant continued to weigh heavily on me. I felt I had to put 
this situation right, there would be consequences for my actions ─ that I knew. 
“Doing the right thing” for the infant meant that I approached the senior teacher, 
expressed my concern for the infant’s well-being and suggested that I spend time 
engaging with the infant in her play. 
In this moment, as with so many other fleeting moments of this nature in my work 
with infants I was faced with making a decision that spoke to my allegiance to the 
voice of teaching authority in the form of a senior teacher. At the same time, it 
spoke to the faithfulness I carried toward the unique personality that I brought to 
my practice. Expressed on the face of the infant in that moment when our eyes 
met was a look of not being listened to, let alone heard. Her response to me in this 
way touched my inner being; I felt if I didn’t put things right the consequences of 
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knowing the ‘right thing to do’ and not doing it would be too much to bear. The 
inner turmoil I felt in that moment was as if time was racing in slow motion as I 
struggled to understand what meaning would be created, for the infant, for the 
teacher, depending on my response. Could I live with the potential consequences 
to my relationships with these others? No, I could not. I had to make a moral 
choice. I felt answerable for the meaning that had been created in the dialogue 
particularly between the infant and (my) self.  
Regardless of how I responded I was implicated. To respond to an infant (or 
anybody for that matter) by ignoring is not a pedagogical approach I employ 
because I value others knowing that they matter, and therefore respond to them 
through my attention. Making the pedagogical decision to account for the learning 
of the infant and the relationship I shared with her left me with a feeling of inner 
peace, because I had found a way to be morally answerable to the infant, senior 
teacher and self. However, those initial few moments of not actualising my deed 
in that lived experience has stained my soul.  
As an infant teacher I therefore ground my thesis in the notion that like all other 
teachers I am morally answerable for the well-being and learning of infants. I am 
correspondingly accountable for the pedagogical acts I make as a teacher. The 
urgency I felt in finding a way to put things right by the infant in a way that spoke 
to my interpretation of what she was saying was because I believed how a person 
responds to another (or if they do not respond), has potential to alter how someone 
learns, interacts, cares, respects, communicates, and forms relationships with 
others. Infants cannot easily advocate for themselves and this makes infant 
pedagogy very interpretive work. Interpretation of meaning is a primary challenge 
faced by infant teachers (White, 2016a). When infant pedagogy is conceptualised 
as an answerable act, I am deeply implicated and answerable for the interpreted 
meanings and associated acts. This experience was a catalyst in cementing in me 
the absolute importance of not only being aware of the self and how my actions 
can impact on multiple others but also how others can contribute to my 
pedagogical practice through their responses. I see this example as an act of moral 
answerability and assert that infant teacher pedagogy as an act of moral 
answerability is a moral imperative. 
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1.5 Self-study introduced 
While in many respects it would have been easier to orient my research towards 
the pedagogical acts of other teachers, as others have done before me, I turned to 
the ‘self’ as a source of research in order to better understand and improve my 
practice as opposed to a study of other teachers. For the purposes of this research I 
employ Hamilton and Pinnegar’s (1998) definition of self-study as “the study of 
one’s self, one’s actions, one’s ideas, …” (p. 238). Which means self-study is 
“autobiographical, historical, cultural, and political and takes a thoughtful look at 
texts read, experiences had, people known and ideas considered” (Hamilton & 
Pinnegar, 1998, p. 236) and their associations to teachers’ and teacher educators’ 
practices (Craig, 2009). Self-study research has its origins in the United States of 
America. In 1993 a group of teacher educators developed their own form of 
practitioner research to align with the particularities of their practice―educating 
student teachers (Vanassche & Kelchtermans, 2015). This group of self-study 
scholars established the Self-Study of Teacher Education Practices Special 
Interest Group (SIG) of the American Educational Research Association (AERA).  
Self-study is concerned with improving the understanding of teacher education in 
general and the exploration and immediate improvement of one’s own 
professional practice (LaBoskey, 2004; Pinnegar & Hamilton, 2009; Samaras, 
2011). Oriented toward improvement (Samaras, 2011), self-study provides a 
means of developing one’s professional self-understanding as a teacher 
(Hamilton, 1998), it is also self-initiated, self-focused, employs multiple methods 
and involves critical friends, and the data is valid and trustworthy (LaBoskey, 
2004).  
Turning to the ‘self’ enabled me to reflect on my answerable acts in interaction 
with infants as a source of data. This data were reflected upon and critiqued at 
staff meetings in dialogue with teachers, and in turn, the staff meetings provided a 
further data source for reflection and analysis. I achieved a much richer study by 
combining a Bakhtinian methodology with a self-study approach with moral 
answerability as the unit of analysis. While it is acknowledged that self-study is 
valuable for the improvement of the individual’s own practice and for his or her 
individual professional growth (Cochran-Smith, 2005), critique that self-study 
research lacks methodological rigour and transparency exists (Loughran, 2010). 
As such, my decision to connect a self-study approach to dialogic methodology 
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combats the critique that self-study has the potential to be limited by a lack of 
theoretical basis. On these grounds, selecting a self-study method for this research 
was appropriate for the research questions and inquiry. Engaging in dialogic self-
study meant working with layers upon layers of complexity. Not only was I 
exploring issues surrounding moral choice, pedagogical acts and accountability, 
but I used a dialogic self-study approach to explore the importance of dialogic 
self-study for infant teacher pedagogy as an act of moral answerability.  
1.6 Research questions 
As the research participant inside the research, the researcher outside of the 
research and the teacher both in between the research spaces my research 
questions are as follows: 
• In what ways am I morally answerable to (my) self and others through my 
practice? 
 
• What does ‘doing the right thing’ mean for infant pedagogy and for the 
professional ECEC teacher? 
 
The rationale for these research questions was based on the need to better 
understand my personal and moral answerable accountabilities in order to better 
understand what ‘doing the right thing’ means in infant pedagogy. This study was 
undertaken as a response to my past lived experiences as an infant teacher in the 
hope that the dialogue I share with the readers of these pages will create new 
meanings of what it means to “do the right thing” in life. I also hope that the 
insights and discoveries of this study may have relevance within discussions of 
educational discourses in connection to infant pedagogy and dialogic self-study. 
1.7 Navigating the thesis 
The following section provides a map of the chapters presented in this thesis. The 
opening chapter introduces you, the reader, to this Bakhtinian dialogic self-study 
with an overview of the conceptualisation of infant teacher pedagogy as an act of 
moral answerability. The Bakhtinian notion of moral answerability is explained in 
tandem with my endeavours to define morals and ethics from a Bakhtinian stance. 
This section presents a story that was a catalyst for me embarking on this dialogic 
self-study. The story presented has significance for me as a human being, a 
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teacher and a person who strives to “do the right thing” by infants and infant 
pedagogy. Finally, I introduce the research questions and a rationale for this 
dialogic approach to studying the self. Importantly, this chapter explains that 
when infant pedagogy is conceptualised as an especially moral act, the teacher is 
morally answerable to and for her responses without an alibi.   
Chapter two presents a more in-depth look at the notion of moral answerability, 
exploring its philosophical roots particularly its Kantian influences. This chapter 
foregrounds Bakhtin’s concept of the ‘I’ as a moral plural voice, followed by an 
outline of a Bakhtinian approach to answerability in the early years. This chapter 
concludes with the view that ‘doing the right thing’ deeply implicates the teacher 
in all aspects of her or his lived experiences with others in an ECEC environment 
that is uniquely shared.  
Chapter three explores the literature on ‘doing the right thing’ in terms of how 
education sees this and how it plays out in terms of evaluation and reflection. I 
argue that being accountable for the learning of learners requires more than 
ethically accounting for one’s actions in accordance with a code, regulation, 
principle, policy, curriculum document, or core value. This chapter highlights the 
importance of teachers’ accounts of their pedagogy noticing, recognising and 
responding to the unique moral particulars of everyday moments of living. I 
conclude with a section on the strong allegiance to some form of self evaluation in 
New Zealand ECEC discourse which makes those important links between self-
study and self-review in support of a self-study method.  
Bakhtin’s dialogic methodology underpinned by the notion of moral answerability 
is presented in chapter four in tandem with self-study as a method for exploring 
(my) teacher pedagogy as an act of moral answerability. The research design 
featuring multiple layers of data collection and analysis is explained alongside 
introducing the participants and New Zealand context where the research 
occurred.  
Chapter five presents three selected events in chronological order drawn from 
three staff meeting dialogues. The first staff meeting illustrated that as an 
answerable self, I have numerous accountabilities to different selves in relation to 
others. The second event provided insight into how deeply held values can be 
challenged in order to “do the right thing”. The third event revealed an important 
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discovery in that there is no universal personal moral code. Instead, what is 
morally valued is shaped in the space in between answerable selves.  
Finally, chapter six concludes by looking back on this dialogic self-study, its 
contributions, limitations and looks ahead to the potential for future dialogic self-
study research. Overall, the context for the dialogic self-study points to the deeply 
moral nature of work with infants and highlights the importance of bringing (my) 
answerable self to the role. A dialogic approach to self-study provides a way to 
better understand how I am implicated for my acts as an infant teacher by 
connecting self, other and practice in dialogue. I like to think as you read through 
the pages of this thesis that Bakhtin is smiling down on you, as I believe he was 
on me, and smiling on this dialogic self-study which celebrates the acts of an 
answerable self. 
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Chapter Two: Answerability: A Bakhtinian Principle for 
Understanding Moral Acts 
 
It is only from within my participation that the function of each 
participant can be understood. In the place of another, just as in my 
own place, I am in the same state of senselessness. To understand 
an object is to understand my ought in relation to it (the attitude or 
position I ought to take in relation to it), that is, to understand it in 
relation to me myself in once-occurrent Being-as-event, and that 
presupposes my answerable participation, and not an abstracting 
from myself. It is only from within my participation that Being can 
be understood as an event, but this moment of once-occurrent 
participation does not exist inside the content seen in abstraction 
from the act qua answerable deed. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 18)   
 
As a teacher I am morally answerable for how I interpret the meaning of the value 
that I come to know from the responses of others, with whom I am in dialogue, in 
their authoring of me and how I in turn respond through my authoring of others. 
For this reason, it is critical, that as a teacher, I am aware of the importance I place 
on what I value, in dialogue with others because how others ─ infants and 
teachers ─ interpret the ideas that I value, has a bearing on the meaning that they 
come to know being in dialogue with me. Of importance to Bakhtin (1993) was 
the particular way people interpreted contextual meanings, language, ethical and 
moral responses when they shared moments of living and knowing with one 
another because words for Bakhtin are always half someone else’s. So too, is the 
meaning generated in communicative acts of living and knowing with others. 
From this perspective there is a suggestion that participants in dialogue share 
accountability for the meanings that are generated (White, 2013).  
2.1 Philosophical roots of moral answerability 
There is no escaping that I am morally answerable for the meaning that infants 
and teachers come to know being in dialogue with me. In the following section, I 
argue that at the heart of this view lies an essentialist versus relativist 
philosophical approach which orients from moral philosophy. There is a 
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fundamental philosophical debate that Bakhtin centres himself at concerning 
relativism and essentialism. While some scholars have argued that in spite of 
Bakhtin’s critique of Kant’s formalism, he did not disregard the content of Kant’s 
three postulates of practical reason, which Kant insisted people are required to 
follow if they are to act ethically (Nielsen, 1998; Emerson, 2011) and others have 
argued for a position that acknowledges Simmel’s views around individual laws 
that provided a source for Bakhtin’s interest in individuality in relation to his 
moral philosophy (Nielsen, 2002). I concur with Brandist (2004) who suggests 
that Bakhtin found a way to reconcile his issues surrounding a systematic 
conception of ethics (universals) and relativism, by connecting the content-sense 
(theoretical) of an act with its actual performance (lived reality). In this way, 
Bakhtin sought to overcome the “law-like morality” of Kantian ethics with its 
“disembodied ideas” (p. 28) at the same time resisting the laissez faire attitude of 
ethical relativism. The position I argue, is that Bakhtin achieved a means of not 
privileging systems of ethics over moral reality through his notion of moral 
answerability. Therefore, on this ground, I argue, moral answerability provides a 
way to understand infant pedagogy.  
Bakhtin’s emphasis on answerability as a moral endeavour owes its genesis to his 
neo-Kantian theories. The following section also provides an overview of these as 
a means of understanding the considerable influence of Kantian and neo-Kantian 
philosophies on Bakhtin’s notion of moral answerability. 
2.1.1 Bakhtin’s early work (1919-1926) 
Amongst other things Bakhtin was a philosopher who advocated for a dialogic 
approach to human relations (Holquist, 2002). His writings were first published in 
the 1960s and have had significant impact across a diverse range of fields such as 
psychology, literature and literary theory, philosophy, theology, biology (Haynes, 
1995; Sullivan, 2007) and education (Matusov, 2009; Wegerif, 2013; White & 
Peters, 2011). This study draws primarily upon Bakhtin’s earlier works (1919-
1926): his first published essay Art and Answerability; Bakhtin’s second recorded 
piece of work Author and hero in aesthetic activity; and his unfinished 
philosophical composition which was published posthumously under the title 
Toward a Philosophy of the Act.  
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I am drawing primarily upon Bakhtin’s earlier philosophical writings (1990; 
1993) because in these works, he endeavoured to emphasise the importance of 
answerability or responsibility explicitly. In addition, Bakhtin’s earlier works are 
testament to his interest from the beginning in moral dilemmas (Ponzio, 2008) and 
people as morally acting subjects (Steinby & Klapuri, 2013). According to 
Steinby and Klapuri (2013) academics often do not credit Bakhtin’s early 
manuscripts with the scholarly weight that they deserve.  An exception to this 
view is found in Brandist (2002b) who acknowledges the merit of these early 
works by highlighting how Bakhtin’s moral philosophy added fresh new ideas to 
his German predecessors because of the attention he gave “to the question of art in 
general and of authorship in particular” (p. 40). For other scholars, answerability 
is the philosophical antecedent and basis for Bakhtin’s later thoughts and ideas in 
relation to dialogic discourse (Hicks, 2000; Holquist, 2002). As Steinby and 
Klapuri (2013) assert Bakhtin’s later projects are testament to his “continuous 
commitment to problems of ethics” (p. xv), as presented in his early moral work. 
The notion of answerability was to form the foundation for Bakhtin’s moral 
philosophy; a philosophy that was enriched by a circle of Bakhtin’s intellectual 
and artistic friends. 
2.1.2 The Bakhtin Circle and moral philosophy 
Bakhtin’s development as a moral philosopher was enhanced by a group of his 
friends who met on a regular basis in Nevel and Vitebsk. Formed in 1918, the 
Bakhtin Circle consisted of Bakhtin himself as a leading figure, and a group of his 
friends including philosopher and mathematician Matvei Isaevich Kagan, 
Konstantin Konstantinovich Vaginov, Valentin Nikolaevich Voloshinov, Mariia 
Veniaminovna Iudina, Ivan Ivanovich Kanaev, Pavel Nikolaevich Medvedev, Lev 
Vasilievich Pumpianskii and Ivan Ivanovich Sollertinskii (Brandist, 2002b). The 
group of friends met at a time when adversities and excitement were being felt by 
the Russian people as a result of the Russian revolution aftermath (Brandist, 
2002b). The Bakhtin Circle provided an intellectual and social context for this 
group of friends to discuss their thoughts and ideas and engage in philosophical 
debate (White, 2016). It was apparently on a walk in the countryside around the 
provincial town of Nevel that Bakhtin first told his friends about the fundamental 
ideas of his moral philosophy (Erdinast-Vulcan & Sandler, 2015). Kagen, who 
had studied at the Marburg School of neo-Kantian philosophy with Hermann 
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Cohen, Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer, played a pivotal role in the discussions of 
the Bakhtin Circle. Kagen was not only an original philosopher in his own right 
but was also a source for the latest works and ideas from the Marburg School 
which was deeply interested in moral philosophy and its outcry. According to 
Brandist (2002b), in 1924 the Bakhtin Circle moved meetings to Leningrad. 
However, the arrest of some of the members, as part of a general eradication of 
intellectuals, resulted in meetings being shut down in 1929. Nevertheless, Bakhtin 
continued to work on the topics that were of great interest to the Bakhtin Circle 
until his death (Brandist, 2002b).  
Pumpianiskii’s notes on Bakhtin’s The Problem of Grounded Peace lecture 
suggest Bakhtin may have been influenced in some way by theology (see Felch & 
Contino, 2001, Appendix). I do not want to make any grand claims as to whether 
or not Bakhtin was a religious man as there are no reliable accounts of him being 
affiliated with Christian theology of which I am aware. Further, Emerson (1997) 
asserts that just because Bakhtin was emphatic that he did not like the atheism of 
the Revolution does not mean that he was a “mainstream Christian believer or that 
his work was a theology in code” (p.124). There are some who recognise Bakhtin 
as a thinker who was influenced by Christianity and who assumed faith as an 
apriori (see Clark & Holquist, 1984; Nollan, 2004).  
In understanding the influence of Kantian and neo-Kantian moral philosophy on 
Bakhtin’s notion of moral answerability, it is my assertion that it is important to 
engage with both in conversation with one another. 
2.1.3 Kantianism & neo-Kantianism influence on moral answerability 
The influence of Kant (1724-1804) and neo-Kantian moral philosophy on 
Bakhtin’s notion of moral answerability is contestable. Sandler (2015) claims 
German neo-Kantian philosophy and the central figures of the Marburg School of 
neo-Kantianism, particularly Hermann Cohen, had much influence on Bakhtin. 
Indeed, Bakhtin’s early works demonstrate the strong influence of German 
philosophy on his thoughts and ideas (Brandist, 2002a). In an interview in 1973, 
Bakhtin acknowledged Cohen, “He was a remarkable philosopher, who has had 
an immense influence on me” (Bakhtin, 2002 [1973] as cited in Sandler, 2015, p. 
3) and commented that in the first half of the 1920s “I was such a zealous 
(zaiadlyj) Kantinian” (Bakhtin, 2002 [1973] as cited in Sandler, 2015, p. 1). 
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However, Holquist asserts that Bakhtin was more concerned with Kant than 
Cohen―avidly reading, lecturing and debating on Kant whilst working on 
Toward a Philosophy of the Act (see Foreword in Bakhtin, 1993). Nevertheless, 
by his own admission there was a time when Bakhtin considered himself to be a 
Kantian or neo-Kantian and yet as expressed earlier in his work Toward a 
Philosophy of the Act Bakhtin criticises the core principles of neo-Kantian 
philosophy and offers a critical evaluation of Cohen and Kant. Perhaps, Sandler 
(2015) suggests Bakhtin may have been trying to establish his own form of neo-
Kantian philosophy more in line with what is known today as existentialism. 
According to Nollan (2004), Bakhtin shared the Neo-Kantian view that morals 
and the range of ways that value, functions in people’s lives should be a primary 
concern of philosophy.  
2.1.4 A Kantian approach to morality 
Although Bakhtin rejected many of the central principles of Kantian morality, 
these differences are not to be overlooked as they were instrumental in the 
formation of his moral philosophy, in which he “expressed his overarching 
concerns” (Nollan, 2004, p. xv). Bakhtin did not wholeheartedly adopt the ideas 
from the Marburg School but saw them as a starting place for engagement with 
dialogue. For instance, theoretism is an approach that Bakhtin argues against in 
Toward a Philosophy of the Act (1993), yet the central claim of the Marburg 
school was that the world is comprised by the theoretical sciences which are 
grounded in logic. Bakhtin was critical of this approach because he viewed it as 
privileging objective knowledge obtained by the theoretical sciences above the 
actuality of the deed (Erdinast-Vulcan and Sandler, 2015). Bakhtin (1993), 
therefore, refuted Kantian approaches to universal or categorical imperatives ─ a 
stance that he called theoretism.   Kant’s principles of morality require: 
that morality be derived from human reason in the form of 
universal principles that are abstract and formal … morality 
consists of a set of principles that are universalizable, impartial, 
concerned with describing what is right. (Tronto, 1993, p. 27) 
From a Kantian viewpoint a categorical distinction is offered between right and 
wrong which applies to and is accepted by all rational thinking members of 
society regardless of their social and historical context or circumstances. An 
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individual, acts morally by understanding the moral law and its requirements; by 
freely choosing the basis for their actions as required by the moral law rather than 
participating in their own self-interests and desires; by believing that the 
objectives imposed by morality are achievable (Guyer, 2014). Kant’s moral theory 
is therefore an example of deontology (duty-bound ethics) ─ people make their 
own ethical decisions and to have moral worth it is imperative they be created and 
enacted out of a sense of duty rather than obedience to a higher authority such as 
God, inclination or love.  
As a deontologist, Kant considered an act is not considered right or wrong based 
on its consequences but whether it fulfils its duty as outlined in the categorical 
imperative. For Kant ethical acts are not aesthetic or creative events but rather 
duties. Kant had no concern for how individuals should act confronted with other 
individuals in a particular situation, individuals whose emotional-volitional or 
axiological orientation were in harmony or conflict, but rather, of importance to 
Kant was how the individuals should act regardless of other axiological positions 
provided in a given context (Nielsen, 1998). From a Kantian perspective morality 
depends on the ‘categorical imperative’: I ought never to act except in such a way 
that I can also will that my maxim (principle) should become a universal law 
(Guyer, 2014). Consequently, moral imperatives from a Kantian perspective must 
be categorical and a priori, not dependent on experience or on what we happen to 
desire. From this view it is possible for the Kantian moral subject to determine 
what comprise universal moral obligations because the subject is rational, stable, 
objective, autonomous, “separate from and stands above empirical reality” 
(Tronto, 1993, p. 27).  In order to protect democracy, the task for education stems 
from Kantian origins to cultivate the growth of an autonomuos, rational thinking 
subject, often linked to outcomes which encourage the child’s developing self-
awareness and exploration of the environment in ECE settings (Broström, Jensen, 
& Hansen, 2017). Further, Tronto (1993) asserts fulfilling one’s moral obligations 
“makes one the bearer of rights” and in turn rights are seen as the glue of social 
order and “as the most important way people can engage in orderly social 
relations” (p. 55). From a Kantian perspective society is viewed as a contract “a 
series of legally determined agreements on the central aspects of human society” 
one is moral if one “has the ability and the authority to exercise rights and fulfil 
obligations” (Tronto, 1993, p. 55).  
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The idea of moral relationships depicting how people should relate to each other 
in society is evident in universal codes which “govern practice and evaluation” 
made visible in “curricula, goals and targets, standards, quality measures, 
standardised measures of assessment” (p. 67). According to Dahlberg and Moss 
(2005) an approach based on Kantian universal principles underpins much ECEC 
policy and practice in westernised countries. Underlining this is often a view of 
the ECEC teacher as one who is delivering a prescribed curriculum (Albon & 
Rosen, 2014). However, Snook (2003) informs there is no recipe for teaching. 
Therefore, as De Vocht (2015a) advises pedagogical approaches that embrace the 
concept of moral answerability go “beyond teaching as a technical approach with 
universal strategies, to provide guidance for teachers in the unique lived 
experiences with their students” (p. 2). This is achieved by participating in the 
dialogue in ways that also pay attention to the particulars of a situation. 
This view is shared by Noddings (1984) whose perspective considers, codes of 
ethical conduct to privilege rationality over an ethic of care for others. For 
example a teacher may recognise a child’s right to play but she does not play with 
him solely out of respect for a Kantian categorical imperative, Noddings would 
argue she acts from an ethic of care (Taggart, 2011).  Furthermore, Sumsion 
(2000) acknowledges that principles rooted in codes of ethics are there to guide 
and support a teacher’s practice. However, she asserts codes of ethical conduct are 
limited in the practical assistance they can offer teacher educators in resolving 
ethical dilemmas that they face in their everyday practice. Snook (2003) echos 
this view but extends it to all teachers, proposing that moral philosophy take a 
pivotal role in teacher education programmes. Snook (2003) upholds if initial 
teacher education programmes endorsed philosophical discussion surrounding 
ethics and moral philosophy this would support student teachers’ abilities to 
analyse critically their own personal views and practices.  
2.1.5 A Bakhtinian approach to morality 
Bakhtin’s moral philosophy calls for thought beyond Kant’s formulation of the 
categorical imperative. Bakhtin opposes Kant’s formalism which asserts that 
morals could be embedded in the notion that all “moral agents should make 
judgements “as if” their consequences did not apply to a particular case involving 
the agent’s own interests but rather “as if” each judgement might affect any 
person at anytime” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. x). According to Hirsckhop (1999), 
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Bakhtin’s critique of theoretism was primarily oriented toward Kantian formalism 
in ethics. Bakhtin’s rejection of a Kantian view of morality is evidenced in his 
essay Toward a Philosophy of the Act:  
“Formal ethics starts out from the perfectly correct insight that the 
ought is a category of consciousness, a form that cannot be derived 
from some particular “material” content. But formal ethics (which 
developed exclusively within the bounds of Kantianism) further 
conceives the category of the ought as a category of theoretical 
consciousness, i.e., it theoretizes the ought, and, as a result, loses 
the individual act or deed. And yet the ought is precisely a category 
of the individual act; even more than that―it is a category of the 
individuality, of the uniqueness of a performed act, of its once-
occurrent compellentness, of its historicity, of the impossibility to 
replace it with anything else or to provide a substitute for it. The 
universal validity of the imperative is substituted for its 
categoricalness which can be thought of in a manner similar to the 
way theoretical truth is conceived”. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 25) 
The point Bakhtin (1993) was making was that laws alone are not sufficient as 
they can only deal in universalities, demanding “a sense of obligation to the 
abstract paradigm or perspective itself” (p. 84). From a Kantian viewpoint, each 
teacher carries the same universal law within them, and teachers are acting 
morally when these universal moral imperatives are applied in practice. However, 
Bakhtin (1993) contended that by reducing all morality to law, the ought (the 
position or attitude I take toward performing a morally answerable act) that arises 
in a particular situation is not generated but rather sifted out resulting in people 
not acknowledging their personal responsibility for an act. As such, guidelines for 
how a teacher is to act may exist (based on what a culture values and believes to 
be true) in forms such as systems of ethics, standards, curricula, policies and 
regulations (or rational objectives). However, they can only guide or prescribe 
teachers who are committed to being moral on how to conduct themselves 
professionally or behave in certain situations ─ when viewed through a 
Bakhtinian lens they are not moral imperatives.  Bakhtin (1993) asserted: 
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What is needed in addition to that is something issuing from within 
myself, namely, the morally ought-to-be attitude of my 
consciousness toward the theoretically valid-in-itself proposition. 
(pp. 23-24)   
2.1.6 The uniqueness of the answerable act 
This refusal of systematisation characterised Bakhtin’s view of morality which 
emphasised the uniqueness of each human being. Consequent of Bakhtin’s (1993) 
view that every human being is unique with unique conscious awareness, unique 
human experiences and engaging in unique acts he argued this uniqueness 
involves a moral imperative such as to be just, to be fair, to trust, to cooperate, to 
respect, to be kind. As such, everyday moments of living are participative 
(evaluative) and the moral moment of an act takes place uniquely within the 
answerable act itself ─ “the answerable act is, after all, the actualization of a 
decision” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 28). Further, an answerable act is defined as the act 
which is “performed on the basis of an acknowledgment” of the morally 
obligating orientation of my uniqueness (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 42). Bakhtin (1993) 
explained, “This acknowledgement of the uniqueness of my participation in Being 
is the actual and effectual foundation of my life and my performed deed” ─ a 
participation which Bakhtin characterised as moral answerability (p. 41). 
Therefore, to acknowledge personal responsibility (non-alibi-in-Being) for my 
ideas ─ my thoughts actualised as deeds ─ by taking ownership of them, is 
considered by Bakhtin to show good judgement and understanding as well as to 
be morally answerable. 
Bakhtin does not dismiss the relevance of knowledge but insists that it must be 
acknowledged and evaluated according to the particular situation. For Bakhtin 
theory cannot provide the foundation for morally answerable action in the world 
because “it does not translate directly into everyday life and experience” (Haynes, 
2013, p. 19). Conversely, a person’s particular acts or deeds do provide a basis for 
evaluating what is most meaningful and for generating an acceptable orientation 
in life (Haynes, 2013). A code of ethics cannot know the morally obligating 
orientation of a teacher’s consciousness. This point is emphasised by Sumsion 
(2000) who called upon Caputo (1993), to highlight the limitations of codes of 
ethics because they cannot anticipate the “moral messiness” and unpredictability 
of educators’ obligations that arise from professional responsibilities and which 
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are many and varied (p. 173). Consequently, Bakhtin (1993) advocates for a moral 
philosophy that is embedded in actual lived experience and action that offers a 
phenomenological description of subjectivity. 
Erdinast-Vulcan and Sandler (2015) explain that the concept of the actuality of the 
deed ─ a decision as deed actualised in a concrete act for which the self is 
answerable, its moral reality ─ is at the heart of Bakhtin’s philosophy and is 
specifically where it differs with the type of neo-Kantianism exemplified by 
Kagen. For Bakhtin (1993), philosophies which attempt to determine the abstract, 
universal laws of different domains of culture as evidenced in Kant’s categorical 
imperative neglect the unique moral act of a person involved in a concrete or real 
event of Being. Bakhtin’s (1993) insistence of the actuality of the deed in its 
concrete form as an answerable act provides evidence of how being immersed in 
the topics that neo-Kantians worked on significantly influenced his moral 
philosophy.  
In contrast to imposing value through universal principles and standards by the 
consensus-producing power of law, which the Kantian subject is obligated to 
follow, Bakhtin (1993) places faith in the “moral subject … on which one must 
rely” (p. 85). Bakhtin (1993) speaks of theoretical validity (such as laws) on its 
own as analogous to a document without a signature “not obligating anyone to 
anything” (p. 44) because people are “no longer present in it as individually and 
answerably active human beings” (p. 7). A Bakhtinian (1993) approach to 
morality means one’s actions cannot be justified by roles, rules, theories or 
knowledge. These are viewed by Bakhtin as alibis for being. Acting in this way, 
with an absence of personal responsibility for one’s actions cannot be described as 
being morally answerable (Albon & Rosen, 2014). Instead, Bakhtin (1993) 
advises everyday moments of living are participative and the moral moment of an 
act takes place uniquely within the act itself. According to Steinby and Klapuri 
(2013) Bakhtin considered a person’s thinking in a concrete act to be unindifferent 
(participative) thinking “in which cognition contains a moment of ought” (p. xvi). 
As such Bakhtin posed an alternative principle to Kant’s categorical imperative ― 
“that of “no alibi” in existence” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. xii).  
As stated in the introduction chapter of this thesis Bakhtin’s moral philosophy 
emphasised that people have no-alibi-in-Being. As such people must take full 
personal responsibility for their responses to others ─ which means, they must be 
   
25 
 
morally answerable. A transcendental viewpoint that may free a person from the 
weight of holding a particular and unique place in-Being is inconceivable in 
Bakhtin’s moral philosophy because of the uniqueness of each and every human 
being. Therefore, without an alibi-in-Being, each person is answerable for their 
unique place in existence and has moral answerability for the way that they relate 
their uniqueness to others in the world. It is this unique place in-Being where 
deeds are performed. Moral activity for Bakhtin (1993) is considered to be a deed. 
As such a person’s values become visible in their deeds. According to Clark and 
Holquist (1984) the deed is not only a physical action but can also take on other 
forms such as utterance, a piece of written text, a person’s thoughts.  In their 
seminal work Mikhail Bakhtin, Clark and Holquist (1984) inform Bakhtin was not 
concerned with the outcome of an action but instead on the moral deed “as an act 
in the process of creating or authoring an event that can be called a deed” (p. 63). 
2.2 Understanding the ‘I’ as a moral (plural) voice 
According to Walter (2011) Kant’s moral subject was required to abstract himself 
from lived experience before he could act. Following Kant’s line of thinking, a 
person is expected to make a decision on how to proceed with an act without 
taking into account human consciousness and the particularity of context.   
Bakhtin, on the other hand, “required a near reversal of this, arguing that the 
subject must live from within his embodied self” (Walter, 2011, p. 193):  
These basic moments are I-for-myself, the other-for-me, and I for-
the-other. All the values of actual life and culture are arranged 
around the basic architectonic points of the actual world of the 
performed act or deed: scientific values, aesthetic values, political 
values (including both ethical and social values), and, finally 
religious values. All spatial-temporal values and all sense-content 
values are drawn toward and concentrated around these central 
emotional-volitional moments: I, the other, and I-for-the-other. 
(Bakhtin, 1993, p. 54)  
For Bakhtin (1993) the fundamental concrete moments that make up an 
answerable act are I-for-myself, the other-for-me, I-for-the-other and I-for-thou 
(see section 4.8.3). The particular and unique answerability of people’s responses 
is expressed in the answerable act (Bakhtin, 1993). From a dialogic standpoint 
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people are connected to others through moral responsibility, as such they accept 
the consequences for the impact of their answerable acts on others. The self is 
deeply implicated in and with the other in the answerable act. Bakhtin (1993) 
highlights the existential freedom of an individual to make the decision to act or 
not to act in a particular situation. Because people are morally answerable and 
therefore accountable for the meaning that is created in dialogue with others it is 
important to understand how this is achieved in order to gain an understanding of 
how it is applied in pedagogical practice. For Bakhtin, from the moment a person 
is born, if not before, until they die, they are always in a process of becoming. 
According to Haynes (2013) Bakhtin’s unique approach to aesthetics was not 
based on traditional aesthetic values such as truth, goodness or beauty. Instead 
aesthetics for Bakhtin was concerned with how people give form to their 
experience, how an object, text or another person is perceived and how that 
perception is shaped into the “whole of the object it is” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. xxiv). 
This shaping of meaning in action or consummation is what Bakhtin referred to as 
an act of authorship.  
Moral action takes place when we make a moral judgement about another in our 
authoring of them from our outside position. Bakhtin’s authoring of self is much 
more complex than other philosophers’ concepts of self (for example see Mead, 
1964). Bakhtin’s authoring self is not separated from other individuals, although 
unique, the self from a Bakhtinian dialogic perspective is always in relationship 
with others and therefore inextricably connected to the other (Bakhtin, 1993). 
Bakhtin and Mead’s definitions of the subject meet at the point that a subject 
includes both the ‘I’ (I-for-myself) and the ‘me’ (I-for-you). However, Mead’s 
(1964) concept of self includes a generalised other. According to Bender (1998) 
this generalised other is not “a real flesh and bone ‘other’, the generalised other is 
an abstraction that represents the rules of the game or the given rules of society” 
(p. 186). Whereas, Bakhtin’s (1990) dialogic notion of self requires a continuous 
negotiation between the ‘I’ and the other in an endeavour to reach an 
understanding of the self’s or the other’s subjectivities.  
According to Bakhtin two non-coinciding consciousnesses are necessary for a 
moral act to occur.  Bakhtin (1993) insists on people being aware of and attentive 
to difference and their unique outside position because these features are vital to 
an answerable deed and all voices being heard. If moral action is to be undertaken 
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on behalf of others, then outsidedness (active empathising/otherness) is essential 
if a phenomenological distance from the other is to be achieved. Haynes (2013) 
explains, Bakhtin was critical of the neo-Kantian concept of aesthetic empathy 
which is the melding of another’s consciousness or co-experiencing an event with 
another person as grounds for moral action. In Bakhtin’s view this type of 
empathy was impossible given spatial and temporal considerations (Haynes, 
2013). From a Bakhtinian perspective experiencing empathy alone does not 
provide grounds for moral action; effective action “is the result of the complex 
interplay of cognitive, moral and aesthetic decisions” (Haynes, 2013, p. 44). 
Therefore, author-hero (self-other) relations are fundamentally active and 
productive, rather than merely being revealed. The important point Bakhtin was 
making was that the outside is not possible without a transgredient relation and 
that the relation between the self’s inner and external bodies is not possible 
without the consummation between the self and the other. 
Bakhtin draws upon his notion of outsideness which takes into consideration the 
necessary separation between subjects and the importance of individuals not 
losing their unique position in being. Although, it is necessary for the self to 
imagine, through a transgredient relation, the projection of him or herself into the 
other, to experience the other’s life from his or her perspective and in doing so 
“consummate him aesthetically” (p.25), “I do not lose myself completely, nor my 
unique place outside it, even for a moment” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 15).  
From a Bakhtinian (1990; 1993) perspective human self-understanding and self-
awareness derives from two aspects. First, thoughts and feelings that originate 
from the unique viewpoints of the acting and thinking self (I-for-myself) which is 
essentially un-representable (I cannot represent my inner thoughts and feelings 
like others can provide representations of my external body). In Bakhtin’s (1990) 
words “I calculate and evaluate all my movements internally … I see an object 
from the standpoint of a future inner experience” (p, 44). The second aspect to 
human self-understanding and self-awareness derives from representations and 
judgements that others convey about the self and then express in dialogue. Each 
viewpoint is necessary in order to overcome the limitations of the other’s excess 
of seeing ─ what they can see from their viewpoint that I cannot.  
Meaning is created in this way by an author (self) choosing to step across in order 
to enter or empathize actively into a hero (other), experience her or his life, but 
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then return to herself or himself and her or his own place in the world. From this 
position of outsidedness, the author bestows a form on the other, using their own 
excess of seeing (what they can see that the other does not), to consummate the 
other and give them meaning; the aim “of such interaction must be the creation of 
meaning, not solipsistic narcissism or domination. In other words, the author (self) 
must become incarnated (but not identical), redemptive” (Felch and Contino, 
2001, p.17) and potentially altered.  
According to Holquist (as cited in Pollard, 2011, p.11) outsidedness makes 
answerability possible because the uniqueness of a person’s position (physical and 
attitude toward a position) also grants an “ontologically imposed” answerability 
for the judgement or evaluation of what a person perceives. Outsidedness is the 
genesis of a moral moment.  For Bakhtin (1993) emphasis is placed on how 
individuals intonate their “acts of living and knowing” with evaluative responses 
“through the particularities of interpretation, feeling, and moral valuing” (Hicks, 
2000, p. 230). Bakhtin addressed his theory to the issue of how self should act 
with moral responsibility toward the other and how the choices a person makes in 
achieving these acts, are to be seen as acts in the event-of-Being. Therefore, moral 
answerability can be conceptualised as a dialogic construct which speaks to the 
process of the self being in the world from multiple standpoints across time and 
space (I-for-me, I-for-you, you-for-me, I-for-thou, I-for-us). 
2.3 Moral answerability in the early years 
Amongst other things teaching requires a continually developing sense of 
judgement regarding not only how to engage learners in subject matter, but also 
how to interpret learners’ understandings (Hansen, 2015). Moral answerability 
might be evident in a teacher’s practice in the way she or he produces language, 
‘opens up’ or ‘shuts down’ opportunities for relationships to be sought, writes a 
learning story assessment, comforts, advocates or negotiates dialogue with 
‘others’. Moral answerability may also be evident in a teacher’s practice when she 
reviews a policy or is challenged by an aspect of the curriculum. For instance, one 
teacher in an interview carried out as part of a study by Rockel and Craw (2011) 
reflected upon the moral responsibility of ensuring the well-being of infants as 
learners: 
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I question myself am I ‘doing the right thing’ by these children? … 
what’s actually happening for each individual child … how they 
are changing, how happy they are to be there?” (Teacher interview) 
Few studies have specifically used the notion of moral answerability in early years 
teacher practice, but there are exceptions in the very recent work of de Vocht 
(2015a), Rosen (2014) and White, Peter and Redder (2015). As a participant 
observer  Rosen’s ethnographic work of children aged 2 to 4 years old in an early 
years context employed the concept of answerability to explore the negotiation of 
meanings in relation to children’s ‘screams’. Rosen (2014) highlights the 
importance of answerable acts that consider not only children’s verbal expressions 
but also their “embodied vocal productions” (p. 50) in order to bring meaning and 
value to others. The notion of answerability has also been employed in research 
exploring teacher and infant interactions in order to gain insight into the ‘work of 
the eye’ as a gaze, glance or watch and its responses by teachers in an ECCE 
setting (White, Redder & Peter, 2015).   
DeVocht (2015b) foregrounds the notion of moral answerability to explore the 
interaction between teachers and young children aged between 3.5 to 5 year olds 
in an early years setting. By emphasising teacher-child dialogue as open-ended 
and children as active agents in the dialogue, DeVocht’s (2015b) study offers an 
alternative view to “dominant discourses with universal teaching strategies that 
are aimed at the encultration of children in an existing world” (p. 319). The 
researcher and two teachers engaged in collaborative discussions in relation to a 
selection of video recordings of teacher-child interactions. These discussions were 
analysed as a meaning making process during the collaborative meetings.  
De Vocht’s (2015b) findings showed teachers’ changed their practice  as a 
morally answerable response to the children’s utterances, after viewing the 
recordings and participating in reflective dialogue. For example de Vocht (2015b) 
explains that teachers’ moral answerability was present in the way they reflected 
on how they were limiting children’s water play because it caused added work in 
changing children when they got wet. Teachers in de Vocht’s (2015b) study felt 
that they were morally answerable in the way they changed their practice, 
promoted water activities and gave children free access to this type of play. By 
applying moral answerability to the collaborative dialogic approach employed 
between teachers and researcher, De Vocht (2015a) was able to view teaching 
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beyond a technical approach with universal strategies “to provide guidance for 
teachers in the unique lived experiences with their students” (p. 2).   
Similar to DeVocht (2015a,b) I have applied the notion of moral answerability to 
teacher interactions but instead of observed teachers’ interactions with young 
children my study drew upon my own interactions with infants as a data source 
and explored my teacher colleagues’ critique of my practice in the data source 
events. Further, DeVocht’s (2015b) study looked closely at how teacher-child 
dialogues are “shaped and/or understood in a teacher-researcher dialogic research 
process” (p. 322) by working alongside teachers; whereas my study focused on 
answerable acts and the potential of moral answerability to alter the  experience of 
the other in the dialogic space.  
I assert that Bakhtin’s notion of  moral answerability provides a way to explore 
and better understand infant pedagogy as a series of moral acts that implicate the 
self because of his philosophy being embedded in “strong subjectivity” in the act 
(Sandler, 2015, p.16). Oddly, I could find few research precedents that align with 
this assertion beyond de Vocht (2015a,b) whose work was with older children. 
In the following chapter the literature covers teacher ethical and moral 
accountability in relation to the way teachers’ pedagogical acts are currently 
understood.   
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Chapter three: ‘Doing the right thing’ in Pedagogy  
 
How each of us views the world will depend on through whose eyes we look. As 
accountable members of a society there are various codes of ethics, standards, 
rules and regulations specified by external authoritative bodies whose ideologies 
influence how different bodies of people understand and comply with what it 
means to ‘do the right thing’ ─ to be accountable. When I look through the eyes of 
the professional teaching body, I am aware of how educational settings have long 
been recognised for preparing learners both academically and morally for life so 
that they can become responsible, capable and contributing members of society 
(Johansson, Brownlee, Cobb-Moore, Boulton-Lewis, Walker & Ailwood, 2011).  
Society expects teachers to do a “reasonable job” at promoting children’s learning 
and holds teachers accountable for this learning taking place (Snook, 2003, p. 41).  
Society’s accountability manifests itself in a variety of practices and mandates 
that require teachers to abide by ethical codes in tandem with professional 
standards ─ documents which call for professional integrity and personal agency 
in their application. In response, some of these will be examined alongside the 
literature concerning teacher accountabilities. I will then establish an argument for 
the contested nature of ethical responsibility concerning teacher pedagogy, and the 
associated moral implications that derive from practice when views of ‘doing the 
right thing’ are seen through different eyes. I argue in this chapter that there are no 
codes, rules or regulations that can fully address the complexity of pedagogy, 
especially infant pedagogy. 
3.1 No ‘recipe’ for teaching 
As members of a profession, teachers across Western societies are introduced to a 
social practice with the long-established professional expectation that they will 
use and abide by objective and rational core values, ideals and principles that 
prescribe standards of conduct, curricula, rules, practice and decision-making 
processes (Snook, 2003). To this end, it is generally assumed that adhering to the 
Kantian formulistic justice-oriented approach to ethics, will provide teachers with 
support for decisions and actions through a shared understanding that is 
universally applicable to everyone. Consequently, an ethical focus is often 
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privileged that leans toward social rather than individual good ─ this is what ‘we’ 
all do.  
An approach that follows objective and rational core values, ideals and principles 
implies that learners’ rights will be protected through the promotion of equality 
and fairness ─ firmly grounded in the principle of justice (French-Lee & Dooley, 
2015). According to O’Neill and Bourke (2010) this is achieved through the 
willing commitment by teachers to endorse what the profession “regards as ‘right’ 
or ‘good’ in its relations with the community” (p. 160). However, universal 
principles and core values do not always respond to learners’ right to autonomy 
and justice. Osman’s (2005) study employed a qualitative research approach that 
embraced the child as an autonomous agent in her right.  The voices of six 
primary aged children in a state funded Australian school were captured using a 
focus group method and children’s artworks. The duration of the two focus group 
discussions were one hour and forty five minutes each. Through discussions and 
drawings that depicted the child as significantly smaller than the teacher, Osman’s 
(2005) findings highlighted a power struggle between learners and teachers. All 
the children consistently described teachers’ acts as “unfair”; they felt “devalued” 
and “not respected” (Osman, 2005, p. 185). The children felt controlled by adults 
with little choice but to do what they were told. Osman’s study reveals how an 
ethical code of practice does not guarantee teachers’ acts will not be interpreted as 
undesirable restrictions on the freedom of learners.   
Through shared desirable pedagogical practices, values, and principles it is 
assumed that the teaching profession has an ethical process in place to hold 
teachers accountable on behalf of society for the judgements they make (O’Neill 
& Bourke, 2010). This means day-to-day pedagogical decisions by teachers can 
be queried by external bodies of authority such as team leaders, principles, senior 
teachers and external evaluation organisations both inside and outside of 
educational contexts. In her or his quest to be a ‘good’ teacher (whatever that 
means) who aspires to do the right thing by others, the ethical teacher can be 
conceived as one who follows a set of agreed upon principles, values, or virtues 
that she can draw upon to reason and justify her practice when called to account. 
Under this guise the ethical teacher is considered to act morally if her actions 
reflect these universal ways of being and doing.  
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An example of how teachers are expected to account for their pedagogy through 
mandated evaluation processes is reflected in how core values as part of a 
teacher’s pedagogical practice are mandated nationally in some parts of the world 
(e.g., Australia). Australia provides an established example of the teaching of 
moral values which became a policy priority 16 years ago. A further emphasis on 
values education was provided in 2005 with the development of the Australian 
National Framework for Values Education in Australian Education (Department 
of Education, Science and Training [DEST], 2005). It was assumed that moral 
values education would enable children to reach their full learning potential as 
moral agents who could contribute responsibly to society. Core moral values that 
underpin a democratic way of life where justice is considered as the right of all 
people such as fairness, integrity and respect make up the framework. In order to 
promote the nine core values that constitute this framework specific pedagogical 
strategies are advocated which include explicit and implicit teaching, discussion 
and reflection (DEST, 2005). Moral and values-based education is also weaved 
implicitly through the Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young 
Australians (Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth 
Affairs [MCEETYA], 2008) document, which explicitly advocates for children to 
become citizens who “act with moral and ethical integrity” (p. 9).  
A critique by Johansson et al., (2011) notes that the incorporation of values into 
the Australian curriculum pays little attention to children’s voices being included 
in the teaching of moral values, as a result emphasis is often on the teachers’ 
perspectives of what should be learnt. In their Australian based study which 
employed ecological systems methodology, Johansson et al. (2011) explored the 
pedagogical practices described by ECEC teachers as significant for teaching 
moral values. An online survey method was used to interview 379 teacher 
participants. Findings suggested teachers tended to hold moral values as absolute. 
This was reflected in the way the teachers valued transmissive teaching practices 
such as the modelling of core values for the learning of morals.  Johansson et al’s 
research (2011) illuminates the importance of teachers who ‘can think outside the 
box’ as opposed to enacting practices that ‘shut down’ opportunities for children 
to actively participate in the generation of moral-meaning and perspective. 
Sharing this view Taggart (2011) suggests “a code of ethics, whilst beneficial, 
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may suggest that morality is defined completely by acts of mental reasoning in 
which people judge their behaviour against a list of values (p. 86).    
To be deemed accountable there is a professional expectation that teachers will 
meet objective standards of conduct and justify decisions made and subsequent 
courses of action by following agreed upon universal principles, values and codes 
(O’Neill & Bourke, 2010). In their study, informed by a dialogic approach to 
practice Fecho, Falter and Hong (2016) tackled the issue faced by many teachers 
caught between a rock and a hard place when it comes to responding to the 
particulars of learners and prescribed mandates in the form of a standardised 
curriculum. Highlighting the dialogic space created in the classrooms of four high 
school teachers Fecho et al (2016) illuminate the ethical and moral dilemmas that 
derive from practice when what teachers believe is good pedagogical practice is 
“put into sway” (p. 5). The authors highlight the importance of teachers ‘opening 
up’ dialogue by teaching “outside the box but inside the standards” in order to 
account for pedagogy in ways that comply with mandated requirements but also 
speak to teachers’ moral answerability for ‘doing right’ by the learners they teach 
and themselves (p. xviii).  Consequently, Fecho et al (2016) alongside others 
(Newman & Pollnitz, 2002; Snook, 2003) illuminate there is no recipe for 
teaching; and everyday moments of living cannot be prescribed or pre-empted ─ 
particularly moral moments (Shotter, 1989). Being accountable for children’s 
learning involves more than obediently abiding by abstract rules and principles; or 
delivering a curriculum by the book or making visible, values and philosophies 
that support one particular worldview.  
3.2 The moral dimensions of teaching  
Being accountable for the learning of learners also requires being morally 
accountable for every lived moment that is experienced in relationship with an 
‘other’ and often through another. Such a focus is also called for by Snook (2003) 
because of the personal being central to the act of teaching. Frequently implicit, 
the moral act of teaching is imbued with moral meaning and consequence as 
teachers’ choice of pedagogy expresses teaching values and moral judgements in 
the everyday moments that make up educational spaces (Hansen, 2013). In 
agreement, Berthelsen (2005) calls for teachers to be more attuned to the moral 
significance of their acts in order to better understand the link between teachers’ 
values and how they connect with the morality of the children they teach. Indeed, 
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Rosenberg’s (2015) stance is that all pedagogical acts have a moral centre. The 
moral act of teaching exposes learners to social and cultural values as they learn 
how to relate to others in ways that may alter from what is valued outside of an 
educational context.  In his ethnographic study of children in a kindergarten based 
in the United States of America (USA), McCadden (1998), employed a 
sociological perspective to focus on children’s moral narratives. He found that the 
content of the curriculum alone had little influence on a child’s moral 
understanding. Instead, his insights illuminated how moral connections and 
relationships developed between children and teachers in everyday concrete 
experiences. This research highlights how a teacher’s personality, values and 
beliefs encroach on every facet of her or his teaching. Which means a distinct line 
cannot be drawn between the personal and the professional as is typically the case 
with other professions (Snook, 2003) ─ interconnectedness prevails. In line with 
this thinking Colnerud (2006) agree, explaining close relationships are essential if 
a teacher is to understand a child and help them learn.  
Research in education typically values the ethical over the moral, which Colnerud 
(2006) explains refers to the everyday, “often not reflected upon, conduct” (p. 
367) and is more likely to focus on moral issues between teacher and child as 
opposed to teacher and teacher. The conceptualisation of teaching as a moral act is 
recognised by many researchers with an interest in the moral dimensions of 
teaching, regardless of their theoretical or philosophical perspective (Bullough, 
2011; Hansen, 2001; Noddings, 1984; Sanger and Osguthorpe, 2013). In a 
literature review of articles spanning 20 years that have explored the moral 
dimensions of teaching, Bullough (2011) asserts “to teach is to be embedded in a 
world of uncertainty and of hard choices, where what a teacher does and how she 
or he thinks is morally laden” (p.27). Further Hansen (2001) explains, teaching 
“can be described as moral because, in very general terms, it presupposes notions 
of better and worse or good and bad” (p. 828). Conversely, Buzzelli and Johnston 
(2001) disagree explaining their view of morality does not concern whether 
practice is good or bad. Using Bernstien’s (1996) notion of pedagogic discourse, 
Buzzelli and Johnston (2001) were provided with a moral lens through which to 
explore the dynamics of power, authority and morality as it takes place in 
moments of interaction between teacher and child. This was their focus of 
investigation because few studies had examined the interplay between power, 
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authority and morality in classroom discourse. They were interested in how 
discourse employed by the participants brought about certain ideological ends. 
One of the classroom dialogues selected for analysis highlighted the struggles that 
were faced when a teacher was torn between enacting her own pedagogical beliefs 
in practice and wanting to find ways for children’s voices to be heard. The teacher 
in the study placed value on encouraging that which is ‘good’ and discouraging 
that which is not in the classroom. When one of the children incorporated beer 
drinking as an aspect of his story issues for the teacher arose around how to 
exercise her authority for moral ends, recognising that the child’s way of thinking 
had become intertwined with the instructional (nurturing children’s competencies 
in the form of emerging writing skills and expression of voice) and the regulative 
(maintaining social order) “into a single pedagogic discourse” (Buzzelli & 
Johnston, 2001, p. 880). The teacher responded to the child by not shutting down 
the beer drinking element in his story. Instead, she employed a dialogical 
approach which conveyed her concern but allowed the child to still follow through 
on his line of thinking. The teacher was able to exercise her authority by 
responding with a moral message that was not authoritative.  The work of Fecho 
et al (2016) and White (2016a) inform that in order to follow a dialogical 
pedagogical stance openness to the uncertainty, complexity, out of comfort 
zoneness and moral messiness of dialogue is imperative.  
As professionals, it is assumed teachers should be able to take personal 
responsibility for decisions. However, Lauermann and Karabenick (2013) advise 
there is sparse research evidence in relation to teachers’ views on their own 
responsibilities as teachers and the circumstances under which they are willing to 
accept personal responsibility. In their critical review of existing teacher 
responsibility scales in relation to the learning of primary school aged students 
they determined that a better conceptualisation is required of what personal 
responsibility entails in practice for both initial teacher education and in-service 
teachers. This is important for the development of a teacher’s professional sense 
of identity and to reconcile their own perspectives of responsibility with 
professional demands in terms of meeting learners’ academic and social needs in 
tandem with professional expectations and norms.   
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3.3 On the same page ─ is it moral, ethical or both? 
Being ‘on the same page’ is typically when consensus or a mutual understanding 
has been reached between members of a society. Shotter’s (1989) seminal work 
calls attention to “communually shared ways or means for making-sense” (p. 138) 
that often place sanction on people’s ways of being in order to ensure that they 
account for all of their experiences in terms which are agreed upon within a 
particular social group. What Shotter (1989) means is that people often endeavour 
to reproduce a certain manner of engaging with others, that takes into account 
shared ways in order to act routinely and in an accountable way. It is assumed that 
actions informed by consensus enable accountable action because people can 
account for themselves to themselves and to others for their acts, which can be 
related to their acknowledgement of how they are placed in relation to the others 
around them. International consensus about human rights is visible in The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 1989), which calls for the 
inclusion of children’s voices in teaching practices, including the teaching of 
values (Bertheson et al, 2009).  These shared ways often manifest in educational 
settings in the forms of philosophies, core values, mission statements, curriculum, 
code of ethics, policies.  
However, Shotter (1989) contends being on the same page can render people’s 
voices invisible because they may feel restricted in what they can say or do. He 
explains, from a person’s youngest age they learn how to be the kind of person 
required in the space of the particular social group within which they are 
momentarily positioned, in order to replicate those ‘communally shared ways’ of 
being. In this way, a person learns how to act, taking their relations to others into 
account in the enactment of their actions. We are shaped by those with whom we 
are in dialogue. If a person’s voice is muzzled, then meaningful dialogue is denied 
because a person’s point of view from their perspective as an autonomous being 
in the world has been silenced. When this happens there is no opportunity for a 
person to participate in meaningful dialogue with other people about their points 
of view on them, consequently rendering a person’s personal point of view 
partially complete.  
Shotter (1989) emphasises the interconnectedness of a person’s relations with 
another, explaining that a person does not simply act “out of” their “own plans or 
desires” unconstrained by the social particulars of their acts. Instead, he suggests 
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people act “in to” the opportunities offered by others for them to act, otherwise 
their endeavours to communicate may not succeed or will be sanctioned in some 
way (p. 139). A person’s action in being situated in this way incurs an “ethical or 
moral quality” because she or he cannot relate without consideration to and for 
others with whom he or she is in relationship (Shotter, 1989, p. 139). Importantly, 
Shotter (1989) points out that this is because the relationship a person has with 
another is not owned by one person over the other but rather it is shared. Acting 
within this shared relationship means “I must proceed with the expectation that 
you will intervene in some way if I go ‘wrong’ ─ only with a highly developed 
skill at anticipating and pre-empting such interventions, can I proceed as I please” 
(Shotter, 1989, p. 139). When ‘we’ are all ‘on the same page’ ‘we’ feel that ‘we’ 
must conform to established shared ways in order to meet “the demands placed 
upon us by our need to sustain our status as responsible members of society” 
(Shotter, 1989, p. 137).  
According to Mattsson, Ax, Ponte and Rönnerman (2008) a culture of compliance 
means teachers risk getting caught in a system compelling them to follow abstract 
rules, standards and codes and behave instrumentally. When this happens, moral 
agency is taken from teachers alongside their will and ability ‘to do the right 
thing’. Walker and Lovat (2017) add when differences are denied pressure is put 
on people to conform. When people act counter to the core values within a context 
there is a risk of fragmentation occurring (Walker & Lovat, 2017).  
In an early years study Nuttall (2006) employed a symbolic interactionist 
approach to explore one teacher’s personal account of the struggle she 
experienced when her pedagogical practice conflicted with the other teachers’ 
practices with whom she worked. Nuttall (2006) suggests teachers are immersed 
in multiple opportunities to negotiate their subjectivity with teachers, children and 
families throughout their day at work in an ECEC setting. However, these 
opportunities for negotiation of teacher subjectivities can be problematic as 
Ngaire, the teacher whose story of practice is the feature of Nuttall’s (2006) study, 
encountered. A particular moral concern for staff and management at the centre 
was the guidance of children’s behaviour. The shared consensus was that a well 
organised programme was valued and a way to ensure children would settle in 
with ease. However, Ngaire’s practice was understood by her colleagues to be the 
cause of concern as it did not, in their view, conform to the centre’s image of 
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itself. Yet, no one had raised this issue with Ngaire, as her team leader avoided 
situations of conflict when addressing what she believed to be inappropriate 
practice in favour of role modelling best practice. Ngaire’s account of her 
experience, responding to being challenged by a child whose behaviour she found 
problematic, provides an example of how she denied her subjectivity when giving 
her account in order to be ‘on the same page’ as the practices of the team ─ even 
though what actually happened in reality was that she was living out her 
subjectivity but was trying to pretend otherwise. Nuttall’s study highlights the 
emotional fear that can be felt by a teacher when her practice is not ‘on the same 
page’ as the practices of her colleagues. Interestingly, in an earlier study at the 
same ECEC service Nuttall (2004) noticed that other teachers’ practices with 
children did not reflect the child-centred approach to teaching their shared 
philosophy subscribed to.  
Ngaire’s experience is not uncommon in the busy environment of an ECEC 
context (Nuttal, 2006). White’s (2009) doctoral research study explored 
metaphoricity as symbol-sharing and the capacity of teachers to notice, recognise 
and respond to toddler language cues in a New Zealand ECEC context. This 
dialogic study involved a teacher, one infant and one toddler aged 18 months and 
23 months. The teacher in White’s (2009) study experienced an inner moral 
struggle surrounding having to “fit” in with her centre management’s approach to 
assessment even though it conflicted with her assessment practice (p. 164). With 
an emphasis on the subjective nature of infant care “in socioculturally informed 
infant pedagogies”, Brennan (2016) has argued recently that infant pedagogy 
remains under researched (p. 317). Brennan’s (2016) research highlights teachers’ 
avoidance of talking about the personal and emotional aspects of their work with 
infants. In addition, she draws upon Elfer’s (2012) study to raise concern about 
the psychological detachment of some teachers in order to cope with the 
emotional demands of infant pedagogical practice. External factors were a feature 
of Elfer’s (2012) work when teachers made pedagogical decisions in relation to 
their practices which were in conflict with their centre’s policies.  
In a birth to threes study, which focused on teacher self-awareness in relation to 
the physical and emotional dimensions of practice, Manning-Morton (2006) 
observed marked contrasts between teachers’ practices in relation to meeting 
children’s emotional needs.  In this study Manning-Morton (2006) summoned 
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teachers to account for their pedagogy through greater self-awareness in order to 
better understand how they respond to learners and how their actions alter 
meaning. Significantly, Manning-Morton emphasised the importance of teachers 
being aware of what they do because what they do contributes to others’ practices 
and the learning of children. In all, these studies highlighted the moral and ethical 
certainty and uncertainty of either being on the ‘same page’ where teachers strove 
to reproduce shared understandings of how to engage with others so they were 
acting in ethically accountable ways, or facing moral struggle for not complying 
with their teacher colleagues.   
3.4 Moral, ethical or answerable agent? 
The central role or persona of the individual professional teacher is as a moral 
agent (Campbell, 2008). However, when contemplating the construct of teacher as 
moral agent it is important to bear in mind that much of the contemporary 
literature surrounding moral agency has origins in Aristotle’s concept of virtue 
ethics and the Kantian notion of rational autonomy (Rosenberg, 2015). From this 
perspective the moral agent is someone who acts consciously in search of valuable 
ends or according to codes of conduct (Sockett, 2012). Adding to this view, 
Fenstermacher and Osguthorpe (2000) note, “a moral agent is one whose choices 
can be accounted for by the giving of reasons and these reasons explain and 
justify their choices” (p.9). Further, Hansen (2013) suggests, that moral agents 
embrace life with a “humane, reflective, and responsible approach toward other 
people and the shared features of public life” (p. vii). Clearly visible in these 
definitions of a moral agent is the Kantian voice of a proscriptive ethical system, 
seeking to ‘norm’alise people through externally imposed universal criteria. 
Consequently, a conceptualisation of the professional teacher as an ethical agent 
rather than a moral agent could be considered a more appropriate term. I see this 
as problematic for how teachers approach reflective practice which is filtered 
through everything that teachers do as members of a teaching professional body.  
Reflective practice for teachers encompasses thinking about how you teach, 
pausing to consider teaching practices and the reasons for them, thinking critically 
about alternative perspectives and altering practices based on new understandings 
(O’Connor & Diggins, 2002). Reflection and self-evaluation are considered 
important if teachers are to think critically about the continually altering practices 
that shape their pedagogy (O’Connor & Diggins, 2002). According to Arthur 
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Beecher, Death, Dockett, and Farmer (2015), self-reflection exhorts informed 
pedagogical decision-making by teachers being able to see things in alternative 
ways. However, ideas about the importance of reflection as an integral part of a 
teacher’s pedagogy, which became noticeable in the education literature in the 
1980s (for example see Schön, 1983 who was most prominent) appear to have 
moved away from their “radical roots” as education has become professionalised 
(Bradbury, Frost, Kilminster, & Zukas, 2012, p. 2).  
The current focus of reflection is on how well teaching supports student 
attainment in curriculum areas, and less about moral answerability and learner 
voice. Campbell (2008) is one researcher who has focused on moral responsibility 
through the emphasis on how the teacher is answerable for the decisions that she 
or he makes individually or collectively with others, for the motivations that 
orient choices, and for his or her actions in educational spaces (Campbell, 2008). 
Colnerud’s (2006) study, related to ethics and morals, illuminated the absence of 
detailed studies of what professionalism entails and the absence of research in 
terms of moral responsibility. This lack of knowledge raises concern for a 
potential disconnection between the educating of how to be a reflective teacher 
and what this means in practice.  Teachers are faced with lived realities that call 
for them to “look beyond ethics toward morals” (Walker & Lovat, 2017, p. 439) 
in making pedagogical decisions that will inform concrete acts in the pluralistic 
society in which people exist.  
3.5 Reflection as a moral act 
Reflection is a process that focuses on a person’s inner thought processes and 
personal responsibility for their actions. It is therefore considered to be a moral 
endeavour because it can be viewed as an act of conscience (Greene, as cited in 
Buzzelli & Johnston, 2014). For Greene (as cited in Buzzelli & Johnston, 2014) 
conscience means “reflexive judgement about things that matter” (p.21). Teachers 
enter educational settings with views about particular pedagogical practices that 
may be in conflict with other teachers’ practices (Elfer, 2012) and values 
(O’Connor & Diggins, 2002) with whom they work. Often these views are based 
on teachers’ lived experiences and cultural upbringings which make up their 
personal histories (Gonzalez-Mena & Shareef, 2005).  
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In a comparative study of research that was carried out in the 1990s with data 
collected between 2008 to 2010, Colnerud (2015) explored how teachers perceive 
and cope with ethical dilemas and moral challenges in their everyday practice. 
Data were collected using the critical incident technique which is a method used 
when asking participants for their experiences. Three primary schools participated 
in the study with children in years one to nine. Seventy five teachers responded to 
the critical incident question that was given to them at a staff meeting. A 
qualitative content analysis was carried out. Colnerud’s study found dilemmas 
were encountered where external factors such as rules and service constraints 
came into conflict with a person’s conscience. Challenges were also experienced 
in situations where a choice had to be made between different moral options 
where no universal principle or rule was evident. Further, Colnerud (2015) 
determined that dilemmas were likely to cause moral stress when teachers’ values 
attached to keeping children safe from harm were put at risk. He reccommended 
future reseach examine situations in which teachers do not follow their 
conscience.   
An understanding of the choices and pedagogical decisions that teachers make 
about their moral acts is central to teachers’ understandings of themselves, their 
worlds and how their actions impact on others. As asserted in the previous 
section, Moate and Sullivan (2015) agree that it is widely accepted that ongoing 
reflective practices hold a pivotal place in teacher education and teacher 
professional development. They also acknowledge that reflective practices are 
important in order for teachers to better understand and develop their professional 
and pedagogic selves (Moate & Sullivan, 2015; O’Connor & Diggins, 2002). 
However, they contend that very little is known about “the moment-to-moment, 
inner moral conflicts and emotions attached to reflection” (Moate & Sullivan, 
2015, p. 412).  
Moate and Sullivan (2015) employed action research based on Dewey’s cycle of 
intelligent deliberation-action-reflection to investigate student teachers’ moral 
experiences either identifying with or resisting the moral order associated with 
learning a new pedagogy. This study took place with 12 students in a Finnish 
tertiary teaching context. What they found was a “dynamic interplay” unfolding 
for the participants between endorsing the authority of a moral order, for example 
the values attached to dialogic pedagogy, questioning it and “irreverently” poking 
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fun at it (Moate & Sullivan, 2015, p. 431). According to Moate and Sullivan 
(2015) teacher education programmes offer students a range of pedagogies with 
which to engage. Yet, how student teachers’ appropriate moral values is not well 
understood (p. 411). Moate and Sullivan (2015) emphasise the importance of 
research inquiring into why reflection leads to some people altering their practices 
and others resisting change. Acknowledging that moral assumptions are often 
implicit in teaching pedagogies Moate and Sullivan (2015) emphasise the lack of 
educational research into the impact of moral assumptions on student teachers. 
This seems ironic when the practice of teaching is frequently referred to as a 
moral act. They suggest future research could explore comprehension not only as 
a cognitive undertaking but also as a moral endeavour. 
As active participants in dialogue, teachers are morally answerable for the 
meanings that are generated in dialogue. Teaching is morally complex, ambiguous 
and uncertain. Indeed, at the turn of the 21st century, this was the very reason 
Sumsion (2000) expressed her concerns surrounding the ethical challenges faced 
by teachers in all areas of education that arise from practice. In line with Snook 
(2003) she highlights the centrality of relationships to pedagogy. Sumsion 
illuminates both the importance of grounding her practice in an ethic of care 
(Noddings, 1984) while being respectful of feminist critiques of this stance which 
caution against power imbalances between students and teachers. From a feminist 
perspective caring can equate to disclosure and unintentional abuses of power ─ 
evidence of a dilemma that can arise from morally grounding one’s practice in 
deeply held values. One form of answerability for Sumsion (2000) is reflecting on 
her practice as a way to inform her pedagogical decision making and support her 
with how she responds to the complex factors in educational practice that can 
cause much moral distress and discomfort.  
Through self-evaluation and reflective practice teachers can think critically about 
their decisions and the continually altering practices that shape their pedagogy.  
That said, the literature highlights how teachers are often not aware of the moral 
consequences of their personal actions and practice (Shapira-Lishchinsky, 2011). 
In her call for answerability Shapira-Lishchinsky (2011) highlighted the lack of 
research exploring teachers’ responses to the moral and ethical dilemmas they 
face in their practice. According to Shapira-Lishchinsky’s (2011) findings, ethical 
dilemmas faced by teachers were the result of experiences where they felt a sense 
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of failure to act appropriately and a lack of confidence in their abilities as 
teachers. In addition, further analysis highlighted how the teachers in Shapira-
Lishchinsky’s (2011) study responded differently to similar ethical challenges. 
For example when there was conflict between accountability to the learner’s 
family and to the school’s educational standards agenda, one teacher responded by 
conforming with the family’s expectations and another teacher asked for support 
from colleagues so that she did not compromise her professional values; in 
another example one teacher followed the rules while another teacher acted in a 
manner that was true to his personal values.  
3.6 A strong allegiance to self-evaluation 
In a New Zealand context ECEC teachers share the same teacher registration 
processes and ethical codes of responsibilities and standards as teachers in 
primary and secondary education sectors (Farquhar & Tesar, 2015). In alignment 
with many Western countries, the ECEC sector in New Zealand is bound by 
legislation, Education (Early Childhood Services) Regulations (New Zealand 
Government, 2008), policy directives, an early years curriculum (Ministry of 
Education [MoE], 2017), ECEC accrediting and credentializing bodies such as the 
Ministry of Education (MoE), Education Review Office (ERO) and the Education 
Council. In a global context, ECEC services in New Zealand are shaped by United 
Nations articles protecting the rights of the child (United Nations, 1989) and 
reviews and recommendations by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD, 2006) “to the economic and social development plans of its 
member nations” (Farquhar, 2012, p. 292). In addition, all registered teachers in 
New Zealand are required to abide by the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (The 
Treaty of Waitangi).  
Professionalism constitutes initial teacher education programmes and students are 
assessed by teacher educators accordingly. A consequence of foregrounding 
professionalism is the formalisation of reflective practices by regulatory 
organisations as a way of developing the professionalism of student and in-service 
teachers. This is achieved through professional development programmes, and 
assessment and evaluation practices of student and in-service teachers (Bradbury 
et al., 2012). Further, “the growth of managerialism and the audit culture fuel 
demands … for evidence to demonstrate reflective practice” (p. 3), in New 
Zealand teachers record reflections of their practice for the purposes of teacher 
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registration and to provide evidence of their practice for the Education Review 
Office (ERO) auditing purposes. Bradbury et al., (2012) assert that the 
formalisation of reflective learning may encourage simplistic explanations of 
reflection resulting in watered down prescriptive outcomes. This means instead of 
reflective practice being the foundation for the radical alteration of practice, there 
is potential for teachers’ reflections to be procedural as if he or she were 
compliantly following a recipe, rather than questioning and challenging. 
The Education Council in New Zealand (Education Council, 2017) provides 
teachers with a resource to support and guide their implementation of the code of 
professional responsibilities in practice. Although the Education Council offer a 
cautionary note, in terms of the resource not being used “as a checklist to be 
assessed on or measured against” it does offer examples as a way of clarifying the 
“expected professional behaviour” to be reflected in practice and the 
“unacceptable behaviour” to be in breach of the code (p.2). In doing so potentially 
‘norm’ alising external criteria. The Education Council (2017) acknowledges that 
teachers will face “complex ethical dilemmas and professional tensions every 
day” (p.2). Although this authoritative body recognises that they cannot account 
for how every situation should be “managed”, the predominant expectation is that 
all teachers will reflect in practice “high professional standards and sound ethical 
decision-making” (p. 2). It is assumed that by acting in this way teachers will 
“uphold the reputation of the teaching profession” and maintain “the trust and 
confidence” of “learners, their families and whānau and the public” ─ 
interestingly teacher colleagues are omitted from this list. I am not advocating for 
teachers to not abide by the ethical expectations as set out by the Education 
Council ─ to do so would be immoral. What I have intended to illuminate is how 
the ethical is often interpreted as professionalism in an external normalised way.  
In New Zealand ECEC discourse, there is already a strong allegiance to some 
form of self-evaluation. The significance of self-evaluation is emphasised by 
O’Connor and Diggins (2002) who explain it is through reflective practice and 
self-evaluation that teachers can gain new insights and challenge deeply held 
assumptions, beliefs and values that influence their views on education and 
pedagogical practices. Designed to support New Zealand ECEC services “to 
develop quality improvement systems and undertake quality reviews” (Ministry of 
Education, 1999, p.1) the Quality Journey written and developed by Anne Meade 
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and Anne Hendricks was the document that laid the foundation for self-review 
practices in New Zealand. Self-review is “a review that is undertaken within an 
early childhood education service in order to evaluate practice” (Ministry of 
Education, 2006, p.8). Further, self-review is a deliberate and ongoing process 
which is employed in order to determine how teacher practice fosters children’s 
learning and development (Ministry of Education, 2006). Self-review processes 
are supported by many in education as a sincere initiative by the government to 
assist quality practices in New Zealand (Grey, 2002; Wansbrough, 2004; White, 
2004). However not everyone supports this view (see May, 1999). Self-review is 
also regulated accordingly via the Education Review Office (ERO). However, the 
regulatory eye of ERO may tie teachers to an obligation to “perform in response 
to an external professionalisation and standards agenda” that does not sit well 
alongside teachers’ educational ideologies and ideas of infant pedagogy (Powell 
& Goouch, 2017).       
In a New Zealand context, the embedded nature of self-study is closely aligned to 
teacher practices due to existing evaluative frameworks such as self-review, and 
accreditation systems such as evidenced in teacher reflections of their practice for 
practising teacher registration requirements. Because these pedagogical practices 
are not typically valued as forms of research, they often go unnoticed and may not 
be conceptualised as representing research. There are exceptions to this view 
noted in programmes such as Centres of Innovation. The primary aim of self-
review is improvement of practice. Improvement of practice is also a central 
aspect of self-study.  
I close this chapter by pulling together the threads of past researchers which 
indicate that self-review aligns with self-study. I assert self-study is a legitimate 
method for ECEC pedagogy. As such, the next chapter outlines an argument for 
the dialogic self-study approach employed in my research to reflect upon and 
evaluate my own teacher practice.  
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Chapter four: A Dialogic Self-Study of Morally Answerable 
Teacher Acts   
What is it that guarantees the internal connection among the 
elements of personality? Only the unity of responsibility. For what 
I have experienced and understood, I answer with my life. (Bakhtin 
in Morson, 1986, p. x) 
Through a moral answerability frame it was possible to explore what it means to 
‘do the right thing’ in infant pedagogy alongside issues surrounding inner and 
outer emotional struggles that I faced in making moral choices that shaped 
pedagogical acts. Connecting dialogic methodology to a self-study method 
enabled a way for me to interrogate the ways I am morally answerable to myself 
and others in an ECEC context that is shared.  
From a Bakhtinian standpoint (1990; 1993) each human subject is a unique 
individual who is constituted and shaped by the particular meanings they come to 
know by being in dialogue with others. Bakhtin emphasises the need for 
humankind to take responsibility for their unique place in existence through 
sensitivity and acts of kindness that they exhibit in deeds for others and the world. 
Meaning is realised through the deed ─ the word made flesh, in Bakhtin’s words: 
“Every thought of mine, along with its content is an act or deed that I perform ─ 
my own individually answerable act or deed” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 3). As a 
participant in the dialogue I am implicated for pedagogical decisions I make 
actualised in concrete acts.  
A dialogic approach to self-study, paves the way to a greater awareness and 
understanding of the self and the self’s axiological position from the perspective 
of others. The importance of greater self-understanding and self-awareness is 
asserted by Macintyre-Latta and Olafson (2006) to be at the heart of all learning 
and must be known in order to promote such understandings in others. By taking a 
more self-aware approach as opposed to this is what ‘we’ do as teachers it is 
possible to better understand how one’s internally held truths, values, actions, 
previous lived experiences, and subjectivity as a teacher, alters external 
relationships with others and shapes pedagogy.  
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4.1 Bringing dialogic methodology to bear on self-study 
For Bakhtin dialogue is not only a form of communication but the most 
fundamental human relation (Sidorkin, 2002a, p.94). A dialogical relation is a 
moral endeavour because it begins with the recognition of another person’s 
unfinalizability. Looking through a dialogic lens, Frank (2005) explains dialogue 
depends on the never-ending openness to the capacity of human beings to become 
someone other than whoever they are at this particular time and space in history. 
King (2017) further explains that the Bakhtinian concept of ideological becoming 
is central to relational pedagogy because it highlights how people’s different ways 
of acting and thinking are influenced by being in relationship with another. In the 
context of this thesis a dialogic approach upheld the openness required for a study 
of the self as one who is always in the process of becoming.  
Through the lifelong process of ideological becoming each person’s way of seeing 
and understanding the world, the ideas that they form, how they are seen by others 
and by themselves is constantly altering (White, 2016a).Viewed in this way, truth, 
knowledge, meaning, reality and the self are never fixed but instead are always in 
a process of being created in dialogue with others (Bakhtin, 1984). It is through 
the process of negotiating relationships, in lived experiences with others that 
subjectivities are constructed (Albon & Rosen, 2014). Seen in this way a teacher’s 
pedagogical self is also in a process of becoming. By connecting a dialogic 
approach with self-study, which emphasises improvement of practice, provided a 
means to view the self and the self’s practice as not transformed (which is another 
self-study premise) but rather in a process of being potentially altered. 
Notwithstanding the growing body of research taking up dialogic methodology 
and its orienting frame (eg., Shotter & Billig, 1998; Cohen, 2009; Dysthe, 2011; 
Edmiston, 2008; Fecho et al., 2016; Junefelt, 2011; King, 2017; Rosen, 2015; 
Sisson & Kroeger, 2016; Tallant, 2015; Wegerif, 2013) it is only more recently 
that ECEC research has ventured into this field. In a recent special issue bringing 
dialogism to bear in the early years several researchers have drawn upon the 
notion of moral answerability specifically (deVocht, 2015b; Gradovski & Lokken, 
2015; White & Redder, 2015) and it is reflected in the recent work of Redder & 
White (2017).  
LaBoskey (2004) draws upon Bullough and Pinnegar (2001) to explain that the 
aim of self-study research is to “provoke, challenge, and illuminate rather than 
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confirm and settle” (p. 20). Samaras (2011) points out that the focus of self-study 
is teacher practice. However, she emphasises that it is important to remember the 
significance of self-study research is also what it can do for learners and 
education. Self-study research is traditionally undertaken by teacher educators but 
is used by teachers in educational contexts outside of teacher education (for 
example see Crowe’s, 2010 social studies classroom self-study). Self-study 
appears to be sparse in a formal capacity in early years research. A recent study by 
Green, Wolodko, Stewart, Edwards, Brooks and Littledyke (2013) who made up a 
team of six ECEC teacher education colleagues from Australia employed a 
socioconstructionist methodological approach to collaborative self-study in order 
to explore their pedagogical practices in an online environment. The intention of 
Green et al (2013) was to build a dialogic online learning environment that 
promoted learners creating knowledge together as opposed to a learning context 
that viewed students as isolated learners who were passive receivers of 
knowledge. The primary aim of Green et al’s (2013) study was to achieve 
professional learning through active participation and reflection on their 
pedagogical practices. Self-study enabled these researchers to better understand 
the theories that were informing their practice.  
Bakhtin’s attention to the particular as opposed to the universal is echoed in a self-
study approach, which views events surrounding context, process and relationship 
as the basis of teaching and teacher education (Bullough & Pinnegar, 2001).  
From a self-study perspective the self in a self-study method is less about looking 
at the self per se than it is about looking at the relationship between self and 
pedagogical practice (Bullough & Pinnegar, 2001; Samaras, 2011). From a 
Bakhtinian dialogic point of view the self, although unique, is inseparable from 
the other. Therefore, the interconnectedness of self, practice and other are brought 
into focus when dialogic methodology is aligned with a self-study method. 
Selecting a self-study method aligned with dialogic methodology provided a way 
to connect (my) self, others and pedagogical practices in consideration of infant 
practice. 
Bakhtin (1981) informs that words become flesh ── alive ─ through dialogue 
“because they are harmonizing with some elements in this environment and 
striking a dissonance with others” (p. 277). A dialogic approach to self-study 
celebrated both the alteric and intersubjective experiences I encountered because 
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of the new perspectives and ideas that were generated through dissonance and 
harmony. Inviting alternative perspectives from others in tandem with the 
development of new ideas is crucial to a self-study if interpretations of situations 
are to be achieved that do not solely re-inforce existing perceptions (Loughran & 
Northfield, 1998). A dialogic approach to critical friend inquiry therefore enabled 
a dialogic understanding to be sought where “meaning only arises when different 
perspectives are brought together” (Wegerif, 2006, p. 146). Importantly, this 
approach aligned to self-study research which considers ways to apply new 
knowledge to improving teaching practices (Bullough & Pinnegar, 2001; 
Samaras, 2002). A vitally important intersection between dialogic methodology 
and self-study is the primary emphasis that is placed on voice. For Bakhtin the 
self is made up of multiple voices; self-study is auto-biographical which means it 
is about (my) voice, which is being brought to bear on dialogism.  
Although a dialogic approach is not uncommon within self-study research 
(Brubaker & Loughran, 2014; Dean, Dean & Danilchick, 2014; Martin & 
Dismuke, 2014), I could only find a handful of self-studies that had employed a 
specific application to Bakhtinian dialogic methodology (Olan and Kaplan, 2014; 
Stewart & McClure, 2013). A search of the self-study literature showed that when 
reference is made to a dialogic approach, researchers often did not articulate the 
theoretical or philosophical perspective of the dialogic approach applied. In the 
work of Olan and Kaplan (2014) that drew specifically upon Bakhtin’s work to 
investigate teachers’ perceptions of narratives and dialogic interactions as part of a 
writing workshop in a university setting. I can find no studies in the early years 
that have employed a Bakhtinian dialogic self-study approach to infant pedagogy. 
Although sparse, literature does exist in relation to self-study as a methodology 
which employs a dialogic approach, drawing upon the notion of answerability. 
Such research work is evident in the work of Macintyre-Latta and Olafson (2006) 
who followed three young women in a middle school setting in order to explore 
the development of identity.    
As the exploration of Bakhtin’s moral philosophy in relation to education showed 
in chapter two, I have already asserted that moral answerability is the nexus 
between Bakhtinian dialogic methodology and self-study as a method. 
Answerability is the moral element of dialogue, as such participants in dialogue 
are personally responsible for the meanings, they create with others ─ past, 
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present and future. Self-study research is situated within one’s own practice.  
Unlike studies where the researcher is positioned as a participant observer (for 
example see Albon & Rosen, 2014) in an attempt to be situated “outside of the 
institutionalised responsibilities and authority embedded in an educator role” (p. 
38), this dialogic self-study doctoral research positions me, as the teacher, inside 
the boundaries of responsibilities and authority that encompass my existing role as 
a teacher in the social context of an infant centre. Moral answerability requires me 
as the teacher-researcher to be engaged with and personally responsible to 
bringing a sense of value and meaning to infant participants and teachers in the 
critical friend inquiry staff meetings. This is achieved by adopting insider and 
outsider positions and all participants bringing their excess of seeing to one 
another in the relationship.  
4.2 Moral self 
Lived encounters in dialogue with others matter.  For it is in the “living act of 
dialogue” with others that meaning is discovered (White, 2016a, p. 20). 
Recognising that the moral self makes moral choices in everyday practice beyond 
any stipulated rules, codes or competencies a dialogic self-study approach for 
infant pedagogy as an act of moral answerability provides a way to better 
understand the moral me that sits behind my pedagogy. Dependent on personal 
responsibility and accountability, moral answerability necessitates a moral self to 
actively take “an axiological stand in every moment of one’s life or to position 
oneself with respect to values” (Bakhtin, 1990, pp. 87-88). In doing so, the moral 
self’s responses become subject to the judgement and perceptions of others with 
whom self is in dialogue. Bakhtin’s dialogic approach views a person’s 
subjectivity (identity, Being) as unique to them but at the same time it is 
dependent on a person’s relationships with other people. Even though Bakhtin 
was of the opinion that a person can never know exactly what another person is 
thinking or what another person is actually experiencing, he believed a person 
needs other people to endow meaning on their experience ─ for which they are 
answerable. As a morally answerable self I am personally responsible for the 
meanings I generate in dialogue engaging with the infants in practice, teachers at 
the staff meetings, and self as author, research participant, teacher, and researcher.  
Expanding on the links to authoring introduced in chapter one (see section 1.3), 
Bakhtin (1990) asserted that each individual’s moral life mission is to constantly 
   
52 
 
author self that is in a continually altering moral relationship with others that they 
engage with socially. In dialogic encounters people are exposed to sides of their 
idea of themselves that can only be accessed from an-other’s perspective 
(Sullivan, 2012). These different understandings of our subjectivities are also 
“constantly altering and altered in relations with others” (White, 2016a, p. 22) as 
selves give value, through authorship to others either in a positive or negative way 
(Sullivan, 2012).  People anticipate and respond to participants in dialogue 
depending on how they think they may be authored or are authored by others 
(Sullivan, 2012). This means people also author their own subjectivities in 
anticipation of how others may author them or expect them to ‘be’ (Sullivan, 
2012). Dialogue, therefore, “entails a form of answerability that is morally 
responsive to unique others and particular relationships” ─ ways of morally being 
and becoming are learnt in these relationships (Hicks, 2000, p. 227).  
When seen in this way a Bakhtinian conceptualisation of dialogue is not about 
‘my’ subjectivity versus ‘my’ teacher colleague’s subjectivity versus the infant 
subjectivities it is about what is created together in the dialogue that is of 
significance. Because from a dialogic point of view each moral self is 
interconnected, each voice influences and interanimates the other depending on 
the values, ideas and ideologies that infuse the language used. The social 
knowledge, lived truth and experience created between participants in the 
dialogue is a mutual endeavour but one that each moral self is personally 
responsible and accountable for. When a dialogic process is considered, paying 
close attention, as a teacher, to what it means to “do the right thing” by self and 
others matters, because of the potential for my internally held truths and values to 
alter my own, and others’ internal states and external social conditions.  
4.3 The dialogic self 
Dialogism from a Bakhtinian (1981) standpoint highlights the interconnectedness 
of self and other both in language and being, people exist in relation to other 
people – which means experiencing the world is possible only because people are 
interconnected with others. Bakhtin (1984) explained “a person’s consciousness 
awakens wrapped in another’s consciousness” (p. 138). Although Bakhtin (1981; 
1984; 1986) emphasised the interconnectedness of human beings to one another, 
he also expressed that people do not merge with others. Instead, people remain 
different from other people – not isolated from one another but distinct. 
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The way in which I create myself is by means of a quest: I go out to 
the other in order to come back with a self. I live into another’s 
consciousness; I see the world through the other’s eyes. But I must 
never completely meld with that version of things, for the more 
successfully I do, the more I will fall prey to the limits of the 
other’s horizon. A complete fusion … even if it were possible, 
would preclude the difference required for dialogue” (Clark & 
Holquist, 1984, p. 78). 
 
Human beings need other human beings to furnish their experience with meaning 
(Bakhtin, 1990). From a dialogic viewpoint subjectivity is “social, relating to self 
as well as well as to others … and conscious. It anticipates ideas and judgements 
of others” (Sullivan, 2012, p.43). A Bakhtinian dialogic view recognises the role 
social, relational and discursive practices play in the formation of the self as a 
moral agent. From a Bakhtinian perspective identity is not formed as an isolated 
characteristic of individuals and identity development is not viewed as a primary 
function of internal cognitive processes (Tappen, 2010). Bakhtin’s view of the self 
needs other people to come to know her or his ‘self’. The self can never 
“coincide” with her or his self (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 59) and is therefore 
interdependent on the other. Dialogical insight illuminates how no one person’s 
voice is ever their own. Therefore, when I refer to ‘my’ (i.e., voice, self, values, 
morals or answerability etc.) in this study the ‘my’ is always permeated with the 
voices of others ─ past, present and future.     
As explained in chapter one (see section 1.3) the self cannot be the author of her 
or his own value. “Inner thoughts and feelings and an incomplete perceptual field” 
on their own are insufficient in understanding ourselves (Gardiner, 1996, p. 134). 
It is the experience of relating to others in everyday moments of living ─ both in 
interaction with infants (when data was initially collected) and with fellow 
teachers in the staff meeting dialogues ─ that I am given form alongside access to 
self-understanding and self-awareness through my evaluation of their experience 
of me, without losing sight of my own uniqueness. As such (my) self is deeply 
implicated in and with the other in the answerable act.  
The perspective of the ‘other’ is integral to both a dialogic approach and a self-
study. I do not draw upon the work of Hermans (2001) who developed dialogical 
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self theory, drawing on Bakhtin’s concept of dialogue and James’ (1890) notion 
of the extension of self. Notwithstanding Sullivan’s critique that Herman’s theory 
of competing voices within the dialogical self acquires “an abstract quality, as 
they become disembodied from a self sensing itself acting with thought and 
emotion in relation to others … Bakhtin’s central concern with the experiencing 
self is lost in this account” (Sullivan, 2007, p. 108), it would be remiss of me not 
to acknowledge the usefulness of Herman’s work in understanding the dynamics 
of the self-other relationship. Herman’s (2001) work contributed to the dialogical 
self, made up of multiple ‘I’ positions e.g., I-as-researcher, I-as-teacher, I-as-
participant, that are bestowed with a voice. However, there is sparse attention paid 
to the answerable self. As such, my study takes a point of departure from 
Herman’s work. Through a conceptualisation of a plural self who is morally 
answerable for acts, I assert that the “sense of unity and integrity to the self that 
exists amongst its multiplicity of dialogues” that Sullivan (2007, p.108) explained 
was missing from Herman’s work, is made visible in the answerable self.  
 4.4 Recap on conceptual framework  
By employing moral answerability as my unit of analysis as set out in the section 
(see 4.8.3), I will be exploring my pedagogy as act of moral answerability in the 
following ways outlined by Bakhtin:  
… an intense interaction takes place between I and other: their 
struggle (honest struggle or mutual deception), balance, harmony 
(as an ideal), naïve ignorance of one another, deliberate ignoring of 
one another, challenge, absence of recognition…including the 
confessional word. (Bakhtin, 1984, pp. 294-295) 
The following conceptual framework explains the relationship between a dialogic 
approach to self-study underpinned by moral answerability as the unit of analysis. 
The associated self-study method is discussed in section 4.6: 
Model 1: from Methodology to Method 
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4.5 Self-study as a legitimate method for ECEC pedagogy 
Self-study is considered to be a methodology in its own right, derived primarily 
from post-modern, feminist and post-colonial paradigms (La Boskey, 2004).  
However, it is at times critiqued for its lack of methodological rigour (see section 
1.5). As such, I have employed self-study as a method to study the self in relation 
to my pedagogical practice. I therefore make the distinction between dialogism as 
my methodology and self-study as my method. Intentional acts of reflection are 
rooted in self-study in order to bring about transformation of self, practices, and 
systems (LaBoskey, 2004). According to Loughran and Northfield (1998) self-
study research is “an extension of reflection on practice, with aspirations that go 
beyond professional development” to the “wider communication and 
consideration of ideas, i.e., the generation and communication of new knowledge 
and understandings” (Loughran & Northfield, 1998, p.15). Advising the necessary 
steps for self-study, Samaras (2011) informs they are rigour, reflection and critical 
thinking. Through inquiry teachers are able to see themselves as learners with the 
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potential to improve practice. A primary critique of Schön’s (1983) reflective 
practice approach is that it omits the “social dimension of learning … focusing on 
introspection rather than through conversation and interaction with people” 
(Kotzee, 2012, p. 6). This is not the case for a self-study which considers 
understanding of pedagogy to derive from contextualised knowledge, by reflective 
subjects in a particular teaching space (Bass, anderson-Patton, & Allender, 2004). 
As such self-study provides a valuable alternative to reflection that goes beyond 
studying the self in isolation (Bass et al., 2004).     
According to Senese (2017), when reflection is undertaken in isolation without the 
perspectives of others there is potential for the layers of meaning intrinsic in 
teaching to not be uncovered. Without others new ways of seeing and 
understanding that might have been gained if experiences were shared in dialogue 
could go unseen. With this in mind, Senese (2017) asked her class of adult 
learners to each carry out an action research as reflective practice self-study. 
Senese (2017) asked each member of the class to write their inquiry question on 
the whiteboard. Class members then spent 20-30 minutes critically discussing 
each question and its meanings as a group. Two opportunities were also made 
available throughout the term for each class member to review their research 
questions with peers. What Senese (2017) noted, was that the dialogue that class 
members shared with their peers provoked them to think differently and enriched 
their understanding of their focus of inquiry. Through action research self-study, 
Senese (2017) was able to provide an alternative route to reflect on practice, 
overcoming self-study’s emphasis on the ‘I’ and critical friend inquiry 
involvement is what typically sets it apart from action research or practitioner 
research.  
Self-study as a method aligns beautifully with Bakhtinian dialogic methodology 
because fundamental to both is the authoring of self and the form shaping 
potential of others to alter self and practice. By connecting self-study as a method 
to dialogic methodology I author the self AND the other in dialogue. When 
viewed through a dialogic methodological lens, self-study’s auto-biographical 
focus ─ I as the teacher become the subject of the study ─ is enhanced because of 
the emphasis on meaning that is created in the dialogue between I and other. 
Further, Bakhtin’s (1990, 1993) view that self-awareness and self-understanding 
could not be achieved through introspection on its own because people evaluate 
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themselves from the perspective of others adds value to self-study’s requirement 
for a critical friend inquiry audience. 
For Bakhtin (1986) evaluation is essential in the creation of meaning, for without 
evaluation understanding is not possible. Through his concept of moral 
answerability people are able to evaluate and understand themselves from the 
perspective of others ─ reflection for Bakhtin takes place in the words and deeds 
of the other. With no recipes for teaching, I need to be able to evaluate how I can 
morally respond to others in every day moment-by-moment interactions that are 
impossible to pre-empt and potentially sit outside the guidelines of an ethical code 
of practice. Informed by Bakhtin (1993), Shotter (2010) explains people engage 
with one another in everyday situations that are unique unrepeatable events of-
Being. No one can foresee how an encounter with another is going to play out, 
responses are anticipated, but no amount of crystal ball gazing will guarantee the 
exact manner in which one person will respond to the intention of another ─ life 
by its very nature is unpredictable (Bakhtin, 1981). Therefore, pedagogical 
moments of living cannot be planned in advance ─ a teacher cannot know ahead 
of time everything that someone is going to say or do ─ this is figured out 
moment-by-moment. An example of what I am articulating is evidenced in 
White’s (2016b) study which employed dialogic methodology to explore 
Bakhtin’s notion of excess of seeing to the field of video research. The main 
participants included a 4-month-old male infant, a 10-month-old female infant and 
two female teachers. White (2016b) highlights how there are no predetermined 
‘recipes’ for teaching. In a re-probing interview one of the teachers in this study 
highlighted “We’re figuring it out all the time. We’d never say we know because 
it is always different” (p. 8). Moral answerability for this teacher was visible in 
the value that she placed on the importance of fleeting pedagogical moments as a 
source of intersubjectivity. The previous chapter concluded with the assertion that 
‘doing the right thing’ in New Zealand ECEC discourse includes carrying out self 
evaluation typically in forms such as self-review, reflection, and evaluative 
appraisals. It is my assertion that self-study as an extension of self-review 
processes is a legitimate method for ECEC practice.   
By aligning dialogic methodology to a self-study method my own practice was 
foregrounded within the broader notion of moral answerability. Self-study 
research is not technical in application, although there are guidelines for 
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undertaking self-study research, it is very much about starting from a deep need to 
study the self’s practice and the self’s role in it (Samaras, 2011). The self-study 
method I used was consistent with the five primary characteristics of self-study 
identified by LaBoskey (2004): 
i.) The study was from the beginning self-focused and self-initiated; I 
chose to study my practice engaging with infants in an ECEC context; 
(my) practice was later critiqued at staff meetings. 
 
ii.)  The primary aim of my study was to improve practice; I wanted to 
better understand and be more self-aware of my own practice because 
of the potential for my deeds and acts to alter infants’ and teachers’ 
learning and subjectivities. Infant pedagogy is an area of educational 
research that is growing, and it was my intention that this study would 
contribute to that body of knowledge; in doing so enhancing teaching 
and learning practices for infants. I also hoped my self-study would 
support teacher evaluation and reflection practices in relation to the 
moral dimensions of teaching.    
 
iii.) It was interactive; my teacher colleagues were my ‘critical friends’ 
critiquing my practice in dialogue with myself and others at three 
separate staff meetings.   
 
iv.) (My) self-study included multiple, mainly qualitative methods; I used 
self-study as the overarching method to study self in tandem with 
critical friend inquiry method, reflexive journaling, polyphonic video 
which were employed to collect data across two different phases of 
analysis.  
 
v.) Defining validity as a validation process based in trustworthiness; 
validation was achieved through the critique of my teacher practice by 
colleagues.  
 
Based on an analysis of the research literature undertaken by (Vanassche & 
Kelchtermans (2015) validity is redefined as trustworthiness. These 
characteristics are also shared by dialogic researchers (for example see Sullivan, 
2012; White, Peter, Redder, 2015).  
The primary purpose of this thesis was to explore my own pedagogy as an act of 
moral answerability in order to better understand i.) my pedagogical acts and their 
complexity; in tandem with ii.) the pedagogical decisions I made in relation to 
practice, particularly when engaged in dialogue with other teachers because of the 
influence these decisions actualised as concrete acts can have on the lives of 
infants. The reason for conducting doctoral research that is self-initiated, self-
focussed, improvement oriented, employs multiple methods, and involves 
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interaction with others (LaBoskey, 2004) was because it will extend the 
professional knowledge, pedagogical understandings and practices of infant 
teachers. It was anticipated that new meaning will be generated as diverse 
perspectives meet “in the tension of a dialogue” (Wegerif, 2013, p. 151). 
Operationalised in tandem with dialogic methodology, self-study provides a 
means of interrogating moral answerability and its dialogic roots through lived 
pedagogical encounter ─ from this perspective it could be conceptualised as a 
moral imperative.  
4.6 Research design 
In this section I describe the research design implemented in order for me to study 
self, using a dialogic self-study method. By placing emphasis on the self as 
dialogic and therefore always located “on the threshold” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 147) 
and never whole without the defining presence of the other (Sullivan, 2012), the 
process of analysing my practice engaging with infants, in staff meeting dialogues 
with teachers, took into account the interconnectedness of voices in dialogic 
relationships with ‘others’. When people meet in dialogue regardless of whether 
or not they share the same perspective, they take on elements of the other. A 
Bakhtinian dialogic approach to self-study provided an effective framework for 
the exploration of my pedagogy as an act of moral answerability because it 
‘opened up’ a space for answerable acts to come to the fore, providing a way to 
address my research questions.  
Explained in the following sections is how the research design had multiple layers 
in terms of data collection and analysis. The multi layered design was necessary in 
order to capture answerable acts in practice that I could take to a staff meeting to 
be analysed by teachers, in order to provide the dialogue that I could later analyse 
in tandem with my inner dialogue in the form of a reflexive journal. The research 
design responded to my quest to better understand my accountability in tandem 
with my personal and moral responsibilities as a teacher for pedagogical acts and 
the decision-making that sits behind them. The following sections present ‘how 
and what’ I did to encompass both my pedagogy with infants who shape my 
practice and the form shaping dialogues I had in the staff meetings with teacher 
colleagues.  
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4.6.1 The context of a New Zealand dialogic self-study study 
The ECEC service that provided the context of the research and the data collection 
was a New Zealand community based centre where I was employed on a part time 
basis in my role as an infant teacher. This ECEC service was comprised of three 
separate areas: a unit for infants aged birth to 18 months; a unit for toddlers aged 
18 months to three; and a unit for children aged over three. The ECEC centre is 
governed by a Board of trustees and their representative who I was directly 
responsible to is the centre coordinator. My research was carried out in the infant 
setting. The infant setting is licenced to accommodate a maximum group size of 
16 infants per day. On the days that I video recorded my practice the group size 
fluctuated, there were times when the group size was made up of eight infants and 
other times when the size of the group comprised 14 infants.  
The infant setting comprised of inside and outside environments which were 
accessible to infants, who were not constrained developmentally, at any time 
throughout the day ─ weather permitting. As my research was exploring my own 
pedagogy as an act moral answerability it was vital that this study be undertaken 
in an ECEC setting where I was an existing and accepted teacher in the social 
context because I had established trusting and meaningful relationships with 
infant participants, their families and teacher colleagues. This meant being able to 
participate in interactions with infants, their family members, and teacher 
colleagues, that were not different to what would typically have taken place in 
their everyday experiences with me.  
4.6.2 Introducing the participants 
The infants attending the centre and the teachers were the primary participants in 
this PhD study. Not all infants attended on a full-time basis. Therefore, there were 
a total of up to approximately 31 infants attending the centre at different times and 
on different days. In total 31 parents or caregivers were approached in relation to 
their infant’s participation. One parent did not give consent for her child to 
participate in the research. The ages of the infants ranged between 3 months and 
18 months. Six teachers, not including myself, made up the teaching team in the 
infant unit ― 5 teachers were qualified and 1 was not; teacher ratios were 1:4. 
Although I was focusing on and video recording my own practice; my teacher 
colleagues were captured in some of the footage. Staff meetings at this centre took 
place on a two weekly basis. Staff meetings commenced at 5:30 pm with a shared 
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dinner. Teachers from the three teaching teams remained together for a general 
staff meeting for one hour duration. At 7 pm each teaching team went to their 
respective units and had a further team staff meeting for another hour. Evaluation 
practices carried out in the context of this setting at the time my study took place 
included each teacher participating in:  
i. their own self-review which involved researching a topic of inquiry related 
to their practice with the aim of improving practice. Teachers had 
opportunities to share developments in their self-review research at staff 
meetings with members from their team. 
 
ii. a wider internal centre self-review which focused on a topic of inquiry 
related to the centre as a whole. Time was set aside at each general staff 
meeting to discuss a particular aspect of the focus for self-review. 
 
iii. evaluative appraisals undertaken 3-4 times annually requesting teachers to 
evaluate their practice in relation to an extensive list of questions often 
linked to the New Zealand ECEC curriculum Te Whāriki (Ministry of 
Education, 2017), the Code of Professional Responsibilities and Standards 
(Education Council, 2017), or documents published by the Education 
Review Office (ERO).  
 
iv. Reflecting on practice in order to provide evidence to account for their 
pedagogy as part of the Practicing Teacher Criteria for quality teaching in 
New Zealand which has to be met by all teachers in New Zealand 
(Education Council, 2017).  
 
v. external centre performance review and appraisal evaluation carried out by 
ERO with the aim of complementing and strengthening an ECEC service’s 
internal evaluation processes. 
 
The context of a staff meeting as a dialogic space to critique my pedagogical 
practice was chosen because staff meetings are generally a time when discussions 
about practice take place.  
4.6.3 Equipment  
I used a polyhonic video approach to data collection in order to capture my 
movements from multiple visual perspectives (see 4.6.5.1) because of the 
emphasis placed on the particularities of context from both a dialogic and self-
study perspective. This meant using multiple video recording devices to capture 
the different views of the self ─ what could be seen and unseen. The three devices 
I chose were video recorder glasses which I sourced from the United States of 
America, a Swivl tracking camera which I loaned from the Wilf Malcolm Institute 
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of Educational Research (WMIER) Video Lab and a polaroid cube video 
recording device which I purchased from a local retailer.  
Image 1. Video recording devices 
 
 
The recorder glasses provided access to my excess of seeing, the tracking camera 
recorded my movements around and between spaces and the cube provided a wide 
angled view of the context as a whole from one visual perspective. The tracking 
camera was positioned opposite the wide angled cube recorder in order to capture 
the view from an alternative visual perspective (see appendix 1 for layout of video 
recording devices and views from each camera).  
Prior to data collection taking place I visited the centre on three separate occasions 
in order to familiarise the infants and teachers with the recording devices and to 
scope out where to place the devices. Figuring out where to place the devices was 
challenging because of the considerable size of the outdoor environment, 
heightened because I was video recording (my)self. I was aware that I would be 
moving around and between inside and outside environmental spaces because data 
collection occurred ‘inside’ my typical work day rather than ‘outside’ of it. It was 
therefore important to take this time to trial the recording devices to ensure 
devices: i.) captured my movements, ii.)  could be positioned in a way that was 
not intrusive, and iii.) were positioned in a way that did not cause harm to infants. 
I initially positioned the tracking camera on the ground as I felt this would be the 
best place to capture (my) self and the infants because of their height. However, 
the tracking camera positioned on the ground was too much of a distraction for 
these babies So, after one particular ‘scary’ moment which involved an older 
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infant, swinging the tracking camera from the cord that attached it to the ipod (for 
just a few seconds), I decided to place the tracking camera on top of a bird cage 
which was a feature of this centre’s outside environment. This meant purchasing a 
tripod which angled the tracking camera in a way that captured both (my)self and 
the infants. Since my data collection took place early 2016, video recorder glasses 
have been used as a tool to collect data in a Master’s thesis study by Morgan 
(2017) which employed dialogic methodology to capture the complexity of adult 
second language learners’ discussion in a classroom environment. Recent research 
has used Swivl tracking video recording to capture two-year-old dialogues in an 
early years setting in tandem with recorder glasses (White, Redder, Bennett, De 
Manser, Geddes & Hjorth, 2018). 
4.6.4 Procedure 
Data collection comprised of three phases:  
i. Phase 1 polyphonic video recording of my practice in the infant setting. 
 
ii. Phase 2 video recording of staff meeting dialogue 
 
iii. Phase 3 reflexive journaling 
 
The first layer comprised of collecting data of my practice engaging with infants 
in the setting in order to identify answerable acts, this process is presented in the 
following section as phase one. The second layer of data collection occurred at 
staff meetings when I collected data in the form of dialogue between (my) self and 
critical teacher friends analysing the answerable acts I presented at the staff 
meetings, this process is reported in the subsequent section as phase two. The 
final layer and third phase involved collecting data in dialogue with self in the 
form of reflexive journaling. The three approaches I drew upon to collect data 
were: Polyphonic video, critical friend inquiry and reflexive journaling. These 
approaches are explained in the following section prefaced by model 2.  
 
Model 2: Data Collection Approaches  
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4.6.5 Phase1 data collection ─ original data source event 
The approach used to collect data of my interactions engaging with infants was 
polyphonic video.  
4.6.5.1 Polyphonic video 
I summoned a polyphonic video method to self-study method as a way to engage 
in dialogic methodology. A polyphonic process for capturing footage, based on 
Bakhtin’s notion of excess of seeing (White, 2016b) was employed for this 
dialogic self-study. The employment of video technology in research has made it 
possible for researchers to make valuable contributions to infant research (see for 
example Selby & Bradley, 2003; Johansson, 2011; White, Peter, & Redder, 2015; 
White, 2009). Video technology made it possible to visually capture the 
experiences of the participants in the dialogue as they interacted with me and one 
another. 
I video recorded my practice as I interacted with infants for 1 hour per week in 
total, for a period of 8 weeks. Video recording of my pedagogical practice 
engaging with infants occurred between February 2016 and May 2016. 
Polyphonic video recording was employed in the present study by time 
synchronising the footage from my visual field with the visual fields of the other 
two recording devices after each filming session occurred. Time synchronisation 
of footage was achieved using an editing software programme called Final Cut 
Pro (Final Cut Pro, n.d.). The 8 hours of polyphonic footage of the three different 
visual perspectives of the one moment in time was uploaded to Studiocode 
(Vosaic, n.d) for identification and selection of answerable acts. 
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The three combined visual fields collectively captured answerable acts as they 
occurred in dialogue. The advantage of employing a polyphonic video approach 
for phase 1 of data collection rather than a single view enabled the dialogic event 
to be captured from multiple visual views enabling “multiple interpretations of the 
act” (White, 2009, p. 79). Having access to multiple visual views meant that 
teachers at the staff meeting dialogue were able to evaluate my practice from 
multiple visual views as evidenced in the following excerpt: 
 Do you look at George on the slide properly? When I was trying to 
watch I don’t see your glasses peer to him but do you recognise 
he’s there? Do you remember? You don’t look at him but you 
might have been peripherally. [Celine, staff meeting 2] 
In total, 72 Answerable acts were identified, of these, 15 were selected prior to 
critical friend inquiry staff meetings, for viewing and analysis with teachers at the 
staff meetings. The 15 selected answerable acts are referred to as original data 
source events. The following is a screenshot of an original data source event (see 
image 2). It was significant because I was answerable in the way I shared (my) 
self with teacher and infants in this event. This screenshot image relates to 
vignette 2, section 5.5.  
Image 2 original data source event  
 
Answerable acts (original data source events) totalling up to 12 minutes in 
duration were viewed by the teachers ─ my critical friends ─ at three, monthly 
staff meetings as explained in the following section. 
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4.6.6 Phase 2 data collection of external staff meeting dialogue 
The staff meeting provided a legitimate place to explore self in the context of 
teaching. The staff meeting dialogues provided a dialogic space for me to act upon 
my moral answerability and highlighted the potential for me to see self differently 
through the teachers’ evaluations of my practice. The approach to self-study used 
to collect data of my dialogue with teachers at the staff meeting was critical friend 
inquiry. 
4.6.6.1 Critical friend inquiry staff meetings 
From Bakhtin’s perspective the other is a vital part of understanding and existing 
as a self. I draw on the critical friend inquiry approach from self-study (Samaras, 
2011), as a means of engaging in dialogic inquiry. Critical friends are viewed as 
vital in self-study research because they provide divergent views as a way to 
access alternative perspectives (Samaras, 2011). A person can be seen and 
approached differently through the other. I video recorded the dialogue between 
(my) self and the infant teachers at staff meetings on a monthly basis for 3 
months, undertaken between February 2016 and May 2016. It was important to 
video record these meetings because of the emphasis Bakhtin places on both the 
aural and visual forms of communication. In total 15 original data source events 
were viewed by the teachers at these three staff meetings. At each monthly staff 
meeting no more than 12 minutes in duration of footage was viewed by teachers.  
Image 3. Critical friend staff meeting 
  
   
67 
 
 
The teachers watched the polyphonic video of each answerable act from my 
laptop in order to provide access to my interactions with infants from multiple 
visual perspectives of the one moment in time.  Teachers viewed, reflected upon, 
evaluated and critiqued my practice in dialogue with me. These teachers were my 
critical friends and their perspectives were integral to this research. Critical friend 
inquiry was also the approach used for phase 1 of my analysis which occurred 
simultaneously with data collection of staff meeting dialogue as teachers were 
analysing my pedagogy in the form of an act of moral answerability. The video of 
each of the three critical friend inquiry staff meetings were transcribed. Transcript 
conventions used are presented in Appendix 2. The video recording of these 
meetings was not polyphonic, only one video recorder was used to capture a 
single view. 
4.6.7 Phase 3 data collection of inner dialogue  
The third phase of data collection involved keeping a reflexive journal of my 
inner dialogue with (my) self.  
4.6.7.1 Reflexive journal 
I employed a reflexive approach to enhance my understanding of my teacher 
practice and to recognise (my) self by looking back on my thoughts, feelings, 
language and actions. Daily entries were made into my journal, of events and 
experiences in the field, at both data collection sites.  It is my assertion that a 
dialogic approach to self-study highlights the importance of dialogue beyond the 
dyad regardless of whether or not participants are physically present, for example 
a participant may be present in a written text or absent from the staff meeting but 
“sitting on my shoulder” (p. 100) a term I use frequently but one also expressed 
by Stewart and Mcclure (2013, p. 100). As such, reflections written as part of my 
everyday pedagogical practice during this period are identified as forms of 
dialogue. Indeed, this self-study is a dialogue with self. My reflexive journal 
aimed to extend the dialogic space of the ECEC context from an educationally 
shared space to a more private dialogue.  
4.7 Ethics 
Ethical approval was sought from the University of Waikato and approved on the 
10th September 2015. The acceptance number is EDU079/15 (see Appendix 3). 
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Prior to commencing my research, I approached the centre co-ordinator informally 
and she gave her verbal assent to my research taking place in the infant setting. 
Once approval had been gained from the University of Waikato confirmation 
panel, I formally approached the centre co-ordinator as the management 
representative to gain her consent for my research to be undertaken at the centre 
(see Appendix 4 & 5). The centre co-ordinator approached the Board of Trustees 
to inform them of my PhD research self-study and to seek their approval for the 
commencement of my research. Once consent had been received an information 
letter explaining my doctoral research and accompanying consent form was issued 
to teachers inviting them to give consent (see Appendix 6, 7 & 8):  
i. for me to use any video recorded footage that they may feature in when I 
am video recording my interactions with infants; and  
 
ii. to be video recorded as they participate in the viewing, reflecting and 
discussing of events I have selected that are of pedagogical significance to 
me, related to my practice at 4 separate monthly staff meetings. 
 
 
There was no turnover of staff during the period of data generation. The 
participation of teachers depended on consent being received from each teacher. 
Each teacher in the infant teaching team of six gave their consent to participating 
in this PhD research study. An information letter explaining my doctoral research 
and accompanying consent form was also sent to parents or caregivers of infants 
enrolled at the centre (see Appendix 9 & 10). All infants attending the centre were 
selected to participate. However, their participation was dependent on consent 
being received from parents or caregivers of the infants. Selection was based on 
whether or not parents or caregivers gave consent to their infant participating in 
this research. One parent did not give consent for her child to participate in the 
research. Consequently, filming occurred when the infant for whom consent was 
not given was not present (i.e., at home) or present but asleep. There were no 
situations where the non-consenting infant was inadvertently evident in the 
footage; if there had been this footage would have been eliminated from the data 
set. Although they were not recruited as participants, consent was also obtained 
from family members of infants who featured in the video recording footage when 
they were present in the infant setting during the process of video recording my 
interactions with infants.  
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In working with infants in an ECEC context I was aware of the ethical issues 
related to the position of power. However, as I was an employed infant teacher at 
the ECEC setting where the collection of data took place, I ensured no infants 
were treated differently regardless of whether or not their parents gave consent to 
them participating in this research. I was not in a primary caregiver role (key 
teacher), because I was employed on a part time basis at the infant setting. 
Therefore, if parents did not consent to their infant participating in this study, the 
child concerned was not harmed or disadvantaged in anyway by me not being 
their key teacher because I did not fulfil this role under usual circumstances. As I 
was wearing a video recording device it was imperative that infant assent be 
monitored and evident throughout the video data collection process. It was my 
responsibility as the researcher to ensure ongoing monitoring of the infant/s for 
evidence of agreement throughout the research process occurred. Therefore, 
dissent on the part of infants themselves was monitored by me, the centre 
coordinator and parents or caregivers of infants. This was clearly expressed in the 
respective consent agreements. If infants expressed discomfort or distress this was 
acknowledged as an expression of dissent, and video recording ceased 
immediately for that day. If infant teachers felt compromised in any way I 
requested they inform me or the centre coordinator and they were informed 
filming would cease on that day or at the staff meeting. I introduced the cameras I 
was using into the setting on three separate occasions prior to data collection. This 
enabled the infants to become familiar with the placement of the video recording 
devices in the environment and the video recorder glasses which I wore, before 
commencement of recording.  
Due to the visual nature of the data it was not possible to assure confidentiality. 
This was clearly expressed in participant information letters and consent forms. A 
pseudonym was used for the early childhood centre’s name. Infant teachers and 
parents or caregivers of infants were only named with the expressed permission of 
each participant. Where permission was not given, a pseudonym was assigned by 
me. Of the 30 infant participants, 10 were assigned pseudonyms at their parent’s 
or caregiver’s request. Three of the teachers also requested pseudonyms. 
Participants were informed in participant information letters and consent forms 
that data would be kept private through storage on a password protected laptop. 
Both the video footage of my interactions with infants and the video footage of 
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teacher reflections and discussion at staff meetings were kept secure on a 
password protected laptop. Participants were informed that while every effort 
would be made to ensure confidentiality in reporting findings through 
downloadable publications, conferences and in other oral and visual presentations, 
this could not be guaranteed. The consent process also sought permission from 
participants to disseminate the research findings, including stills of footage, video 
footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and 
quotations/narratives in my PhD thesis at conferences, in other oral and visual 
presentations, and in downloadable publications including journals such as Video 
Journal of Education and Pedagogy and other video-based educational forum. The 
consent process also sought permission from participants to use the research 
findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive 
discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives for teaching purposes. It was 
important to obtain consent from participants for dissemination of research and 
teaching purposes in light of a self-study approach and its emphasis on making 
results public in order to contribute to a public-knowledge base of teacher 
education (Vanassche & Kelchtermans, 2015) 
4.8 Approach to data analysis 
This section presents moral answerability as the unit of analysis, followed by a 
description of the two-pronged approach to data analysis. Data analysis took place 
in two phases as detailed in the sections that follow. 
i. Phase 1 Analysis of my practice engaging with infants by teachers at the 
staff meeting 
 
ii. Phase 2 Analysis of the staff meeting dialogue (external dialogue) in 
tandem with my reflexive journal (inner dialogue) 
4.8.1 Answerability as the unit of analysis 
For the purposes of this thesis Bakhtin’s notion of moral answerability was the 
unit of analysis. By applying moral answerability as the unit of analysis it was 
possible to analyse pedagogy as an act of moral answerability. Moral 
answerability was employed for the purpose of: i.) initially identifying answerable 
acts from the video footage which I took to staff meetings; and ii.) analysing the 
critical friend staff meeting dialogues in relation to the three selected answerable 
acts presented at the critical friend inquiry meetings.  
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The distinctiveness of using Bakhtin’s concept of moral answerability as opposed 
to other notions encompassing responsibility (for example see Levinas’ (1969) 
notion of the call to responsibility with its emphasis on the ‘other’) lies in the fact 
that moral responsibility for self is not privileged over moral responsibility for 
other and vice a versa; the self is equally as responsible for her or his-self as he or 
she is for others’ selves. 
4.8.2 Phase1 Data analysis of my practice engaging with infants 
My initial approach to data analysis was framed around the 15 original data 
source events which I considered to be answerable acts sourced from the video 
recordings of my practice interacting with infants in the infant setting (4.6.5). 
Data analysis of my practice took place at three staff meetings by teachers as my 
critical friends in dialogue with me. This is the point where analysis and data 
collection intersected because the staff meeting was not only a source of data 
collection but also a site of analysis. Each original data source event was analysed 
by the teachers at the staff meetings in the form of a critique of my practice. An 
event is an encounter between human beings that Bakhtin considers ‘co-being’ 
which is closely linked with the shared experience of two or more subjects 
(Brandist, 2002b). The following provocations were considered by teachers: 
• What do you see? 
• How did this event speak to you? 
• What, if any, do you see as pedagogical tensions in this event and/or our 
discussions? 
• In what ways do you think I am being or not being answerable to infants in 
this event? 
• As someone who knows these infants well, is there anything in particular 
you could add to my understanding of this event? 
Participants in the critical inquiry meeting were able to co-experience what one 
another had said because of their insider view as teachers in the same infant 
setting but then were able to return to their outsider positions in order to offer 
their unique perspective on my pedagogical practice. As explained in chapter two 
my outside position enabled me to perceive myself and my actions through the 
eyes of my critical friends. Bakhtin (1993) highlights the importance of people not 
losing or downplaying their unique position by taking on the voice or authority of 
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someone other than themselves. When people do this, they speak from an alibi 
and reduce the moral content and “oughtness” (morality) of the act itself (Bakhtin, 
1993, pp. 40-42). Bakhtin (1981) calls the “links and interrelationships of the 
multiple social voices that collide at any given time in dialogue” heteroglossia (p. 
263). The hereroglossic environment of the staff meeting opened up a dialogic 
space to provide insight and more in-depth understanding of the complexities of 
what it meant for me as a teacher to be morally answerable in this context. Each 
answerable act selected for analysis at the critical friend inquiry meeting was 
chosen because it had moral meaning for me. The teachers’ analyses of my 
practice engaging with infants provided the data for me to analyse self in dialogue 
with my teacher colleagues as explained in the following section ─ an analysis of 
an analysis! 
4.8.3 Phase 2 Data analysis of internal & external dialogue 
The design of this research was at times challenging and often confusing if I am to 
be honest with (my) self and you the reader. The multiple layers required for data 
collection and for analysis, which I hope I have been able to articulate in a way 
that you can make sense of, were unavoidable because of the interconnectedness 
of all that ‘we’ do in education, particularly early years education where team 
teaching is a significant feature of ‘our’ work. Trying to capture this 
interconnectedness was extremely important for me because lived experience has 
taught me that my pedagogy is shaped as much by the infants that I teach as it is 
by the teachers with whom I work and not in an isolated way. By this I mean the 
infants although not physically present at the staff meetings were very much there 
“sitting on my shoulder” as the answerable acts (original data source event) were 
being discussed and analysed by the teachers in the staff meeting dialogue.  
This section presents phase 2 of analysis which explains how I analysed the form 
shaping dialogue I had in the staff meetings with my teacher colleagues. By 
analysing dialogue about dialogue about my pedagogical practice provided a way 
to understanding moral answerability in order to be more self-aware of my acts, 
how I account for my pedagogy and what it means ‘to do the right thing’ as an 
infant teacher. The reflexive journal entries used for analysis were those that 
represented my internal dialogue. The transcripts and video footage from the staff 
meeting represented the external voices of the teachers and self in dialogue.  
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Moral answerability (Bakhtin, 1993) as my unit of analysis invited dialogic 
processes of meaning-making between (my) pedagogical acts from multiple 
standpoints across time and space. Employing moral answerability to underpin my 
analysis provided a way for me to evaluate my axiological position from multiple 
selves’ viewpoints because as Jacobs (2001, p.34) pointed out: 
True answerability is achieved only when I realise the “fact of 
uniqueness” imposes a responsibility upon me that I cannot avert. 
When I acknowledge my responsibility and act upon it ─ whether 
in a conversation with a friend or in reading a novel ─ I realise the 
authentic “I-for-myself” and “I-for-another”. This is true love; this 
is the incarnated deed. 
 
Moral answerability is acknowledged in the answerable act when I respond to my 
personal responsibility by acting upon it in dialogue with the infants. I further 
undersign my deed, which was actualised in the act, when I presented the 
answerable acts at the staff meetings later in time committing myself more, to an 
acknowledgement of moral answerability. As explained in chapters one and two 
an answerable act is one where how I participate takes into account the moral 
position or attitude I should take in relation to the other based on what it means 
for me to ‘do the right thing’ as the other would want, it also speaks to my moral 
position and what it means to also do the right thing by the I-for-myself at this 
unique moment in time. Because moral answerability is never just about the I-for-
myself, it always includes the I-for-you and the you-for-me I developed an 
analytic frame that spoke to Bakhtin’s ‘I’ as a moral (plural) voice (see 2.2). 
Based on the fundamental concrete moments that make up an answerable act: I-
for-myself, the other-for-me and I-for-the-other the analytic frame provided a way 
for me to analyse the: i) inner dialogue, and ii) external dialogue with teachers 
from multiple viewpoints (see Appendix 11 for an excerpt from my analysis 
table). Being able to analyse my reflexive journal entries (inner dialogue) and the 
staff meeting dialogue (external dialogue) was critical for this phase two final 
analysis phase because of the importance of capturing the multiple different ways 
the world and those in it can be perceived (I-for-me, I-for-you, you-for-me, I-for-
us, I-for-thou).   By considering these different points of view a route was 
provided to better understand moral answerability through dialogic self-study. 
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From a Bakhtinian stance the self is made up of multiple voices. The following 
table presents the different Answerable ‘I’ orientations that were used for 
analysis: 
Answerable ‘I’ 
orientations 
Definition 
I-for-myself How (my)self looks and feels to my own 
consciousness 
I-for-you How (my)self appears to others outside her; how 
(my)selves are shaped from the outside by others 
You-for-me How others appear to (my)self; How (my)selves 
shape others 
I-for-us How I appear to others as a group i.e., the teaching 
team; How (my)selves are shaped by the team as a 
collective ‘we’   
I-for-thou How form is given from external bodies of 
authority from the outside i.e., Ministry of 
Education   
Table 1 Answerable “I” orientations 
A dialogic self-study enabled me, as a teacher, to not only analyse inner and 
external dialogue from my inside perspective (I-for-myself) but also to reflect on 
and evaluate my pedagogy from an outside perspective (I-for-you, you-for-me, I-
for-us, us-for-me, I-for-thou). As explained in chapter two, dialogue from a 
Bakhtinian perspective is always moral because we need others to give a value to 
self (see 2.2). For Bakhtin there is no universal self “I exist and a particular 
concrete other exists. If I remain in communion with immediate experience and 
the concrete other, then I can maintain a relation of answerability to other selves, 
and the world at large, and can accept full responsibility for my actions and 
words” (Gardiner, 1996, p. 32).  
By analysing moral answerability from multiple standpoints, it was possible to 
“maintain a relation to other selves” and their experience of the world ─ 
overcoming the limitations of my excess of seeing. Hicks (2000) emphasises 
Bakhtin’s focus on acts of emotion and value that accompany dialogue. Because 
moral answerability underpinned my analysis, I was able to explore how the 
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meaning (content) of what the teachers said took shape in my experience of them 
from multiple viewpoints. Sullivan & McCarthy (2005) highlight the importance 
of paying attention to “our nascent feelings of love, indifference, or dislike for our 
participants, for instance”, because these feelings influence how a person comes to 
understand “the meaning of their actions and gives their experience a value that it 
formally did not have” (p. 626). I assert that the analytic frame I use for analysis 
addresses what Bakhtin (1990, 1993) achieved in uniting the aesthetic (the 
shaping of meaning in action) and the moral into a unified event of Being. In other 
words, analysing the inner reflexive dialogue and the external staff meeting 
dialogue from multiple standpoints aimed to unite experience and meaning 
(content) through a fully answerable response without an alibi.   
I selected three events for in depth analysis from the overall total of 15 presented 
at the three staff meetings. I chose these events for analysis because they 
represented different but interconnected dimensions of moral answerability. The 
transcripts from the staff meeting dialogue, entries from my reflexive journal and 
the video recording of the staff meeting dialogue were analysed simultaneously 
from (my) self’s multiple viewpoints (I-for-me, I-for-you, you-for-me, I-for-thou, 
I-for-us, us-for-me). Which meant I reflected upon the staff meeting dialogue and 
the reflexive journal from I-for-myself (inner), I-for-you, You-for-me, I-for-us, I-
for-thou (external) multiple viewpoints that comprise the answerable act.  
My analysis revealed that I am made up of multiple selves each with numerous 
accountabilities to different other selves. In my analysis ‘doing the right thing’ in 
infant pedagogy meant being paying attention to how each of my multiple selves 
see the world from their multiple different viewpoints. With a focus on multiple 
selves, analysis revealed that to be answerable to myself and others without losing 
myself meant  
i. having the courage to expose of my feelings and values in dialogue, with 
others, when this happened opportunities were opened up for voices to be 
heard in the dialogue.  
ii. actively participating in the dialogue not passively agreeing 
iii. celebrating people challenging my practice because it opened up 
opportunities to voice my perspective, when this takes place in an 
environment where we are not being subsumed by the voices of others. 
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My insights and discoveries from my interpretation of the analysis are presented 
in the subsequent chapter. 
4.9 (My) selfhood as a reflexive researcher 
Prior to having the dialogic door opened, reflections for me were very much 
influenced by Schön’s (1983) approach, focusing on the ‘I’ trying to understand 
the experience from my perspective with an understanding of the 
interconnectedness of personal experience to the social dimensions and how all 
learners are active participants in understanding what they are experiencing ─ 
Vygotsky’s (1978) sociocultural influence on me. Once I entered the world of 
dialogism my eyes were opened to a new way of seeing reflective and reflexive 
practice. In essence I discovered ‘you’. Suddenly, the significance of the other and 
what it meant to step outside myself momentarily, to see myself reflected in your 
eyes, returning with an enriched view altered the way I reflected on and in life. 
This thesis has further augmented the value I place on a dialogic self-study 
approach to reflection and reflexivity through the new insights gleaned from 
connecting with self-study.  
Video provided an effective means for me to “step outside” of my own lived 
experience as a teacher “inside” the dialogue and take up a position as author from 
outside of (my)self as subject. The Cartesian interpretation of the subject is that it 
is always open to itself in an act of self-reflection (Nikulin, 2011). Contrary to this 
standpoint, Bakhtin’s dialogic view considers the self as “not immediately 
accessible and fully transparent to itself” (p. 61). A dialogic self-study provides a 
way for one to reflect and be reflected in the eyes of the other. In the context of 
my thesis this means self-reflection alone is like looking in a mirror it only offers 
a partial view of (my) self, practice and axiological position. Rowe (2016) 
explains that people depend “on being able to engage in meaningful dialogue with 
other voices about their points of view on them as agents in the world” (p. 188). 
According to Rowe (2016) when practice is studied with others the possibility is 
generated for “real dialogue amongst multiple points of view, and particularly 
between phronetic accounts of ourselves (or our selfs) as actors in the world and 
episteme accounts of teaching and learning as universal, generalizable 
experiences” (p. 189).  
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The video footage of the answerable acts presented at staff meetings provided a 
way for me to view the particulars of (my)selves and the situation that I typically 
would not have had access to because of my limited excess of seeing. The video 
of the staff meeting dialogue also provided a way for me to again analyse the 
dialogue (internal and external) by moving between spaces and being prepared to 
be altered through the experience from each different viewpoint without being 
subsumed by the other: I-for-myself (inner), I-for-you, You-for-me, I-for-us, I-
for-thou (external). 
Self-confidence is an attribute that Loughran and Northfield (1998) note is 
important for positive self-study experiences because “one needs to be 
comfortable with the sense of vulnerability necessary to genuinely study personal 
practice and the over-arching need to learn through self-study inevitably creates 
personal conflicts and a sense of dissonance” (p. 14). This point was also raised 
by Lisa in Fecho et al’s (2016) work who expressed the importance of 
vulnerability and feeling uncomfortable for “true learning” (p. 35) to take place 
(p.35). Although there are many times throughout my life when I would not 
describe myself as an overly self-confident person, I do feel comfortable in my 
own skin and embraced the deeply personal nature of the self-study experience in 
the face of closely held assumptions, ideas and values being challenged.  
4.10 Validity 
Defining validity as a validation process based in trustworthiness; validation was 
achieved through the critique of my teacher practice by colleagues. The 
employment of a critical friend inquiry self-study method as discussed in Samaras 
(2011) avoids researcher bias as my practice was shared with and critiqued by my 
teacher colleagues as critical friends. My critical friends therefore contributed to 
the validation of findings because the analysis extended beyond one’s personal 
views and therefore addresses any potential bias. This was important for my self-
study since my own practice and associated subjectivity was at the centre of 
theorisation. 
4.11 Looking back, looking forward 
In this chapter I have presented an argument for a dialogic methodological 
approach to self-study in order to better understand what it means “to do the right 
thing” as an infant teacher who is answerable. I have provided an argument for 
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dialogic methodology in tandem with self-study method underpinned by moral 
answerability as the unit of analysis. The New Zealand context for this study was 
introduced alongside the infant and teacher participants. The research design 
comprised two primary phases of data analysis. The first involved the analysis of 
answerable acts in relation to my practice, which were analysed by teachers at 
staff meetings. The second analysis phase involved me analysing the staff meeting 
dialogue from multiple answerable ‘I’ orientations. The chapter that follows 
presents my insights, discoveries and discussion as a source of insight concerning 
(my) moral answerability and what this means for infant pedagogy. 
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Chapter five: Discoveries, Insights & Discussion  
A dialogic study of the self in dialogue with others provided a way for me to 
better understand (my) self and the pedagogical decisions I make actualised as 
deeds in concrete acts in relationship with others. My discoveries and insights are 
presented in three primary sections in the following chapter. This chapter begins 
with an overview of how Bakhtin’s perspective on dialogue overlaps with and 
differs from other influential perspectives. 
5.1 Bakhtin’s location in dialogue 
Bakhtin was not the only thinker to discuss dialogue. According to White and 
Peters (2011) scholars “from Plato to Gadamer, from Wittgenstein and Marx to 
Freire and the post moderns such as Foucault and Rorty”, have, in their own ways 
contributed to the understanding in Western tradition of “philosophy, pedagogy, 
and culture as dialogue, as somehow essentially dialogical” (p. 2). An in-depth 
discussion of these significant works is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, I 
recognise that there are other scholars besides Bakhtin who have addressed 
dialogue.   
Although Bakhtin did “not adopt dialogue as a theory of education” in line with 
his contemporaries such as Freire; dialogue and dialogism “implicitly defined 
Bakhtin’s philosophy of culture” (White & Peters, 2011, p. 5). Born a generation 
apart, there is no evidence that Bakhtin and Freire (1921-1997) engaged with one 
another’s ideas, however, they share a deep interest in language and ideas about 
dialogue (Rule, 2009). Like Bakhtin, Freire was neither a relativist nor did he 
condone dogmatism (Roberts, 2005). In line with the thinking of Buber, both 
Bakhtin and Freire regarded “dialogue as an authentic way of being rather than 
simply as a technique or type of communication” (p. 4). A meeting place for 
Bakhtin, Freire and Buber is in their immense moral concern for the relationship 
between self and other. However, it was the influence of Dostoevsky, particularly 
his interpretation of Christ, that many of Bakhtin’s ideas such as the importance of 
outsidedness and self-other difference were personified. The point of difference 
for Bakhtin in relation to Buber and Freire was that he brought morality into 
conversation with dialogue through his concept of answerability. I interpret 
answerability to be for Bakhtin, the moral element of dialogue.  
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5.2 Presentation of discoveries & insights 
Discoveries and insights are presented in three primary sections. Each section 
opens with a vignette describing the original data source event (answerable act) 
that was presented to teachers at the staff meeting to analyse in dialogue with me 
(see section 4.6.5). Presented here are the insights and discoveries from my 
‘analyses’ of the external dialogue (staff meeting dialogue) in tandem with the 
inner dialogue (reflexive journal entries). External and inner dialogue are 
presented in a variety of ways: An excerpt (partial or full) from my ‘analysis’ 
table, dialogue between (my) self and teachers from staff meeting transcript, inner 
dialogue from reflexive journal entries, or a combination of all of these. The 
internal and external dialogues were ‘analysed’ using an ‘I’ voice and a ‘you’ 
voice and have been presented this way in places in this section i.e., excerpts from 
‘analyses’. The format I chose to present the dialogue depended on how it spoke 
to me at the time of writing this chapter. I have been consistent with presenting 
my discoveries and insights in relation to the I-for-myself, I-for-you, you-for-me, 
I-for-us, us-for-me, I-for-thou viewpoints.    
Following each primary section is the discussion.The following table lists the 
three original data source events I chose to analyse in more depth and presented in 
this section: 
Title of Vignette Explanation of heading 
Ditch the infant! When abstracted from reality the act took on a 
new life, with multiple moral meanings 
Re-evaluating values  Deeply held values were challenged in order 
to be morally answerable 
Shock, horror! How practice that is not valued is trivialised 
Table 2. List of original data source events  
5.3 A dialogic self-study approach to teacher pedagogy  
Undertaking a dialogic self-study approach to teacher pedagogy provided a way 
for me to better understand what it means for me ‘to do the right thing’ in relation 
to my pedagogy as an infant teacher. The morally laden nature of my pedagogy 
infiltrates all that I do. It is therefore imperative that if I am to lead a meaningful 
existence, as a human being and as a teacher that I endeavour to genuinely 
understand how I am morally answerable for my responses to others and self in 
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the shared space of an ECEC setting. The following sections address the research 
questions: 
• What does ‘doing the right thing’ mean for infant pedagogy and for the 
professional ECEC teacher? 
 
• In what ways am I morally answerable to (my) self and others through my 
practice? 
5.4 Answerable Self with multiple accountabilities in relation to 
pedagogy 
I begin by foregrounding the first of the three selected events. Events are 
presented in chronological order according to staff meeting (i.e., staff meeting 
1,2,3). The following event took place at the first staff meeting. The event 
provoked dialogue at the first staff meeting around the moral dilemma of sharing 
(my) self in practice with infants. The event is presented to you here as vignette 1.  
Endeavours to engage with infants simultaneously in a way that upheld my 
personal responsibilities and accountabilities to attend to the responses of both 
infants challenged me pedagogically.  
Vignette 1. Ditch an infant!  
I am interacting with Rex and Ashton on a mat outside. I notice 
another infant Olivia is pushing a swing back and forth at the end 
of the outside environment. I make eye contact with her and 
interpret her action with the swing as a request for help. I attempt 
to stand up. Before I move to help Olivia, I offer a toy to Rex and 
Ashton as I gently rub Ashton’s back. Ashton cries, I respond “Do 
you want to come with me?” Ashton stretches out his arms, I pick 
him up saying “We’ll go and help Olivia get into the swing”, Rex 
plays with the toy.  Holding Ashton, I walk toward Olivia saying 
“Look, here’s Olivia she wants a lift up into the swing”. As we 
approach, I say “Olivia, I’ll help you hop in”. I momentarily try to 
place Ashton on the ground, he cries, “I’m just here”, he pushes 
back on me and gestures to be held. I pick him up move close to 
Olivia but cannot physically lift her into the swing and 
simultaneously hold Ashton. I turn to Olivia who is holding on 
tightly to the swing and say “I’ll go and get someone to help”. 
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By exploring my inner dialogue (I-for-myself), in relation to my external dialogue 
at the staff meeting with the teachers (I-for-you, you-for-me, I-for-thou, I-for-us) 
it was possible to see across all 3 selected events how, as a teacher, I had 
numerous accountabilities to different selves in relation to others (other selves). 
As a scholar who embraces dialogism, I was aware of the importance of self-other 
relations and of the plural self in relationship with others. However, what I was 
not expecting to discover was the numerous accountabilities to different selves in 
relation to others that are taking place in every lived moment-by-moment as 
evidenced in the staff meeting dialogue. The following table (see Table 3) 
provides an example of an excerpt of my interpretation of the external dialogue in 
tandem with my internal dialogue. This excerpt is in relation to the original data 
source event (answerable act) expressed in vignette 1 and provides an example of 
my multiple different selves’ accountabilities. Although this is an excerpt from 
event 1, multiple different selves’ accountabilities were a feature of all three 
events. 
 
Table 3 Excerpt from analysis of external and internal dialogue.  
Illustrated in table 3 is how in this excerpt of the external and internal dialogue I 
was accountable to: myself (I-for-myself), the infants (I-for-you), their family (I-
for-you), Mel my team leader (I-for-you), Celine another teacher (I-for-me) to 
documents that as a teacher I am bound to abide by (I-for-thou), knowledge that I 
have gained from working in a research team (I-for-thou), and family values 
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passed down to me from ancestors that I hold dear (I-for-thou). In studying self, I 
found that I have a plural self with moral answerabilities to multiple relationships 
with others as evidenced in the excerpt from the staff meeting dialogue (see Table 
3). The plural self is, therefore, answerable. As such, (my) plural self is comprised 
of different voices that have the potential to be altered by others and vice a versa, 
depending on relationships that are shared, the particulars of the situation and who 
I was responding to at that time in the context of the staff meeting. What was also 
apparent was each of (my) answerable selves had unique moral accountabilities 
that were specific to a particular relationship such as denying my subjectivity as a 
way to be answerable to Mel my team leader. The multiple ways that I was 
morally accountable are expanded upon in the following section. This discovery 
was evident in each event studied. This insight aligns with the work of Petrilli 
(2013) who draws upon Welby to view the self as comprised of multiple selves 
that are unique but interconnected. Petrilli (2013) locates the self in a place of in-
between-ness. My insights reveal the self is understood in terms of unfinalised 
plurality with numerous fragmented but interconnected answerable selves. Instead 
of multiple selves, my discoveries have illuminated an answerable self. When 
viewed in this way the traditional view of a universal professional identity is 
challenged. I suggest a re-conceptualised view of professional identity be 
considered in the form of a plural concept. This discovery suggests that instead of 
a universal focus on what ‘we’ do as a teaching profession, opportunities would 
be opened up to better understand the uniqueness of professional identities in the 
process of becoming depending on their relationships with other selves and what 
that means for pedagogy. According to Kopisto (2014, p. 146) confusion 
surrounding roles and responsibilities exists in many respects because of the 
‘multiprofessional’ environment with teachers from a diverse range of educational 
backgrounds (kopisto et al., 2014, p. 146). I suggest that confusion may exist not 
solely because of the different backgrounds of teachers but potentially because of 
the ways different answerable selves interact in relationship with other selves. 
5.4.1 Responses of obedience, denial, doubt & manipulation 
In establishing that I am an answerable self with multiple accountabilities to 
others, I noticed that my pedagogy altered depending on who my answerable self 
was in relationship with. What this shows is how my axiological position, had the 
potential to be altered each time (my) answerable self was in a lived experience in 
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relationship with other selves. In studying (my)  answerable self, I found that how 
I accounted for the moral answerability that existed in the relations between the 
infants and (my) answerable self (see vignette 1) later through the staff meeting 
dialogue, had the potential to be viewed differently in my accounting of it, 
perhaps even altered depending upon which answerable self-in-relationship-with-
other I was responding to. This was demonstrated in the way I denied my 
subjectivity (I-for-myself) when obediently (I-for-you) responding to Mel in her 
position of authority as my team leader (see Table 3).  
Evidence of denying my subjectivity was demonstrated in the way I was alarmed 
(I-for-myself) at how I was potentially being defined as someone who could ditch 
an infant (I-for-you) because this goes against “every fibre of my moral being” (I-
for-myself). Yet, as demonstrated in table 3, my initial response by nodding my 
head in the form of a gesture of acknowledgment (you-for-me) hid the personal 
responsibility I felt toward acting in a way that upheld the best interests of the 
infants (I-for-you) and their right to have their perspectives taken into account by 
me as stated in the UNROC (I-for-thou). My act of masking how I really felt in 
that moment meant I supressed the value of standing up for what I believed in, 
which is ensuring infants know they matter ─ I supressed what was morally 
important to me and my pedagogical practice as a teacher. My use of a gesture to 
respond in a way that outwardly confirmed Mel’s initial view that I was 
potentially going to ‘ditch’ the infant, illuminates how feelings and emotions can 
be masked to agree with others and comply. This was a fleeting moment that took 
place in the dialogue but the choice I made to mask my ‘true’ feelings to be 
‘obedient’ caused me inner emotional turmoil that did not reflect in reality what I 
was actually experiencing inside. I began to see that this particular answerable self 
when in relationship with Mel as the authoritative figure offered some form of 
obedience, in this example the nod of a head in agreement. What I noticed was 
that by obediently choosing to take on the words of the other as received truth, 
there was potential for this to lead to the ‘shutting down’ of dialogue around this 
dilemma, and values such as advocating for what I believed to be ‘doing the right 
thing’, that underpinned answerability in this situation, going unnoticed.  
At other times, the act of denying my subjectivity (I-for-myself) was evident in 
the dialogue when my perspective did not align with the perspective of the group. 
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Again, I externally agreed with the group by gesturing “no”, as evidenced in table 
4.  
External 
Dialogue 
Staff Meeting 
Inner Dialogue:  
I-for-myself 
I-for-you You-for-me 
Sue: But Olivia 
would never 
say anything 
(gestures no 
with head). 
Bridgette: 
(gestures no 
with head) 
Celine: No 
Eliza: No 
Sue: She would 
just stand there 
and wait, that’s 
her personality. 
 
Sue: Because 
when you’re 
like that it’s not 
like you’re 
ditching 
Ashton. You 
would put him 
down here 
beside you 
(gestures with 
hands to the 
ground), lift 
Olivia in and 
then pick 
I place 
importance on 
tuning into the 
language of the 
infants and 
responding in 
ways that show 
I have listened 
to their voices.  
 
By not 
advocating for 
this position I 
felt I was not 
true to myself. 
Do I remain 
silent because I 
felt 
misunderstood, 
or is because  
 I felt frustrated 
with myself.  
  
 
I was annoyed 
at myself for 
not advocating 
for the 
importance of 
However, you 
made me feel 
frustrated that 
you still didn’t 
seem to 
understand that 
my reason for 
not doing what 
was suggested 
by you now (at 
the staff 
meeting), at the 
time, was 
because Ashton 
was telling me 
through his 
embodied 
language that he 
did not want to 
be placed on the 
ground. 
 
I felt you did not 
value my 
practice because 
I perceived you 
could not see 
the value in 
what I was 
 
 
By gesturing ‘No’  
I confirm that I agree 
with what you are 
saying in relation to 
Olivia not saying 
anything.  
 
By agreeing with you I 
valued your 
understanding of Oliva 
over mine.  
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Ashton back 
up. It’s not like 
you’re walking 
away from him. 
 
Celine: you’re 
just trying to 
solve both 
problems really 
quick. 
 
B: Even with 
the pushing, 
you would have 
still put him 
down, maybe 
in that moment 
I could have? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
responding to 
infants in ways 
that I believed 
listened to their 
voices.   
 
 
 
I started to 
doubt my 
practice, not the 
values I uphold, 
but I started to 
wonder if there 
had been an 
alternative way 
to have 
responded to 
the infants that 
I had not 
considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
saying. 
Recognition by 
you that I was 
not “ditching” 
the infant gave 
me a sense of 
inner peace that 
how you 
interpreted my 
actions was not 
seen as 
neglecting 
Ashton.   
 
I felt that you 
doubted my 
practice and that 
made me doubt 
me. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
By acknowledging your 
suggestion of an 
alternative way to 
respond, I am letting 
you know that I am 
open to your 
pedagogical 
approaches.  
Table 4. Responses of denial, obedience and masking truth 
Having established the answerable self as a plural concept it was also possible for 
me to recognise the different types of accountabilities ‘my’ different selves were 
responding to. Typically, (my) answerable self were responding obediently when 
responding to teachers, who in the staff meeting, I believed were in a position of 
authority because they knew the infant “better than me” (I-for-myself). For 
example, Sue, Celine and Eliza had spent more time with Olivia than I had as a 
part-time teacher, in their roles as full time key and buddy teachers. I was 
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surprised to find some of (my) answerable selves acting in this way, I did not 
realise that in dialogue with others I was responding with embodied language that 
denied what other selves were thinking. At these times I identified as being 
accountable in ways that as a teacher I doubt (my) self, am obedient, likes to fit, 
doesn’t want to hurt the feelings of others and continually tries to please.  
What these insights revealed for me was that ‘doing the right’ thing in infant 
pedagogy meant paying attention to those responses of denial wrapped up in 
obedience ─ often masked ─ that rested within and ‘in between’ answerable 
selves in dialogue. What I found was they were sprinkled throughout the dialogue 
and could have remained unnoticed had I not been for (my) dialogic self-study 
and had I not video recorded the staff meeting dialogue. These moments of denial 
were important to notice because they pin pointed places in the dialogue where 
there was potential for meaning to be altered in a way that generated a different 
truth from how truth was perceived by me in the living event with the infants. Had 
I not doubted my practice and my moral judgement that the infant was speaking to 
me through her embodied language (see table 4 & vignette 1) I could have offered 
the teachers an alternative view with which to evaluate their practice ─ potentially 
creating a different truth for them from the one they understood i.e., that Olivia 
would never say anything. I could have opened up a potential opportunity for 
them to learn the importance of silent forms of infant language.  
I now realise that I am not being answerable to (my) selves or others when I shut 
down dialogue in this way by passively agreeing rather than actively participating. 
For me this very personal self-discovery resonated with Lisa’s story presented in 
Fecho et al’s (2016) study. Although Lisa did not passively agree when she 
perceived her practice was being challenged, she ‘shut down’ herself and ceased 
the dialogue. What Lisa found was that ‘doing the right thing’ in her situation 
would have been to “keep talking, even if the conversation was an uncomfortable 
one” (p. 33). When one voice reigns supreme over another opportunities are lost 
for a richer, deeper, more creative and meaningful dialogue (White, 2016a). What 
is demonstrated in my study is that by being aware of (my) answerable selves in 
relationship with pedagogy I am able to identify which of my selves in 
relationship with other multiple selves is likely to respond to the voice of 
authority in this way. In doing so, becoming more self-aware of how others’ 
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multiple selves are shaping my pedagogy and how my actions are shutting down 
the dialogue in and through dialogue.        
On more than one occasion I denied my subjectivities (I-for-you), evidenced in 
the way I confirmed the moral position of another (you-for-me) through my 
gestures of affirmation such as when I nodded my head in agreement or 
disagreement (see Tables 3 & 4). This finding is in alignment with Nuttall’s 
(2006) study which highlighted the potential for teachers to subscribe to the 
subjectivities of others and in doing so denying their own subjectivities. My study 
extends on Nuttall’s work suggesting that as the teacher (my) answerable selves 
not only had the capacity to deny my own subjectivity (I-for-myself, I-for-you) in 
the staff meeting dialogue but also they also had the capacity to deny the 
subjectivities of multiple others through the new meaning I assigned to their 
words in dialogue with them (you-for-me). This was evidenced in the way I 
altered the meaning of Eliza and Sue’s words to fit with my own when I said: 
Bridgette: So I felt in that moment exactly what you just said then 
[both of you] that [I felt] I had to respond to her as well …[(gesture 
with one hand to Eliza and with the other hand to Sue)] … but how 
do you do that when there is more than one infant. You know it is 
an interaction beyond one to one. 
Group: pause [Teacher transcript staff meeting 1] 
Manipulation of the teachers’ words in my endeavour to be answerable by 
advocating for the infants, by bringing about a consensus, shut down the dialogue, 
silencing the teachers’ voices. This surface agreement instigated by me through 
the authoring of the teachers’ words (you-for-me) did not solve the problem or the 
moral dilemma I was experiencing in trying to get them to understand my 
pedagogical approach in the answerable act with the infants. I would never have 
defined myself as manipulative (I-for-me) but in this situation this is what I 
interpreted was happening because I was trying to persuade other teachers to hold 
the same moral position as me (you-for-me). Manipulation was born out of the 
dialogue because of the strong pull on my part for us to be all on the ‘same page’ 
(I-for-us) and ‘doing the right thing’ in this moment meant using what was at my 
disposal to combat their resistance.  
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The shutting down of dialogue when the authorial voice had spoken, often 
bringing about a consensus, suggests that situations where dissensus or alterity 
prevailed had the potential to provoke dialogue. Moments of alterity may not 
necessarily have solved the issue at hand but opened up a dialogic space that 
offered ways to better understand the different moral approaches that underpinned 
(my) answerable selves’ values and attitudes which informed practice. This was 
evidenced on several occasions when the teachers opened up an opportunity for 
me to be answerable in the dialogue through potentially misunderstanding or 
bringing my answerable act (to be answerable to both infants) into question. This 
was visible when one teacher misinterpreted what I said; opening up the floor for 
me to ‘put right’ what I meant pedagogically. Similarly, when another teacher 
queried my practice (See Table 5):  
External Dialogue Inner Dialogue 
S: …or do you think you would have 
done it any different if you thought you 
weren’t being videoed?  
B: No, in my practice I try to respond 
to the voices of each child [Teacher 
transcript] 
I emphatically said “No”. I perceived 
you were challenging my pedagogical 
practice by suggesting that I would have 
potentially engaged with the infants in 
another way had I not been video 
recorded.   
Table 5. Challenging me pedagogically 
The opportunity to be answerable in the dialogue by advocating for and defending 
a moral stance personal to me made visible in the dialogue the self’s internally 
held moral values concerning sharing oneself and being there for everyone, that 
initially had been masked. If my practice had not been challenged by the teacher 
this opportunity to voice my moral position would not have occurred ─ her 
challenge opened up dialogue. This discovery reveals how valued moral 
perspectives such as ensuring infants know they are being listened to and heard 
can be brought into question when what others’ value is brought to bear on one’s 
practice.  
This section has highlighted the potential for teachers’ perspectives to alter my 
view on how I could have responded to both infants in a way that I felt would be 
valued by the infants, evidenced in my response when I said “maybe in that 
moment I could have?” In light of the potential for others’ perspectives to inform 
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my practice, I suggest it is important for ‘opening up dialogue’ in ways that 
challenge, provoke, and query as a form of moral answerability. If the opening up 
of dialogue was promoted in this way opportunities to better understand teachers’ 
moral approaches to values that could potentially inform the practices of multiple 
selves in an early years setting would be made available. Also illuminated is how 
a dialogic space that opens up dialogue provides a way for what is potentially 
valued from the infants’ perspectives to be considered ─ emphasising how 
answerable acts in different dialogic spaces can influence practice later in time. 
5.4.2 Moral and ethical messiness 
I have struggled with where to place this section because it links to all the 
aforementioned tables. In my efforts not to confuse you, the reader, I have placed 
it here ─ I hope that it fits. Demonstrated in this dialogic self-study is how the 
received truth from the authoritative words of the codes, standards and articles 
although acknowledged and recognised amongst each member of the teaching 
team (I-for-thou) were received and applied by me in my practice differently (see 
Table 3). In accounting for my answerable act in the staff meeting dialogue, about 
simultaneously sharing self with both infants (I-for-you), it was possible to see 
how as a teaching team the same code of ethics, standards and articles can be 
shared (I-for-us) but teachers make different pedagogical decisions (I-for-me, I-
for-you) depending upon each person’s interpretations on how to apply them in 
practice, according to how each teacher evaluated the particulars of the situation. 
Consequently, codes, standards, policies, regulations and articles can generate 
multiple different meanings when considered in tandem with the particulars of a 
situation by different people. A conflict of moral positions existed even though 
there was a shared agreement between teachers that I had highlighted a moral 
dilemma that was experienced often and by all (I-for-us) (see Table 3). This is 
evident in the way I see I need to share myself in my practice (I-for-me) but this 
moral attitude was not shared by my fellow teachers who, although they 
recognised the dilemma, offered alternative ways for me to be answerable to both 
infants (I-for-us) (see Table 4). When analysed through a moral answerability lens 
different perspective are illuminated in relation to practices surrounding situations 
where there is moral challenge regardless of whether there is agreement or 
disagreement (Table 6).  
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This discovery highlights the importance of being self-aware of my axiological 
position because of its influence in shaping pedagogical practice and being shaped 
in dialogue with others. How I interpreted professional responsibilities, that were 
shared, and actualised in practice was influenced by the values that I drew upon in 
that moment of living. For example in the original data source event (vignette 1) 
the value I placed on ensuring all voices in the dialogue were heard, listened and 
responded to made visible my allegiance to codes, standards and articles that 
apply to all (I-for-thou) in tandem with the moral answerability I felt toward 
responding to both infants (I-for-you). However, later in time, in the staff meeting 
dialogue the teachers offered their alternative views on how they saw I could have 
engaged with the infants in the situation (see Table 4). In doing so, they offered 
me an alternative way to be answerable that had implications for me morally 
because their suggestions were at odds with the dialogic philosophy that informed 
my practice.  
At the time of the staff meeting dialogue, I felt frustrated that the teachers had not 
interpreted the reasoning behind my actions as I had intended them. However, 
through the process of voicing her alternative perspective Sue opened up an 
opportunity for me to re-evaluate my axiological position in the staff meeting 
dialogue by stating that “it’s not like you’re ditching Ashton” (see Table 4). This 
was important for me personally and professionally because I did not want to be 
seen as someone who had the capacity to neglect or ‘ditch’ an infant, particularly 
when this was in total contrast to my actualised deed in reality.  
As my interpretations of the internal and external dialogue have shown different 
values can be assigned to the same event depending on the perspective from 
which it is being viewed. The emotional and moral struggle that I was trying to 
cope with internally and externally was illuminated for me in interpreting this 
lived moment. Feelings of not being valued, doubt, frustration, annoyance, 
advocating for my values and then feeling valued, all tied together (Tables 3 & 4). 
Codes of ethics could not sort out how I was to act in these moral moments of 
living that had challenged my practice. It was as if my commitment to learners 
and teacher colleagues, as set out in the code of ethics (Education Council, 2017) 
were in conflict with one another and then at other times in synch ─ my moral 
compass was spinning! 
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I agree with Taggart (2011) when she articulated that the moral dimensions of our 
practice need to be a “central plank of professionalism” (p. 85). If the teaching 
profession seeks teachers who are critical thinkers, as stated in the code of ethics 
(Education Council, 2017) that I abide by, then consideration needs to be given to 
the moral messiness of teaching that cannot be defined by universal lists of values. 
At the turn of the century Sumsion (2000) recognised the significance of 
principles embedded in codes of professional conduct but emphasised their 
limited role in guiding and supporting teachers with ethical and moral dilemmas 
that arise in everyday pedagogical situations. I contend that nearly 20 years later 
the seriousness of this issue still prevails. Shapira-Lishchinsky (2011) summon 
teachers to an amplified self-awareness and understanding because of ethical 
challenges that they may encounter pedagogically. I agree wholeheartedly but 
emphasise the imperative of also turning up the volume on an amplified self-
awareness in relation to moral challenges in tandem with the moral implications 
of ethical challenges.   
5.5 Re-evaluating values 
I chose the following event to take to the second staff meeting because it 
highlighted an answerable act that was interconnected with multiple members of 
the teaching group. I had been holding a young infant for 20 minutes, while 
engaging with three other infants, I was aware that I was not his key teacher. 
Earlier that day I had offered to help Sandy, another teacher, who was settling an 
older child, I asked if she wanted me to hold the older infant as she was on nappy 
duty and could then attend to the younger infant Bryn, what I was not expecting 
was for the older infant to be holding a cracker which caused an ethical and moral 
dilemma for me: 
Vignette 2. Re-evaluating values   
I am sitting outside on a platform attached to the slide outdoor 
equipment, holding Bryn. One of the teachers, Sandy, asks me to 
hold and bottle feed Lucia. Sandy passes me a cracker that Lucia is 
holding; this is a ritual for Lucia who arrives at the centre with 
crackers from home. An informal policy within the infant setting 
and amongst teachers is that children are to eat food at the table. 
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However, without anybody saying a word an allowance is made for 
Lucia in this situation. 
Although this event is separate to event 1, it is connected in that it meant ‘sharing 
myself’ but this time in order to help another teacher who was settling an older 
infant. In the staff meeting dialogue Sandy acknowledged that this was an 
answerable act for her too: 
Sandy: …Like the fact I’ve had to hand you Lucia while she’s 
having a bottle just to cope. Bryn, was overdue to bed to go to sleep 
so. I felt quite bad doing that. 
Bridgette: So, to you, that would have been an answerable moment 
for you? 
Sanvi: Having to pass her while she’s having a bottle. 
Sandy: Yeah, just because it was crazy. 
 
Although my practice was being critiqued by the teachers, I noticed that the 
dialogue also opened up opportunities for the teachers to reflect on their I-for-
myself practice and sense of morality, evidenced in the way Sandy said she felt 
“quite bad for doing that”. This highlighted how a dialogic self-study is never just 
about the individual ‘I’ ─ although I was studying (my) self, other teachers 
queried their practices. Sandy’s words also demonstrated how she was faced with 
a moral choice in relation to which infant to share herself with ─ highlighting the 
interconnectedness of answerable acts. Another member of the team queried if the 
answerable act that I was referring to in that moment was:   “having to pass her 
while she’s having a bottle”. This insight illustrates for me how what I considered 
to be answerable was different to what another teacher considered to be 
answerable ─ different but connected. For me the moral dilemma was not so 
much about the bottle feeding as it was about interrupting an interaction with one 
infant to engage with another and what that potentially was saying to Bryn when 
he was ‘placed on the ground’ (I will come back to this point later) so that I could 
hold Lucia ─ the value I placed on not interrupting another’s interaction 
challenged again. However, Sanvi’s reference to “passing her while she is having 
a bottle” brought to the surface for me how different philosophical perspectives 
can impact on how pedagogy is viewed as an act of moral answerability. As a 
team ‘we’ had shared our individual philosophies at staff meetings outside of this 
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research, because of that I was aware that Pikler’s (1970) philosophy was an 
influence for this teacher and therefore I understood her focus on the intimate 
nature of care moments such as bottle feeding.  
What stood out for me was how in the staff meeting dialogue my 
acknowledgement of an answerable act and my deed within it created 
opportunities for other teachers to affirm their deeds. In doing so opening up a 
dialogic space for a richer understanding of the meaning of one another’s acts as 
different philosophical perspectives that informed pedagogies were illuminated. 
Visible in this event was how Sandy, later in time at the staff meeting, was able to 
make a connection to an answerable act that she took ownership of, which was the 
catalyst for (my) selves’ answerable act (original data source event). This 
intertwining of different people’s answerable acts illuminates how people are 
implicated in the answerable acts of others. I related to Sandy’s confession 
regarding her feelings because earlier that day I had myself felt ‘bad’ and a sense 
of guilt (I-for-myself) for interrupting Sandy’s engagement with Lucia in an 
endeavour to offer help with the intention of being answerable to both Sandy and 
the infant (I-for-you). This provoked me to ask: 
Bridgette: … Sandy, what is your perspective on when I actually 
interrupt your interaction in the beginning with Lucia because I was 
aware that you were on nursery [sleep room], Bryn was tired, I had 
been holding him he didn’t want to go down.  
Sandy: That was fine because I didn’t really know Lucia that well 
either because Eliza had spent a lot of time with her so I was happy 
for any input yeah into what I could do to either calm 
her…[Teacher transcript, staff meeting 2] 
Initially, feeling bad (I-for-me) was a result of being aware of the importance of 
not interrupting an infant’s engagement with someone else, which linked back to 
my initial teacher education (I-for-thou). Both Sandy and I revealed feeling ‘bad’ 
(I-for-us) about our individual actions but when brought to the surface in the 
dialogue I perceived ‘we’ could see how one another’s actions in that situation 
were welcomed by the other (you-for-me). Although interrupting a teacher’s 
engagement with an infant is a practice I do not value (I-for-myself), it was a 
practice I drew upon to rescue a colleague (you-for-me) from the ‘craziness’ of 
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the moment a term used on more than one occasion in the staff meeting dialogue. 
It meant Bryn would get a well overdue sleep even though it meant Lucia who 
was settling into her day would be with me. I did feel comfortable with this (I-for-
myself) because I had spent time with Lucia previously and felt we had built a 
relationship (you-for-me). What the staff meeting dialogue revealed for me was 
the importance of being able to expose inner emotions and feelings externally in 
dialogue with others because of the new meaning that was able to spring forth.  
What I discovered was that values take on new meaning depending on the 
particulars of unique moments of living ─ what is not valued in one situation is 
valued in another depending on the particulars of the situation, and the 
relationships with the people involved. This dialogic self-study was showing me 
more and more that it is not so much about understanding self or understanding 
infants or teachers but understanding (my) selves in relationship with infants 
and/or teachers and my pedagogy within that, and how that shapes my 
relationships with children and colleagues. This discovery expands on the work of 
Brennen (2014), and Elfer and Page (2015) who illuminated the importance of 
shifting focus from the infant to the infant in interaction with teacher. I suggest 
that an answerable pedagogy is one that pays attention to the teacher in 
relationship with infant.  
This particular self was prepared to comprise deeply held values, concerned with 
not interrupting someone else’s interaction with a child in order to be answerable 
for my response to a colleague. Sandy and I created a ‘new’ morality in the 
dialogue at that unique moment in time. This insight speaks to Bakhtin’s (1990; 
1993) notion of moral answerability where moments of living are continuously 
altered in the event of-Being as people shape one another in response to the moral 
realities that they create in dialogue together. ‘Doing the right thing’ for infants 
pedagogically is extremely complex because of the entanglement of routines, 
policies, emotions, values, professional integrity and personalities that make up 
every day lived experiences. I have come to realise that there is no universal 
personal moral code. What my study is foregrounding, I believe, is the 
continuously never-ending interplay of the shaping and re-shaping of personal 
moral codes bouncing off one another in dialogue.     
The opportunities offered in the staff meeting dialogue to answerably account for 
the decisions I made to respond in particular ways to both teachers and infants 
   
96 
 
(you-for-me) illuminated how I-for-myself can misinterpret how others receive 
the meaning behind their actions i.e., I initially perceived Sandy was annoyed that 
I interrupted her interaction with the infant. The form shaping potential of 
dialogism is evident in the new meanings that were generated when perspectives 
were shared and exposed through the staff meeting dialogue and which 
contributed to my practice. Instead of feeling ‘bad’ a new way to morally see was 
made visible ─ altering each other’s personal moral code in the process. What was 
initially interpreted as ‘bad’ could in this context be viewed as ‘good’. This 
highlighted for me how there is no fixed universal truth (istina) in relation to 
being morally good or bad, wrong or right. It re-enforced the importance of 
ensuring the voices of individual personalities within a group are heard and the 
particulars of lived experiences considered in order for truth (pravda) to be visible.      
The influence of teachers’ personal moral codes on me and vice versa was further 
evidenced in the staff meeting dialogue when discussion oriented to Lucia holding 
a cracker which she brought from home when Sandy passed her to me to hold and 
bottle feed. Although, I am aware that the infant setting has an informal policy 
amongst teachers (I-for-us) that infants are to eat food at the table, the decision I 
made to not remove the cracker in this context was influenced by Sandy’s 
decision to not take the cracker from Lucia (I-for-you) when she passed her to me. 
This highlights how others’ values can be imposed on self’s pedagogical decisions 
(I-for-you).  However, in this event Sandy’s act (I-for-you) also resonated with 
my internally held truth that it is important for infants to feel emotionally safe, 
build trust and a sense of belonging (I-for-myself, you-for-me). As such, I also felt 
that Sandy had offered me a route to be morally answerable in a way that spoke to 
my internally held truths. However, the implication of this decision for my 
practice meant potentially sending mixed messages to the other infants (you-for-
me) as one teacher in the staff meeting dialogue highlighted: 
Celine: I love how you’re trying to keep them all busy at the same 
time whilst also trying to feed Lucia. Like Abby trying to come 
through them, like all trying to get the cracker. 
Bridgette: Yeah, yeah. 
 
Although it was not explicitly stated, I felt Celine’s comment drew attention to 
how my decision to be answerable to Lucia could have been perceived as not 
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‘doing the right thing’ by the other infants (I-for-you) or the informal policy 
amongst the teachers as a group concerning food (I-for-us). Celine’s comment 
also opened up a space for the perspectives of others to be brought into dialogue:    
Sue: That’s probably something we need to watch with that too is 
her coming in with crackers and being out in the playground. 
Mel: She did that a few times, coming in with a cracker, maybe 
twice in a row. 
Sue: She should probably sit down with them. 
Bridgette: And what do you think the other children were thinking, 
that’s what I was thinking in that moment too. 
Mel: Yeah. 
Sue: Yeah, they all want a cracker. 
Sandy: It was one of her first days, that’s probably why. 
Bridgette: So, yeah in some ways we are being answerable to the 
parent because that’s what they want but how do you think the 
other children may have felt knowing that policy is you eat food at 
the table. 
Sandy: Yeah. 
Sue: We always keep telling them to sit down and Lily knows 
enough to know that you’re supposed to sit down while you’re 
eating them. That’s something we will probably have to follow 
through with her and make sure that. Ashton’s mother does the 
same when she comes in but she always sits him down at the table 
with a biscuit. 
Mel: I think it was only the first two days that she did that Lucia. 
She has them in the car. 
Sue: I must be fair, what date was that? 
Sandy: I remember it was one of her first days. 
 
This situation highlights the tension between ethics and morals that I raised in 
chapter 3 ─ it also illuminates how Kantian transcendental aprioris cannot address 
ethical and moral problems and dilemmas that unfold within every day lived 
experiences (see 2.1.4).  The staff meeting dialogue makes visible the different 
perspectives: either ethically following through on a universal informal policy or 
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rule (I-for-us) that is typically followed by all teachers in the infant setting what 
we all do or making a pedagogical decision, like I did, that took into account the 
moral ramifications if I had taken away the cracker from Lucia. My inner dialogue 
reflected the turmoil I felt in this moment:  
“I feel torn between my accountabilities to this infant, her family, 
the other infants, their families, the teachers who potentially saw 
my actions as ‘breaking the rules’. I want to please everybody but 
am starting to see that this cannot always be. Can I be ‘doing the 
right thing’ and not ‘doing the right thing’ at the same time??? 
[reflexive journal]  
 
The staff meeting dialogue had me questioning if ‘doing the right thing’ by Lucia 
and by (my) selves, had pedagogical consequences for the other infants. I noticed 
that I started to use the I-for-us voice in dialogue with the teachers “in some ways 
we are being answerable to the parent”. In in my endeavour to bring about a 
consensus I ended up more or less justifying my practice because it was important 
for me to let the team know that I had thought about the other infants and although 
I had potentially broken an unwritten ‘rule’; Lucia was not actually eating the 
cracker she was being bottled fed and positioned on my lap not walking around. I 
even find (my) self now defending my practice and wonder if this is what often 
happens, limiting what teachers can learn from one another pedagogically because 
of the fear of being exposed.   Bakhtin (1990, 1993) explains that when we justify 
our deeds by recourse to an abstract ideology or in this case a rule we are provided 
with an alibi for evading personal responsibility ─ I therefore acknowledge moral 
answerability for this act as I sit here and write. But wonder if it is at all possible 
for multiple selves to be simultaneously answerable to the numerous number of 
different demands to be accountable pedagogically in a given moment ─ 
particularly when ethical and moral dilemmas can arise from rules that are often in 
play in an ECEC context but not mandated. I now see that accountability is not 
about pleasing everybody all the time. 
I have to confess many of (my) answerable selves and (my) personal and 
professional identities are trying to find ‘peace and that harmony’ but I also see 
how that in itself can be a problem because of the culture of obedience it can 
conjure up. The struggle to find the ‘right’ balance between being an answerable 
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self who is morally ‘doing right’ by others and (my) selves without losing (my) 
selves in the process is not for the faint hearted.  
I end this section with final words from (my) answerable self’s critical teacher 
friends, intoned with genuine light-hearted laughter they said to me: 
Sue: do you realise you say “right” quite a lot? It’s quite funny 
you’ve sorted something out and you go right.  
Bridgette: I gesture by moving my hands from up to down 
Sue: It’s like let’s re group 
Eliza: That’s because you want harmony and happy days (does 
same up-down motion with her hands as me) when you say right 
Celine: It’s like your mantra to live by.  
 [Teacher transcript, staff meeting 3]  
 
I had not noticed that I do this, these teachers on more than one occasion made 
visible my personality in the dialogue. What this insight suggests is that a dialogic 
self-study with the aim of critiquing my practice was also about me.  
5.5.1 Looking back 
Earlier I highlighted a point that I said I would return to in relation to placing 
Bryn on the ground. This is evidence of how my pedagogical practice was altered 
by the dialogue from the first staff meeting. An alternative way to engage with 
infants when faced with the moral dilemma of sharing (my)self in practice was 
highlighted in the first staff meeting: “you would put him down here beside you 
(gestures with hands to the ground)” [teacher transcript, staff meeting 1] (see 
5.4.1). Although this was a different situation with its own particulars, it connects 
to the previous answerable act in that I was faced with the same dilemma with 
having to share (my) selves with others but this time I altered my practice by 
placing the infant on the ground and communicating to him my intention to do so. 
It was as if the teachers were sitting on my shoulder in this moment (I-for-you). 
What I am highlighting here is the form shaping potential of others’ practices on 
the self. Also, how in one situation I felt morally compromised but in this 
situation I did not. Another teacher was physically present, so I knew there was 
someone on hand who was going to pick up the infant immediately. But I felt that 
by exposing feelings and values in dialogue at the first staff meeting (although 
frustrating), somehow aided me in making this pedagogical decision later in time. 
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This shows me that answerable acts are not isolated events in time but are 
interconnected across time and space.  
5.6 Shock, horror! 
This event took place at the third staff meeting. I played the original data source 
event to the teachers and although it was not long in duration it provoked much 
discussion about my practice. I chose this original data source event (vignette 3) 
because I value infants having opportunities to communicate with one another. 
Moral answerability was evident in the decision I made to not ‘shut down’ the 
‘cup banging’ that was initiated by three infants sitting at a table.  
Vignette 3. Shock, horror!  
I was sitting at the same table as three infants, they start to bang 
their cups, I say smiling “water is going everywhere” as their cups 
slide across the table in a sideways motion. Celine, who is writing 
on the daily communication sheet, notices what is happening, she 
walks toward us leans down and takes a cup from one of the infants 
then pauses and gives it back. Celine leaves, then returns with a 
cloth without saying a verbal word she wipes the water that has 
been spilt on the table.  
  
This event stood out for me because it highlighted the morally laden nature of 
infant pedagogy. In this particular situation I was drawing from both the lived 
experiences of the infants in that moment (truth Pravda) in tandem with an 
authoritative source (truth istina) in the form of an article (I-for-thou) that my 
chief supervisor had written on carnivalesque (see White, 2017) which 
highlighted the important benefits of children engaging in this way i.e., cup 
banging. In the dialogic space of the staff meeting answerability was altered 
because of the different moral attitudes and authoritative sources teachers were 
drawing from. After I played this particular piece of footage at the staff meeting, I 
invited the teachers to critique my practice. Celine was the first person to speak:  
Celine: What did I come across to do? 
SV:  You took a cup away or something. 
Celine: Emm because I am writing something at the bench. Aww 
am I coming to steal someone’s cup. 
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SV: Yeah. 
Celine: Shock, horror. [Teacher transcript, staff meeting 3] 
My inner dialogue reflects how Celine’s words of “shock, horror” altered the way 
I looked at the original data source event: 
I felt your words trivialised my practice. I realised you said these 
words in jest, but they diminished the value I placed on infants 
having the opportunity to engage with one another in this way.  
[I-for-myself] 
Celine’s words made me feel trivialised [I-for-me] as if my pedagogical practice 
could be dismissed, as if it didn’t matter. The tone that Celine used was bordering 
on a ‘big deal’ tone with a touch of sarcasm (I-for-you). The irony of this event 
for me was that I perceived Celine was poking fun by using a bit of carnivalesque 
(I-for-you), which I also perceived the infants were doing (I-for-you). I did not 
consider (my)self to be a voice of authority (I-for-you) in the infant unit as I held 
a part-time position, so I waited before responding in the staff meeting dialogue 
because “I did not want to sound like the voice of authority, that’s me in life” (I-
for-myself). In this moment I wondered if I was being dethroned. Re-enforced by 
Celine’s words when she said: 
Celine: Without telling them, I’m just non-verbally telling them to 
stop banging their cups. By placing them in front of them again?  
Bridgette: So, you’re non-verbally telling them Celine. By you 
non-verbally telling them were you silently telling me something?  
Celine: Probably, probably. In my head I was probably thinking, 
well I think that all the time in there [sleep room] when a child is 
banging something on the wall, you’re like, why is someone not 
fixing the problem that’s going on and on and on and on. I don’t 
know cups just irritate me on the table. [Teacher transcript 3] 
I perceived that the words “I don’t know cups just irritate me on the table” were 
an indication to me that pedagogical practice that I valued was not valued by 
Celine (I-for-you). Being accountable to the infants was potentially not being 
accountable to a colleague because of the struggle between what is valued. This 
insight highlighted for me how my moral position in relation to what I valued 
such as fostering infants’ contributions to their own learning through their 
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engagement with one another was seen differently when viewed through the eyes 
of another (I-for-you). This discovery expands on Anton’s (2001) work which 
highlighted that people can fail to do the right thing for others when they try to do 
the right thing for themselves. I reveal that in an ECEC context ‘doing the right 
thing’ for a colleague can potentially mean failing to do the right thing for oneself, 
which in turn, often, as I have shown, risks ‘doing the right thing’ by infants from 
the self’s perspective. This insight extends on previous work (Redder & White, 
2017) which emphasised how teachers are implicated in dialogues with infants 
and peers as well as infants and teachers (White & Redder, 2015) regardless of 
whether they are present or not, to suggest that teachers are also implicated in 
relationships with one another’s pedagogies. The meaning that was created in this 
“shock, horror” dialogue opened my eyes to how an aspect of my pedagogy was 
not valued by all the teachers with whom I work, if indeed, any of my colleagues, 
in relation to this element of my practice. Although, Celine’s response was 
confronting it provided me with an opportunity to be answerable and account for 
my decision to foster infant’s learning in this way and have my viewpoint 
considered by the group and vice a versa. The teachers in the team challenged my 
practice asking (I-for-you): 
Sandy: Were you going to take the cups off them? 
Celine: But if you were focussing on something else. 
Bridgette: Well I actually thought they were having this interaction 
you see … 
Eliza: Aww 
Bridgette: … that’s my thinking. They’re engaging in this 
interaction and their cup banging is a form of language that they are 
using to respond to one another …   
Sue: I suppose you get to the stage where you think, I probably 
look at it  and think if I don’t stop that I’m going to have these 3 
children they are going to have to be completely changed, which I 
suppose isn’t an issue but when you’re busy it can be an issue.  
Sue: But do we let them sit with their bowls at the big table and 
bang them? Bang and crash them. 
And then re-enforcing the proverbial ‘we’ voice (I-for-us): 
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Celine: No, we ask them to stop it. 
Sue: So, it’s like the same thing, we’ve got to actually say well 
hang on a minute your food is for eating your water is for drinking. 
If you’re out in water play, then yeah you go for it. But I don’t 
know that’s how I look at it. 
Mel: You know we have to have clear expectations as a team 
really. So that the children know what those expectations are 
because if you never stop them doing it and I always take their cups 
away when they do it, that’s really sending quite a mixed message 
don’t you think? 
Sue: And I think every one of us says to them please don’t bang 
your bowl, please put your bowl nicely in front of you….  
Celine: or you motion … 
Mel: Food and water come hand and hand. I mean we are not 
allowed to play with food as far as a cultural thing goes. So I think 
maybe when there is water and water cups it’s for drinking. When 
it’s water play, play in it.  
Mel: I think it’s nice if you look at the positive of what you want 
them to do. 
Sue: Emm. 
Mel: water is for drinking, it’s as simple as that, not - don’t bang 
the cups, that’s all the incredible years stuff coming through 
focusing on what you want not what you don’t want. 
What this dialogue further revealed, was how there is no universal personal moral 
code. The research that I drew upon shaped my practice and the research that 
others in the dialogue drew upon for example the “Incredible Years” programme 
meant they were making morally different judgements. It is not that anybody 
came out and said I was not being answerable, but I perceived my colleagues felt 
that I was not complying with the ‘rules’ of the infant ECEC space. This event is 
connected to event 2 in that “we have to have clear expectations as a team … So 
that the children know what those expectations are”. I felt that although I was on 
the inside, I was actually on the outside. Prior to the staff meeting dialogue I had 
not viewed my actions in this way. In her thesis which explored self-review 
processes Grey (2010) emphasises the importance of moral accountability that 
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derives from building “respect and understanding” (p. 276) as opposed to 
accountability that comes from pleasing the group to stay in the good books so to 
speak. I expand on Grey’s (2010) view, suggesting that more attention be focused 
on teachers holding themselves morally answerable for their pedagogical acts.   
Although, I appreciate the value of rules and codes, I thought in this situation they 
were limiting what it meant for me to be answerable to infants and (my) self. 
Again, there is no formal policy or philosophy to say that complying in this way is 
what we, as a teaching team, are required to do but it is an unwritten rule which 
presumably will keep us all on the same page. Shotter (1989) informs, that people 
often endeavour to reproduce a certain way of engaging with others, that 
considers shared ways, in order to routinely respond in an accountable manner. 
This study offers an alternative to the view that accountability is primarily 
achieved when shared ways of being in a teaching team are agreed upon, by 
drawing attention to the moral complexity in decision making that goes beyond a 
shared set of rules and guidelines.  I have highlighted in this thesis, how the 
application of universal sets of values alone or rules, whether written or unwritten, 
cannot ensure accountability beyond passive obedience. ECEC spaces are filled 
with endless amounts of shades of grey, which call for pedagogical decision 
making that considers the particular in tandem with the universal (the moral and 
the ethical) in order for an answerable decision to spring forth. Building on the 
work of Snowden and Boone (2007), who contend that spaces of complexity do 
not lend themselves to certainty and easy-fix solutions, this thesis highlights the 
importance of teachers’ self-awareness in terms of how their values are 
compromised, confronted and created anew each time pedagogical decisions are 
made in dialogue with others.    
 The teachers’ voices highlighted for me the implications of playing with water in 
relation to playing with food from a bi-cultural perspective. I had not thought of 
water in this way, and the lived truth of this moment bears witness to the fact that 
if infants were tipping their food out, I would be concerned that they were not 
eating. But that was not my interpretation of what the infants were engaging in as 
evidenced by the original data source event. However, rather than justifying my 
practice, this event opened my eyes to pedagogical practice that I had not 
considered but which I could try and understand and be altered by it and 
potentially alter the pedagogical practice of my colleagues in some way. 
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My thoughts are that when pedagogical practice is suffocated by universally 
applied standards alone, the opportunities for creativity, relationship building, 
communication and dialogue are often snuffed out. I suggest attention be paid to 
an answerable pedagogy that pays attention to the moral implications when 
universal rules are applied. Colnerud (2006) illuminated how teachers through 
their dialogues with teachers are implicated in the lives of children regardless of 
the decisions they make to respond in particular ways. I add to this view that 
perhaps if teachers were less concerned with understanding infants or less 
concerned with understanding one other and more focused on understanding their 
multiple selves in relationship with infants and and how that ultimately influences 
their relationships with infants, one another and infant pedagogy. As this event 
has uncovered, I made moral choices beyond any stipulated rules, as such I assert 
that teachers are answerable selves and pedagogy is an act of moral answerability. 
The discoveries and insights that I have illuminated and discussed in this chapter 
question whether there can ever be a definable universally good teacher, but 
instead, an answerable teacher who is morally accountable and deeply implicated 
in her or his pedagogical acts. The subsequent and concluding chapter looks back 
on what I have learnt in relation to the research questions. It makes links to 
implications, limitations and future research. 
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Chapter Six: ‘Doing the Right Thing’ Revisited: By Way of a 
Conclusion 
Throughout this thesis I set out to interrogate my everyday acts of ‘doing the right 
thing’ as a pedagogical force of moral answerability. I did so through the route of 
dialogic self-study. Dialogic self-study research begins with a deep need to study 
one’s own practice and one’s role within it. It is about finding self and not losing 
self. However I discovered that there were many times along this journey where I 
had to let go of layers upon layers of myself, in a way it was as if I had to lose 
(my)self in order to find (my) self, so that I was not suffocated by the self who is 
constantly challenged with ‘doing the right thing’. Self who is constantly 
challenged by ‘doing the right thing’ is accountable to self and others who will 
read this work, like you, to ensure I have opened (my) answerable self up to the 
possibilities at my disposal. Possibilities which are free from the reigns that 
restrict creativity and harness the potential to expose (my) plural self and their 
thoughts and ideas in order to find me on these pages. 
6.1 Going back to the beginning 
I began this thesis highlighting an issue that I recognised in my early days as a 
practising teacher in relation to moral accountability. It was my assertion that 
often teachers are challenged in their practice pedagogically and morally when 
they find themselves in a position where they are unsure of whom to be 
accountable to. In my situation all those years ago an event happened where I 
found myself struggling between accountabilities to myself, the infant, and the 
teachers who were in the physical space. Faced with a moral choice, the 
significance of my acts on this infant’s learning and subjectivity weighed heavily 
on me ─ in that moment and still today. I also felt the weight of accountabilities 
that I had to the teacher and the teaching team as a whole, my actions had the 
potential to either pull me away from or toward consensus with the rest of the 
team. My fundamental aim of joining the teaching profession, at the risk of 
sounding cliché, was to make a positive difference in the lives of children. But in 
that moment my axiological position was being challenged because this situation 
that derived from practice had left me in what felt like a pedagogical no man’s 
land. It suddenly dawned on me that this was not just about me and ‘my’ practice 
but that whatever pedagogical decision I made was also being shaped in that 
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moment by other contributing factors such as the look in the infant’s eyes, the 
expression on the teacher’s face and tone of voice. Aware that whatever choice I 
made would have an influence on this infant’s subjectivity and every aspect of her 
learning I responded in a way that was morally answerable. Consequently, I end 
this thesis with the view that an awareness of how teachers are morally 
answerable for their pedagogical acts is central to all professional practice. It 
matters how one’s actions are interpreted by others in that dialogic space and vice 
a versa and this has been especially true for me as an infant teacher because of the 
value I place on people knowing that they matter. In this context, I am morally 
answerable, regardless of any hierarchy statutes or beliefs I might hold for the 
meaning that is created in that space and its influence on the lives of infants. 
Fundamental to this view based on my previous lived experiences is an awareness 
of how other external factors such as practices of other teachers, family 
expectations, centre management requirements, codes of ethics and core values 
have the potential to alter my practice and in doing so my acts.  
6.2 What was it all about and why? 
(My) dialogic self-study adds to the existing research base encompassing infant 
pedagogy by bringing the Bakhtinian notion of moral answerability (Bakhtin, 
1993) to the fore in order to better understand the pedagogical decisions and acts I 
made as a teacher in relation to my practice in dialogue with teachers as critical 
friends about practice that involved infants. The issue, as I saw it, was that ‘doing 
the right thing’ can mean many different things for different people in particular 
contexts at a particular time in a particular space. When applied to practice ‘doing 
the right thing’ pedagogically can mean a raft of different things depending on the 
particulars of a situation, the personalities present, time and space. With no 
universal ‘right’ way (as I see it) challenges can derive from practice when how a 
teacher acts intersects with the practices of other teachers, infants, their families 
and society as a whole. In many Western educational settings ‘doing the right 
thing’ is prescribed in the form of professional codes of practice, standards, 
policies, rules and regulations. These documents demand adherence by members 
of a professional body to ensure we are universally ‘doing the right thing’ by 
teacher colleagues, learners and the societies within which we live. These 
mandated codes, rules and standards typically do not set out principles for ‘doing 
the right thing’ that considers self. With the many subjective ways codes of ethical 
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conduct, standards and practices can be interpreted ‘doing the right thing’ may not 
be as universal as it looks from this viewpoint ─ highlighting the contested nature 
of ethical responsibility concerning teacher pedagogy. I have also expressed in 
previous chapters how teaching is a moral endeavour because it concerns human 
relations and actions (for example see Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2013; Hansen, 
2001). As such moral implications derive from practice when views of ‘doing the 
right thing’ are seen through different eyes.  
I have illuminated in this thesis how typically in education and educational 
research consideration is given to how teachers are ethically accountable as 
opposed to morally accountable to learners, their families, teacher colleagues and 
society as a whole. As such, I have brought to the surface how teachers are 
expected to account for their pedagogy through mandated evaluation processes 
such as self-review (in a New Zealand context), which often neglect the moral 
impact on teaching and learning acts ─ evidenced in the way they are often linked 
to ethical codes and standards. I therefore argue that there are no codes, rules or 
regulations that can fully address the complexity of pedagogy, especially infant 
pedagogy. It is (my) assertion that through greater self-awareness I and perhaps 
other teachers too can better understand what it means pedagogically to do the 
right thing by all others and (my) self without losing self in the process.  
Moral answerability (Bakhtin, 1993), which invites dialogic processes of 
meaning-making between (my) pedagogical acts from multiple standpoints across 
time and space was the means I used to better understand pedagogical decisions 
and acts and their complexity in relation to practice, particularly when engaged in 
dialogue with other teachers. Selecting a self-study method aligned with dialogic 
methodology provided a way to connect (my) self, others and pedagogical 
practices in consideration of infant practice. This thesis was therefore based on the 
premise that teacher pedagogy is an act of moral answerability.  
To support my argument for a dialogic self-study approach I made links to 
evaluative requirements that exist in my New Zealand ECEC context. Both 
dialogic self-study and self-review are processes concerned with evaluation of the 
self. The alignment of self-study places the lens firmly on self-evaluation from the 
perspective of the other in order to evaluate one’s axiological position. It was 
important to better understand my axiological position because this is the value 
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laden basis for my moral judgements, perceptions and responses. From a 
Bakhtinian perspective I need others to give me value because I do not possess an 
autonomous value-oriented self-consciousness. When pedagogy is viewed as an 
act of moral answerability a means is provided for teachers to gain a better 
understanding of the pedagogical decisions they are making in relation to their 
practice because this notion pays particular attention to how individuals evaluate 
their axiological position. In this thesis I explained how it is vital that I understand 
my axiological position because from a Bakhtinian perspective morality is 
comprised of the value systems of each person that orient their actions and 
behaviours as human beings in the event of co-Being. Which means with a greater 
understanding of my axiological position, from the perspective of others, I will 
better understand the morality concerned with the decisions I make which for 
better or worse will alter my life and the lives of others for which I am 
answerable. Turning to the research questions I asked in what ways am I morally 
answerable to (my) self and others through my practice and what does ‘doing the 
right thing’ mean for infant pedagogy and for the professional ECEC teacher. 
6.3 Dialogic self-study insights and discoveries 
This dialogic self-study responded to the issues surrounding moral choice, 
pedagogical acts and accountability that I as a teacher in an early years context are 
faced with in everyday moments of living. Often, I have wondered why teachers 
do what they do. I am sure they (other teachers) have wondered what it is that I do 
and why I do it too. But seldom do we ever give such ponderings the status they 
deserve in shaping pedagogy. I am also quite sure that the babies whom ‘we’ 
teach must so often be bemused by the acts that take place in the “craziness” and 
“busy-ness”, to use the words of several critical friends, of the space that makes 
up the ECEC space that many infants spend a considerable amount of time at. 
Looking back on the insights and discoveries of this thesis it is possible to see 
how dialogic self-study opened up a way for me to better understand how I am 
implicated in ‘doing what I do’ in my endeavours ‘to do the right thing’. 
6.3.1 In what ways am I morally answerable to (my) self and 
others through my practice? 
My dialogic self-study has shown me the extent to which I am accountable to 
(my) answerable self simultaneously through responses that orient toward 
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multiple others, for example the teaching team leader, other teachers, codes of 
ethics and family members all in the same dialogic event. This discovery 
highlights the complexity of infant pedagogy when being answerable means being 
accountable to different selves in the same moment. I now realise, more keenly 
than ever, that ‘doing the right thing’ can mean different things for different 
people illuminating the moral complexity of infant pedagogy. Each answerable 
act (original data source event) provided evidence of how pedagogical practices 
that I considered ‘to be doing the right thing’ were not valued by all members of 
the teaching team. 
By stripping back, the layers upon layers of complexity that comprise (my) plural 
self, which was at times daunting, I discovered the answerable self who has 
numerous accountabilities to different others, that are taking place in every lived 
moment-by-moment. Insights revealed not only the complexity but also the moral 
weight experienced in endeavours to be answerable to multiple relationships with 
others both in the present and in the past, known and unknown. In discovering that 
self is answerable I am better able to notice, recognise and respond to different 
ways of being and becoming in dialogue with others. I recognised that some of 
(my) answerable self’s ways of being morally accountable meant being aware of 
when I was denying my subjectivity or the subjectivity of others, upholding the 
best interests of the infant and valuing the infants’ rights to have their voice heard.   
When viewed in this way it was possible to see more clearly how different lived 
and received answerable positions pulled in different directions depending on the 
particulars of the situation. The significance of better understanding how I 
oriented the impact of others’ evaluations on answerable self’s axiological 
position is brought to the surface. This is important because of the everyday form 
shaping potential of others to shape and alter (my) answerable self’s ways of 
being in relationships and practice. I have discovered that I cannot talk about 
pedagogy without talking about the person, the personality and the relationship 
that sits behind it. So often in education people are told to leave ‘the personal’ at 
the door in exchange for the ‘professional’, as if it were possible to shed all those 
emotions and values that make up a personality before entering the educational 
space.  
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The personal being central to the act of teaching is more integral to the teaching 
profession than to any other professional group because personal relationships are 
“an intimate part of teaching” and a teacher’s personality encroaches on every 
facet of this interpersonal work (Snook, 2003, p. 79). I assert that professionalism 
is a discourse that could potentially get in the way of people being really truly 
morally answerable.   
I suggest a re-envisioned view of professionalism be sought one in which the 
teacher as answerable self becomes the main starting point in understanding and 
stimulating professional development. Ironically, although in many respects this 
thesis was a study about my teacher pedagogy it was all about “me”! The 
discovery that as a teacher I am an answerable self in relationship with others 
summons a re-conceptualisation of professional identity as a plural concept. This 
challenges the traditional conceptualisation of professional identity as singular, in 
ownership of a defined set of assets valued by the teaching profession.  I was 
surprised to find that being answerable meant (my) answerable self was 
implicated in ways that were foreign to me such as in my role as a manipulator in 
order to bring about a consensus because I valued how I had engaged with the 
infants but perceived that my teacher colleagues did not place the same 
importance on my pedagogical approach so when I got the opportunity to have us 
all on the same page I stole it! I did this by speaking for the other teachers in the 
dialogue in a way that restricted and made invisible their voices.  
By viewing professional identity as a plural concept, I was able to see how in 
some situations the professional plural “I” was answerable through practices that 
were manipulative.  The art of manipulation may not typically be included in a 
‘best practice’ list of valued qualities that are sought after by the teaching 
profession, but I was advocating for the voices of both infants to be heard and 
respectfully attended to. I am not suggesting that the moral positions of the other 
teachers were wrong because they did not align with mine. On the contrary, there 
is no universal right or wrong, in my opinion, but their moral attitudes toward 
‘doing the right thing’ in this situation were different to mine. As such, they 
motivated me to respond to them in a way that denied their subjectivities. But at 
the same time my endeavour to have us all on the same page was an answerable 
response to the infants and what I considered to be in their best interests, 
alongside their right to have their views respected (in line with UNCROC), it 
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spoke to the received truth from research projects I had participated in 
(surrounding infant-teacher dialogue and the importance of response, see White et 
al., 2015), it also spoke to my interpretation of the teachers code of professional 
ethics and responsibilities. This discovery highlighted for me how accounting for 
infants’ learning and their relationships is not isolated to following universal 
codes of ethics, standards, or rules. Being morally accountable and answerable to 
infant pedagogy encompasses being aware of the morality that is created between 
participants in the dialogue.  
This study has shown me that there can be no universal perfect professional 
teacher ─ she or he does not exist because as I showed my values are constantly 
being re-created in every unique situation. Through the visibility of my values in 
the dialogue the answerable selves are born in that moment. My personality is 
what makes the professional me, me! Bakhtin (1990; 1993) constantly re-iterates 
the uniqueness of individuals and the uniqueness of the particulars of a situation. 
As explained in chapters one and two, it is from this position ─ of my 
outsidedness to your experience of yourself and the world and your outsidedness 
to mine ─ that Bakhtin (1990; 1993) believed people can offer moral value to one 
another. This is achieved through evaluations and judgements that accompany the 
knowledge and orientations (my) answerable selves make in relation to others 
based on differences in terms of all (my) answerable selves varying aspects such 
as values, culture, gender, sexuality, different experiences, particular situation in 
the world, beliefs, and personality. It is in relationship with the other that (my) 
answerable selves see themselves in relation to their pedagogy.  
As I have been at pains to point out moral answerability arises from one’s 
axiological position which is imbued with the voices from one’s past. I was 
answerable in the staff meeting dialogue for the infants in the events that had 
occurred previously which was because of my deeply held values such as relating 
to sharing of selves, that placed importance on ensuring people know they matter. 
This was visible in the staff meeting dialogue when I felt compelled to advocate 
for the way I responded to the infants, even though my fellow teacher colleagues 
explained they would have engaged differently. It is my assertion that answerable 
acts are linked across time and space. As such, there is not one isolated 
answerable moment. Instead the interconnectedness of moral answerability across 
time and space ─ acts with infants shaping my practice from one perspective 
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interconnected with staff meeting dialogue with teachers shaping my practice 
from another perspective, codes, articles and valued research shaping my practice 
from another perspective and then family values in relation to giving of self, 
shaping my practice from yet another vantage point ─ all intertwined. These 
discoveries emphasise the significance of considering the moral impact on 
pedagogical practices from multiple different perspectives in order to better 
understand the moral consequences of actions.  
Although, insights have not made infant pedagogy any less interpretive, what this 
dialogic self-study has provided is a way to better understand the moral 
seriousness of how I am implicated through my pedagogical interpretations ─ 
with infants and with other teachers. The discoveries of this thesis suggest that 
being answerable to (my) self and others means not only being aware of my 
axiological position but also ensuring attention is focused on what is valued and 
the values that are continuously being shaped and taking on new meanings in 
dialogue with infants as active rather than passive participants in their learning 
and relationships ─ and ultimately (my) answerable self’s learning and 
relationships with all others in the shared ECEC space. 
I now have a greater awareness of how being morally answerable to (my) self and 
others in one situation has the potential to alter pedagogical practices of and with 
others in another context. The never-ending potential for pedagogy to alter and be 
altered suggests there is no universal infant pedagogical approach but rather one 
continually created anew in the dialogue. Which means there can be no ‘best 
practice’, instead I suggest there is an answerable practice which beckons teachers 
to expose their vulnerabilities in order to notice, recognise and respond to parts of 
themselves that had previously been untapped.  
6.3.2 What does ‘doing the right thing’ mean in my infant 
pedagogy and for the professional ECEC teacher? 
As a teacher whose pedagogy is answerably driven, I, like many, perhaps all, of 
my colleagues are motivated by a personal conviction to ‘do the right thing’. The 
issue is less my desire to do so but its origin and, importantly, its consequences 
for infants. When the professional ECEC teacher is viewed as an answerable self, 
focus is placed on responses in relation to the particulars of what is valued in each 
lived experience in tandem with what is universally agreed upon. Viewed in this 
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way, what is valued professionally and pedagogically is not fixed but born 
between the answerable self in relationship with others. Although this dialogic 
self-study was about my voice, the alternative voices of my teacher colleagues 
were implicated in relation to my self-understanding and self-awareness. 
Listening to and hearing the teachers’ voices, gaining access to their excess of 
seeing, enabled me to see aspects of (my) self that were previously unseen, this 
was made possible through dialogue. Telling my story in this dialogic self-study 
has given me the opportunity to see that being accountable for infants’ learning 
and relationships, by ‘doing the right thing’, does not mean having to comply and 
please without question. I now see that ‘peace and harmony’ can be a problem 
because if everybody just passively agrees the status quo remains unaltered and 
creativity and new meanings may remain buried under a cover of compliance. It is 
not to say that ‘peace and harmony’ are not welcome, of course they are but in a 
space that also celebrates challenge and alterity. Being answerable to infants, 
teachers and self, meant exposing self in dialogue and being exposed by others. 
Insights reveal that it was often in the moments of struggle, challenge, 
vulnerability and discomfort that dialogue was opened up and new ways of seeing 
were born. An openness for new ways of seeing came about I believe from the 
exposure of my values, feelings and emotions in the dialogue ─ the rawness of 
(my) inner dialogue lay bare in these moments. What I found was that often when 
consensus was sought the dialogue was shut down or silenced because inner 
emotions remained disclosed. I now understand the importance of recognising the 
self who wants to stand up and say hey wait a minute, I disagree. That self 
deserves to have a voice rather than being continuously suffocated by the self who 
passively complies without question or contemplation in order to share the same 
page with others and not cause any waves.  
I can better recognise how my resistance or willingness to expose my multiple 
selves’ values, emotions, and feelings shapes infant pedagogy and the lives of 
infants. Insights have already had an impact on my practice and how I respond to 
others in life in general because I am more aware of how I mask my inner 
thoughts with people in dialogue. Prior to this dialogic self-study I did not realise 
the potential for (my) embodied language to mask my ‘true’ feelings for example 
when I nodded my head in agreement when I was actually not in agreement with 
what people were saying. I have recognised through dialogic self-study that 
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‘doing the right thing’ often means not being part of the ‘we’. Although not being 
on the ‘same page’ can be challenging, by having the opportunity to evaluate (my) 
answerable selves from the perspectives of the team enabled me to discover more 
about me and the person I am pedagogically in relationship with others.  
These discoveries present a significant challenge to contemporary literature which 
highlights the importance of pedagogical relationships with children, their 
families, other teachers but does not often talk about a person’s relationship with 
their pedagogy. These relationships are very intimate and personal located in the 
constantly altering contexts of living moments. The values that each teacher 
brings are shaped by these moments. I now better understand that to improve my 
pedagogical practice it is important to understand that I am also in a relationship 
with pedagogy. I discovered that ‘doing the right thing’ meant not always being 
on the ‘same page’ as my teacher colleagues and that moral answerability requires 
deep reflection and courage. An implication of this insight for my practice meant 
recognising the negative impact for myself and others (especially infants) of 
denying my subjectivity and masking what I was really thinking and feeling to 
align with the group. At other times alternative opportunities for me to be 
answerable were opened up when teachers challenged my moral stance. This 
insight highlighted how as a teacher my own personal moral code is always in 
dialogue with the moral codes of multiple others. I suggest that there are no 
universal personal moral codes. 
What I have also realised throughout this self exodus is  that ‘doing the right 
thing’ means paying attention to fleeting moments of response because of the 
potential for these moments to alter the dialogue and the truth of a situation. With 
this new realisation, I am now more aware of how others’ (e.g., teachers, infants, 
and families) contributions to my practice will depend on which of the answerable 
selves is engaging. Indeed, multiple different selves could be engaging with 
different others simultaneously. This insight highlights the complexity of moral 
answerability in any given situation because how I responded from the 
perspective of each of these different selves in the dialogue had the potential to 
affirm or alter my axiological position causing me to experience a feeling of inner 
peace or turmoil as one moral position provoked another. In this, I believe I am a 
better, if greatly challenged, teacher. 
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6.4 Contributions of this dialogic self-study research  
The insights I have gained throughout this thesis are, however, not for me alone. 
The broader contributions of this research are both methodological and 
pedagogical with a particular emphasis on infant research. This dialogic self-study 
has highlighted the moral messiness of infant pedagogy. The messiness of 
pedagogy has previously been foregrounded in a study which urged teachers to 
embrace aspects of the curriculum, characterised by uncertainty, that were 
typically swept under the carpet (White, 2011). In this thesis, the messiness has 
not been swept under the carpet but rather rests within and ‘in between’ different 
answerable selves. Dialogic self-study for infant teacher pedagogy as an act of 
moral answerability provided an alternative approach to infant teacher practice. 
Dialogic self-study contributes to the infant research knowledge base by 
illuminating the importance of moral answerability in order to better understand 
the complexity of acts, accountabilities and moral choices that derive from 
practice. Dialogic self-study has the potential to make an important, previously 
unexplored contribution as a formal self-study method. This dialogic self-study 
makes a contribution by demonstrating to self-study researchers that Bakhtinian 
dialogic methodology is effective as a means to explore current practices in order 
to better understand the impact of infant teacher practices on those they teach and 
beyond.  
Moral answerability as a theoretical perspective is a contribution to the field of 
education and more explicitly, ECEC. Research employing the Bakhtinian notion 
of moral answerability is limited in ECEC research. By focussing on moral 
answerability as a moral imperative in the early years this dialogic self-study 
informs infant pedagogy by providing insight into the ways teachers are morally 
responsible and accountable to infants in ECEC contexts through their everyday 
moments of interaction.  Moral answerability as a moral imperative provides a 
way for teachers to explore the complexities and dynamics of all areas of their 
pedagogical practice and its impact on others in the dialogic space of an ECEC 
context and beyond.  
A strength of this research was the alignment of dialogic methodology to a self-
study method in order for a way to be provided for me to reflect on and evaluate 
the self’s inner dialogue (reflexive journal) beyond a traditional view of how the 
experience affected an individualised me in relation to (my) selves’ external 
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dialogue with other teachers, about my practice. Teachers often face challenges 
making explicit their own reflections particularly in relation to moral occurrences 
in their everyday lived experiences (Colnerud, 2006). According to Bradbury et al 
(2012) there is often an individualistic lens shone on reflection. This critique is 
taken up by Kotzee (2012) who bring centre stage Schön’s (1983) reflective 
approach to illuminate its focus on the inner life of the teacher and her own 
interpretations of her learning experiences. Although these authors recognise its 
stronghold in mainstream education, they feel it has lost its “critical edge” (p. 5). 
In agreement Boud (2010) points out the challenge from professional practice that 
confronts teachers and researchers to find new ways of thinking about reflection 
that recognise the complexities and the relational qualities of practice. A dialogic 
self-study offers alternative ways for the social dimensions of reflection to be 
viewed and evaluated by not only considering the perspectives of others but also 
the perspectives of multiple ‘I’ orientations (I-for-you, you-for-me, I-for-us, I-for-
thou). When viewed through a Bakhtinian dialogic lens it was possible to study 
the self by reflecting upon and evaluating my inner dialogue with self in tandem 
with my external dialogue with others from both inside and outside perspectives.   
6.5 Implications and future dialogic self-study research 
A dialogic self-study, while profoundly confronting at times, provided a way for 
me to be an active author of my own experience within it. As the subject of my 
own research, dialogic self-study provided a way for my voice to be heard. I 
began to know ‘myself’. In returning to the research questions it would have been 
very easy for self-study to rest solely within the self. But dialogic self-study is 
never just about me, this would have been an indulgence. A dialogic self-study is 
also about what is taking place in the dialogue ‘in between’ teacher colleagues and 
(my) answerable self. Although this was a study of the self, the alternative voices 
of my ‘professional’ teacher colleagues were implicated as what they valued was 
responded to by me in the dialogue. According to Hansen (2013) teacher 
education pays little attention to programmes that enable preservice teachers to 
better understand how the moral aspects of teaching are enacted through their 
practice. Building on this view I assert teacher education programmes consider 
dialogic self-study as a way for beginning teachers to better understand the moral 
dimensions of teaching in order to better understand and improve their practice. 
As student and teacher populations become increasingly diverse, educational 
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settings face the challenge of promoting pedagogical environments that are 
sensitive to pedagogical participants’ multiple ways of being beyond solely 
delivering academic curricula (Husu & Tirri, 2001).  
My dialogic self-study has highlighted the need for teachers, who work with 
infants, to be critical and philosophical thinkers who are not afraid to challenge 
the dominant discourse in order to advocate for infants. I agree with Shapira-
Lishchinsky (2011) who suggest programmes be developed for teachers to enrich 
their moral knowledge and empower them to “develop pluralistic attitudes and 
more complex moral understanding of the choices open to them” (p. 655).  
However, as my dialogic self-study illuminates, as an infant teacher who was part 
of a team, I was not always well prepared when I disagreed with or was 
challenged by my teacher colleagues.  
An implication for practice is that when teachers’ views sit outside the views of 
others this often causes further issues. It is my suggestion that teacher education 
programmes not only focus on the moral dimensions of teaching but also on what 
it means to work in an ECEC teaching team so that teachers can enter the 
profession better equipped with the skills and insight required to face the potential 
struggles of being morally answerable for pedagogical decisions and acts without 
losing self but also being answerable for others as others. According to Flores and 
Day (2006) beginning teachers are often not well prepared for the moral aspects of 
teaching. My research suggests that teachers with experience, like (my) self are 
also not always well equipped with how the moral dimensions of teaching impact 
on their work. As such I suggest a further contribution would be the potential for 
dialogic self-study to be considered as an extension on self-review practices by 
paying attention to the moral impact of teachers’ work in order for teachers to 
better understand in dialogue with others how the moral aspects of teaching are 
enacted through their practice. A dialogic self-study is also not regulated by a 
regulatory body such as ERO.  
Self-study is about studying the self that is self-explanatory.  However, highly 
evident throughout this study was that a dialogic self-study is not just about the 
self. The assertion that a self-study is not about the individual ‘I’ was reflected in 
the way meanings were generated in the dialogue that shaped what I valued in 
relation to (my) self, my pedagogical practice and my axiological position. Also, 
the infants and teachers were continually referring to their practice or relating the 
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meanings that were being created in the dialogue to their lived experiences and 
moral attitudes even though this was a self-study about my pedagogical practice. 
However, in undertaking a study of the self the challenge is in not being able to 
carry out self-study on your colleagues.  
Time and time again in my interpretation of the data I had to remind (my) self that 
this was a self-study about me and ethically and morally I did not have a right to 
analyse the practice of my teacher colleagues. However, it was challenging not 
critiquing their practice at the same time as I was analysing how they had 
critiqued mine. I suggest this is an issue about self-study as a method and perhaps 
as a methodology when yoked with dialogism which orients my focus far beyond 
the ‘self’ while retaining the centrality of me as plural selves! To cope with this 
issue I had to continually remind (my) self that this was a dialogic self-study 
about how I received what the teachers had said about my practice in the dialogue 
and how it impacted on the way that I looked at the event NOT how the teachers 
looked at the event ─ that is a different study for future research. At times my 
supervisors were at pains to remind me not to fall into the ‘moral trap’ that people 
fall into when they start to assert other people’s values to other people’s 
contributions in a dialogue, which is another issue to be cautious of when 
undertaking this type of research.  
This dialogic self-study took place in one ECEC context and drew upon my 
practice as the only source of research. It did take place across a range of different 
contexts ─ in dialogue with infants and teachers separately. This dialogic self-
study makes the claim that as a teacher I have multiple answerable selves who are 
implicated in unique relationships with others’ multiple answerable selves. As this 
research has shown each of these multiple selves has the potential to be altered 
depending on the particulars of the situation and other selves’ moral 
answerabilities that may be part of the encounter. This research did not analyse 
the pedagogical practice of my teacher colleagues as an act of moral 
answerability. It also, did not, nor did it set out to, consider the pedagogical 
practices of teachers outside of an infant context or outside of a teaching team 
context. Nevertheless, it would be valuable for future research to consider a 
collaborative dialogic self-study approach in order to analyse the pedagogical 
practices of multiple teachers from multiple different plural ‘I’ perspectives (I-for-
myself, I-for-you, you-for-me, I-for-us, and I-for-thou). A collaborative dialogic 
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self-study would provide insight into the form shaping potential of my practice to 
alter the practices of my teacher colleagues which was not explored in this study. 
Future research could use a dialogic self-study approach to explore the different 
types of professional identities that teachers’ answerable selves identify with and 
what that would mean working in an educational environment particularly 
teaching team situations. An understanding of self as a plural construct opens up 
potential to better understand what is meant by ‘quality’ relationships for which 
the self is answerable. For example an investigation into the different identities a 
teacher’s answerable selves have with different infants’ selves could uncover 
different layers of quality depending on the accountabilities and how she or he is 
answerable in a particular situation i.e., there could be a difference if a teacher is 
in a key teacher role or if a parent is present, in a ‘we’ or ‘us’ situation. 
A dialogic self-study provided the opportunity for me to account for the moral 
answerability that existed in the relations between the infants and my selves as 
they played out through the staff meeting dialogues. What became very apparent 
to me was how my account of pedagogical acts that had taken place between the 
infants and me had the potential to be viewed differently at the staff meeting 
dialogue and consequently shaped depending upon which selves-in-relationship-
with-other I was responding to. This discovery made me aware of the importance 
of having the video footage available to the teachers to view so that the infants’ 
voices could be seen and heard as opposed to no video account which would have 
meant only my words in relation to the event would have been heard. The video 
made it possible to transcend time and space by bringing the past forward into the 
present.  
6.6 Concluding words 
This research informs infant pedagogy, policy and practice by highlighting infant 
pedagogy as an act of moral answerability that deeply implicates the infant 
teacher in every lived moment. As others who have gone before me have 
explained (White, 2016a; de Vocht, 2015b) finalising words in ECEC pedagogy 
challenge a dialogic way of thinking. However, in my endeavours to close this 
chapter of my thesis, I end by saying how I am so much more aware of (my) 
answerable self in relationship with others especially how the dialogue is opened 
up or shut down when selves are exposed or often brought to a consensus when 
the authoritative voice speaks. Dialogic self-study has opened my eyes to the 
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importance of understanding the many different answerable selves that make up 
me in my relationships with others. I have such a greater self-awareness of the 
pedagogical decisions that I make as an infant teacher and associated acts in 
practice having undertaken this dialogic self-study. 
By viewing infant pedagogy as an act of moral answerability it was possible to see 
beyond externally mandated standards, codes and rules to how I was personally 
responsible and accountable for the particulars of my acts in the moment. My 
study implies that if teachers are to be accountable for the learning of learners it is 
essential that the moral dimensions of teaching in everyday lived experiences are 
prioritised in tandem with an ethical allegiance to externally mandated codes, 
prescriptions and standards. Bakhtin’s (1990; 1993) notion of moral answerability 
provides a way for this to be achieved. This thesis was my response to a greater 
awareness surrounding moral answerability in educational settings ─ in particular 
infant pedagogical contexts. It is my hope that (my) dialogic self-study will 
generate further responses that will alter the way ‘we’ think about moral and 
ethical accountability in education.   
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Appendix 1 
Layout and positioning of video recording devices 
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Appendix 2 
Transcript conventions  
[ Point overlap in conversation starts 
] Point overlap in conversation ends 
(0.0) Lapsed time in tenths of seconds 
(   ) Non verbal language e.g. (smile) 
word Speaker emphasis  
word Loud tone 
Word 
------- 
Soft tone 
☺ Laughter 
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Appendix 3 
 University of Waikato Ethics approval letter 
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Appendix 4 
Dear Centre Coordinator 
As you are aware I am a teacher in the infant setting of the XXX. I am very interested in 
the way I am answerable to infants in pedagogical events and how my pedagogy 
impacts on infants’ subjectivities and relationships with people, places and things in an 
early childhood education (ECE) context. In addition, the interpretations of other infant 
teachers in relation to events of pedagogical significance surrounding my practice with 
infants are of great interest to me. I am writing to request formal approval from you, as 
the centre coordinator and representative of the Board of Trustees to undertake a PhD 
research study at the centre and to ask if you could please inform the Board of Trustees 
of my doctoral research and seek approval from them.  
I would like to explore the following questions specifically: 
• How am I, as an infant teacher, answerable to infants in everyday pedagogical 
events? 
• How do my answerable acts in pedagogical events impact on infants in the 
dialogic space of an early childhood education context? 
• How do my answerable acts influence the embodied language choices I make 
and how do these choices impact on infants’ subjectivities?  
• What are the pedagogical tensions for teachers in infant based early childhood 
care and education. 
I would like to video record my practice as I interact with infants for 1 hour per week 
in total, for a period of 16 weeks. Video recording would occur between February 2016 
and August 2016. On a monthly basis, preferably at a staff meeting, I would like to 
invite infant teachers to view, reflect upon and discuss a selection of events I have 
selected that are of pedagogical significance to me; these teacher reflection discussions 
would also be video recorded. 
I am also approaching you in the first instance, as coordinator of the centre, to seek your 
consent for me to approach teachers in the infant setting and parents or caregivers of 
infants with this in mind. In addition I am approaching you to request that if parents or 
caregivers of infants and fellow infant teachers feel distress, discomfort or compromised 
in any way with the video recording of my practice that they can contact you if they feel 
they cannot or do not wish to contact me to explain their situation, and recording will 
cease on that day or at the staff meeting. In your role as a potential mentor to 
participants it is important that video recording occur when you are not included in the 
teacher ratios. Participants will also have the option to contact my supervisors 
(Associate Professor Jayne White email: whiteej@waikato.ac.nz; or Dr Carol Murphy 
email: carolmm@waikato.ac.nz).  
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In giving your consent you would be agreeing to the following activities which would 
take place in your ECE setting during this time: 
 
December 2015: consent forms sent to teachers. 
4 January 2016: Consent forms sent to parents or caregivers of infants. 
5 February 2016: Completion of all consent forms from teachers, parents or caregivers 
of infants. Please note consent forms will need to be obtained from parents of new 
infants enrolling at the centre during the data collection period. 
8-9 February 2016: Two days would be spent introducing the cameras to the infants in 
the ECE infant setting; this would include both the video recording device that I will 
wear and the tracking cameras that will be positioned in the inside and outside 
environment. 
February to August 2016: 1 hour filming on a weekly basis, across different times of the 
day and across different days of the week for 16 weeks. Video recording would take 
place between February and August 2016. I will wear a video recording device to record 
my practice from my field of vision and the tracking cameras will be positioned 
accordingly to capture my practice and the wider context from a different visual field. 
Other teachers in the infant setting and family members of infants may be captured in 
the video recording process. 
February to August 2016: Video recorded reflective discussions with infant teachers at 
staff meetings on a monthly basis for 4 months will be undertaken whereby a selection 
of events I have selected of pedagogical significance to me, related to my practice, of up 
to a total of 12 minutes in duration will be viewed, reflected upon and discussed by 
infant teachers in collaboration with me. The practice of other teachers could be part of 
an event of pedagogical significance related to my practice and would therefore be part 
of the dialogue at these meetings. 
February to August 2016: Parents/caregivers and infant teachers may approach you or 
me if they feel an infant is in distress or discomfort and recording will cease for that 
day. In addition, teachers can approach you or me if they feel compromised and 
recording will cease for that day or at the staff meeting. 
All participants would have the right to withdraw from the study at any time during the 
data collection period. Should the families of the infants choose to withdraw their 
child’s involvement, video recording will then take place on a day when their infant is 
either not present at the centre or it may be possible to undertake video recording when 
their infant is sleeping. If other adults or children in the setting feature on any footage 
that has been taken wish to withdraw, any video or notes where they are visible would 
be destroyed. The footage and notes would be accessed by me, as researcher and my 
PhD supervisors Associate Professor Jayne White, Dr Carol Murphy and Professor 
Bronwen Cowie.  
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All data collected, including notes taken by the researcher, footage and transcripts, will 
be transcribed or captured in an electronic format. This will then be stored on a 
password protected computer software programme and external hard drive for the 
duration of the PhD research study. At completion of the study all material will be 
stored for a subsequent five years on a password protected computer software 
programme. 
Participants (or parents/caregivers of participants) would be given the opportunity to 
check any of the selected video recording excerpts which feature as part of the results. 
Any of these images that they do not approve of would be deleted from the data set and 
any future presentations. Infant teachers would also be given the opportunity to review, 
amend and approve the transcripts of the reflective staff meeting discussions. 
Filming will continue during nappy changing procedures (because these are known to 
be prime times for infant-teacher interaction) ― where private body parts are exposed 
the footage will be discretely edited. Those excerpts that are approved may be used for 
teaching purposes and/or shared with members of the public via presentations.  
Due to the visual nature of the data, it is not possible to assure confidentiality or 
anonymity to the participants in this study. However, teachers will be given a 
pseudonym by me should they request one; and parents or caregivers will be given a 
pseudonym for their child should they wish to have one. Your ECE setting will not be 
named; instead I will give it a pseudonym. 
The research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher 
reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives will be disseminated in my 
PhD thesis at conferences, in other oral and visual presentations, and in downloadable 
publications including journals such as Video Journal of Education and Pedagogy and 
other video-based educational forum. The research findings, including stills of footage, 
video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and 
quotations/narratives may be used for teaching purposes. 
As a management representative of this ECE setting you can request a copy of any of 
these publications by contacting the researcher (bms17@students.waikato.ac.nz). An 
electronic copy of this PhD thesis will become widely available, as the University of 
Waikato requires that a digital copy of a Doctoral thesis be lodged permanently in the 
University’s digital repository: Research Commons ― a link will be sent to you on 
completion of my thesis. 
If you agree, please sign the attached consent form by the 5th December. 
Yours truly 
Bridgette Redder 
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Appendix 5 
Teacher pedagogy as an answerable act in dialogic encounters with 
infants.  
A self-study of teacher interactions as a moral imperative. 
This form invites you to give consent for your early childhood education (ECE) service 
to participate in this PhD research study which explores my practice as an infant teacher 
and how it impacts on infants’ subjectivities and relationships with people, places and 
things in an ECE context. 
Please indicate your consent by ticking the box beside each relevant statement below, 
and signing the accompanying form by 5th December 2015. In signing this sheet you are 
agreeing to the following statements: 
□ I have read the explanatory letter, which I have kept for my own information, and 
have had the opportunity to seek clarification on any issues. 
□ I have approached the Board of Trustees and informed them of Bridgette Redder’s 
PhD research study and they have given their approval for this doctoral research to be 
undertaken at the centre.   
□ I understand that infants in this ECE setting will feature in the video recording that is 
taken. 
□ I understand that although the focus of this research is on Bridgette Redder’s practice 
with infants (as the teacher and researcher) other teachers in this ECE setting and  
family members of infants may be captured in the video recording of Bridgette’s 
practice with infants. 
□ I understand that video recording of Bridgette’s practice with infants will occur for 1 
hour on a weekly basis, across different times of the day and across different days of the 
week for 16 weeks. Video recording would take place between February and August 
2016. Bridgette will wear a video recording device. I also understand that 2 tracking 
cameras will be located, 1 inside and 1 outside to video record Bridgette’s practice, 
from a different visual perspective, as she interacts with infants.  
□ I understand that infant teachers will be asked to view, reflect and discuss their 
interpretations, up to 12 minutes in total, of events selected by Bridgette which she 
considers to be of pedagogical significance in relation to her own practice. This will 
take place on a monthly basis for 4 months at a staff meeting, over a period of 6 months. 
These reflexive discussions will be video recorded. I also understand that the practice of 
other teachers may feature in these events of pedagogical significance related to 
Bridgette’s practice and maybe discussed as part of these reflexive discussions. I 
understand that teachers will have the opportunity to review, amend and approve 
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transcriptions of these reflexive discussions on a monthly basis. 
□ I understand that the research findings, including stills of footage, video footage 
excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives will also be 
disseminated in my PhD thesis, downloadable publications including journals such as 
Video Journal of Education and Pedagogy and other video-based educational forum, at 
conferences and in other oral and visual presentations.  
□ I understand that the research findings, including stills of footage, video footage 
excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives could also 
be used for teaching purposes.   
□ I understand that an electronic copy of this PhD thesis will become widely available, 
as the University of Waikato requires that a digital copy of a Doctoral thesis be lodged 
permanently in the University’s digital repository: Research Commons. I understand 
that a link will be sent to me on completion of this PhD thesis. 
□ I understand that participants can ask that any images or other information about them 
are withdrawn at any point of data collection ― at which time any footage containing 
images of themselves or their child will be destroyed. 
□ I understand that, due to the visual nature of this study, anonymity and confidentiality 
cannot be assured for the participants or the setting. 
□ I understand that parents/caregivers and infant teachers can approach me or Bridgette 
if they feel an infant is in distress or discomfort and recording will cease for that day. 
□ I understand that teachers can approach me or Bridgette if they feel compromised and 
recording will cease for that day or at the staff meeting. 
□ I understand that this ECE setting will not be named. 
□ I/we agree/do not agree [please circle which applies] for this ECE setting to take part 
in Bridgette Redder’s PhD research study as described in the information letter.  
 
Name of ECE setting ………………………………………….. 
Name of Centre Coordinator ………………………………. 
Contact details ………………………………………………. 
Signature of Centre Coordinator …………………………………… 
Thank you for completing this form. Please return it to me by 5th December 2015. 
Bridgette Redder 
  
  
147 
 
 
Appendix 6 
Dear Teacher 
I am very interested in the way I am answerable to infants in pedagogical events and 
how my pedagogy impacts on infants’ subjectivities and relationships with people, 
places and things in an early childhood education (ECE) context. In addition, the 
interpretations of other infant teachers in relation to events of pedagogical significance 
surrounding my practice with infants are of great interest to me. 
I have planned to undertake a PhD research study in which I would like to explore the 
following questions specifically: 
• How am I, as an infant teacher, answerable to infants in everyday pedagogical 
events? 
• How do my answerable acts in pedagogical events impact on infants in the 
dialogic space of an early childhood education context? 
• How do my answerable acts influence the embodied language choices I make 
and how do these choices impact on infants’ subjectivities?  
• What are the pedagogical tensions for teachers in infant based early childhood 
care and education. 
As an infant teacher with whom I work, I am advising you that I will be video recording 
my own practice with infants for 1 hour per week, for 16 weeks between February 
2016 and August 2016. Although I am focusing on my own practice, you may be 
captured on film as part of the video recording process as I will be wearing a video 
recording device and there will be 2 tracking video cameras located 1 in the inside area 
and 1 in the outdoor environment. This means that your practice could be part of an 
event of pedagogical significance. Therefore, I am approaching you for permission to 
include any footage that is taken involving yourself as a fellow teacher in the infant 
setting to be included in this PhD research study.   
I would also like to invite you to view, reflect upon and discuss your interpretations of a 
selection of events I have selected that are of pedagogical significance to me, related to 
my practice, on a monthly basis at a staff meeting. There would be 4 reflexive staff 
meeting discussions which would be undertaken between February 2016 and August 
2016. 
Management of the centre has agreed for me to approach you to seek your consent. In 
giving your consent, you would be agreeing to the following activities which you would 
be involved in indirectly or/and directly: 
 February - August 2016: As I will be wearing a video recording device for 1 hour per 
week, for 16 weeks between February and August and because 2 tracking cameras will 
be located in the ECE environment, you may be video recorded as part of the data 
collection process involved in the video recording of my practice with infants. 
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February - August 2016: View, reflect and discuss your interpretations, up to 12 
minutes in total, of events I have selected that are of pedagogical significance to me, in 
relation to my practice. This will take place on a monthly basis at 4 separate staff 
meetings. These reflexive discussions will be videotaped and transcribed. Your practice 
may feature in these events of pedagogical significance related to my practice and 
maybe discussed as part of these reflexive discussions. On a monthly basis you will be 
invited to amend, review and approve transcripts of the reflective staff meeting 
discussions. 
You would have the right to withdraw from the PhD research study at any time during 
the data collection period.  
The footage and notes would be accessed by myself, as the teacher-researcher, my 
supervisors Associate Professor Jayne White, Dr Carol Murphy and Professor Bronwen 
Cowie. All data collected, including notes taken by the teacher-researcher, footage and 
reflexive transcripts, will be transcribed or captured in an electronic format. This will 
then be stored on a password protected computer software programme and external hard 
drive for the duration of the PhD research study. At completion of the study all material 
will be stored for a subsequent five years on a password protected computer software 
programme. 
You would be given the opportunity to check any of the selected video recording 
excerpts which may feature you as part of the results. Any of these images that you do 
not approve of would be deleted from the data set and any future presentations. You 
would also be given the opportunity to review, amend and approve the transcripts of the 
reflexive staff meeting discussions. Filming will continue during nappy changing 
procedures (because these are known to be prime times for infant-teacher interaction) ― 
where private body parts are exposed the footage will be discretely edited. Those 
excerpts that are approved may be used for teaching purposes and/or shared with 
members of the public via presentations.  
Due to the visual nature of the data, it is not possible to assure confidentiality or 
anonymity to the participants in this PhD research study. However, a pseudonym will be 
nominated for you by Bridgette should you request one. The centre will not be named in 
this PhD research study. 
The research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher 
reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives will be disseminated in my 
PhD thesis, at conferences, in other oral and visual presentations, and in downloadable 
publications including journals such as Video Journal of Education and Pedagogy and 
other video-based educational forum. The research findings, including stills of footage, 
video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and 
quotations/narratives may be used for teaching purposes. 
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You can request a copy of any of these publications by contacting the researcher 
(bms17@students.waikato.ac.nz).. An electronic copy of this PhD thesis will become 
widely available, as the University of Waikato requires that a digital copy of a Doctoral 
thesis be lodged permanently in the University’s digital repository: Research Commons 
― a link will be sent to you on completion of my thesis. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me in relation to any further queries related to this 
research study. Alternatively, you may contact Associate Professor Jayne White 
whiteej@waikato.ac.nz; or Dr Carol Murphy carolmm@waikato.ac.nz). 
If you agree, please sign the attached consent form by the 5th February, 2016. 
Yours truly,   
 
Bridgette Redder 
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Appendix 7 
Teacher pedagogy as an answerable act in dialogic encounters with 
infants. 
A self-study of teacher interactions as a moral imperative. 
 
This form invites you to give consent to participate in this PhD research study which 
explores my practice as an infant teacher and how it impacts on infants’ subjectivities 
and their relationships with people, places and things in an ECE context. 
Please indicate your consent by ticking the box beside each relevant statement below, 
and signing the accompanying form by 5th February 2016. In signing this sheet you are 
agreeing to the following statements: 
□ I have read the explanatory letter, which I have kept for my own information, and 
have had the opportunity to seek clarification on any issues. 
□ I understand that I may feature in the video recording of Bridgette Redder’s practice 
as she interacts with infants in the early childhood setting that we both work in for 1 
hour per week for 16 weeks. Video recording will take place over a period of 6 months. 
I also understand that Bridgette will wear a video recording device and that 2 tracking 
cameras will be located, 1 inside and 1 outside to video record Bridgette’s practice, 
from a different visual perspective. 
□ I understand that my practice could be part of an event selected by Bridgette which 
she considers to be of pedagogical significance, for teachers to view, reflect and discuss 
in relation to Bridgette’s practice. 
□ I understand that I will be invited to view, reflect and discuss my interpretations, up to 
12 minutes in total, of events selected by Bridgette which are of pedagogical 
significance to her in relation to her own practice. This will take place on a monthly 
basis for 4 months at a staff meeting. These reflexive discussions will be video recorded 
over a period of 6 months. I understand that teachers will have the opportunity to 
review, amend and approve transcriptions of these reflexive discussions on a monthly 
basis. 
□ If at any time during this video recording process I feel compromised in any way I 
understand that I can inform Bridgette as the teacher-researcher or Lauren as the centre 
coordinator. In such cases, I am assured that filming will cease on that day or at the staff 
meeting.  
□ I understand the research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, 
teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives will be disseminated 
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in my PhD thesis, downloadable publications including journals such as Video Journal 
of Education and Pedagogy and other video-based educational forum, at conferences 
and in other oral and visual presentations.  
□ I understand that the research findings, including stills of footage, video footage 
excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives could also 
be used for teaching purposes. 
□ I understand that an electronic copy of this PhD thesis will become widely available, 
as the University of Waikato requires that a digital copy of a Doctoral thesis be lodged 
permanently in the University’s digital repository: Research Commons. I understand 
that a link will be sent to me on completion of this PhD thesis. 
□ I understand that I can ask that any images or other information about me are 
withdrawn at any point of the data collection ― at which time any footage containing 
images of me will be destroyed. 
□ I understand that, due to the visual nature of this PhD research study, my anonymity 
and confidentiality cannot be assured. 
□ I agree/do not agree [please circle which applies] to take part in Bridgette Redder’s 
PhD research study as described in the information letter.  
 
Name of Infant Teacher ………………………………. 
 
Please assign me a pseudonym (Please tick yes or no):  □ YES 
        □ No 
Contact details ………………………………………………. 
Signature of Infant Teacher …………………………………… 
Date ……………………………………………………………. 
Thank you for completing this form. Please return it to me by 5th February 2016 
Bridgette Redder  
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Appendix 8 
Schedule of Questions 
 
The purpose of these reflexive staff meeting discussions is for us to engage in 
pedagogical dialogue based on a selection of events involving myself and infants that I 
have chosen because I consider that they represent rich contexts for discussion about 
pedagogy as an answerable act. 
Answerability “in the early years provides a means through which we can consider the 
significant impact of our acts on the lives of infants … whether we recognise this or 
not” (White, 2016, p. 21).  
The following questions will provide the framework for our reflexive staff meeting 
discussions: 
 
• How do you see I am answerable in this pedagogical event? What do you see as 
pedagogically significant in these events? What I, as teacher, did or did not do? 
Why was this important?  
 
• What are some of the implications for infant pedagogy and practice you can think 
of in contemplating these events.   
 
• As someone who knows these infants well, is there anything in particular you 
could add to my understanding of this event? 
 
• What, if any, do you see as pedagogical tensions in this event and/or our 
discussions? 
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Appendix 9 
Dear Family 
I am very interested in the way I am answerable to infants in interactions with them as 
their teacher and how my practice impacts on infants’ subjectivities and relationships 
with people, places and things in an early childhood education (ECE) context. In 
addition, the interpretations of other infant teachers in relation to events of pedagogical 
significance surrounding my practice with infants are of great interest to me. 
I have planned to undertake a PhD research study in which I would like to explore the 
following questions specifically: 
• How am I, as an infant teacher, answerable to infants in everyday pedagogical 
events? 
• How do my answerable acts in pedagogical events impact on infants in the 
dialogic space of an early childhood education context? 
• How do my answerable acts influence the embodied language choices I make 
and how do these choices impact on infants’ subjectivities?  
• What are the pedagogical tensions for teachers in infant based early childhood 
care and education. 
To answer these questions I would like to video record my own practice interacting with 
the infants in the centre for 1 hour per week, for 16 weeks between February 2016 and 
August 2016. As your infant is one of the children presently attending the nursery, I am 
approaching you for permission to include your infant in this PhD research study. As I 
will be wearing a video recording device and there will be 2 tracking video cameras 
located, 1 in the inside area and 1 in the outdoor environment, you and any other 
children you may have with you, could potentially be captured in the video recording of 
my practice with the infants at the centre ― if you attend the centre at this time. 
Therefore, I am also approaching you for permission to include any footage that is taken 
involving yourself and/or your other children to be included in the study. 
In giving your consent, you would be agreeing to the following activities which your 
infant would be involved in directly and which you and your other children may also be 
involved in should you attend the centre at the time of recording: 
February - August 2016: Agreeing for me as the teacher-researcher to video record my 
practice as I interact with your infant for 1 hour per week, for 16 weeks. Video 
recording would take place over a period of 6 months between February and August 
2016. 
 February - August 2016: As I will be wearing a video recording device and 2 tracking 
cameras will be located in the ECE environment, you and any of your other children 
may be video recorded as part of the data collection process involved in me video 
recording my own practice with infants at the ECE setting when you attend. 
You would have the right to withdraw your infant from the PhD research study at any 
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time during the data collection period.  
Footage of a selection of events I have selected of pedagogical significance to me, 
which are related to my practice, will be viewed by, reflected upon and discussed with 
other infant teachers from the centre at a monthly staff meeting for 4 months. 
The footage and notes would be accessed by me as the teacher-researcher, my 
supervisors Associate Professor Jayne White, Dr Carol Murphy and Professor Bronwen 
Cowie. All data collected, including notes taken by the teacher-researcher, footage and 
reflexive transcripts, will be transcribed or captured in an electronic format. This will 
then be stored on a password protected computer software programme and external hard 
drive for the duration of the PhD research study. At completion of the study all material 
will be stored for a subsequent five years on a password protected computer software 
programme. 
You would be given the opportunity to check any of the selected video recording 
excerpts which feature your infant or you or any of your other children as part of the 
results. Any of these images that you do not approve of would be deleted from the data 
set and any future presentations. Though filming will continue during nappy changing 
procedures (because these are known to be prime times for infant-teacher interaction) ― 
where private body parts are exposed the footage will be discretely edited. Those 
excerpts that are approved may be used for teaching purposes and/or shared with 
members of the public via presentations.  
Due to the visual nature of the data, it is not possible to assure confidentiality or 
anonymity to the participants in this PhD research study. However, a pseudonym will be 
nominated by Bridgette for your infant should you request one. The centre will not be 
named in this PhD research study. 
The research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, teacher 
reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives will be disseminated in my 
PhD thesis, at conferences, in other oral and visual presentations, and in downloadable 
publications including journals such as Video Journal of Education and Pedagogy and 
other video-based educational forum. The research findings, including stills of footage, 
video footage excerpts, teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and 
quotations/narratives may be used for teaching purposes. 
You can request a copy of any of these publications by contacting me as the researcher 
(bms17@students.waikato.ac.nz). An electronic copy of this PhD thesis will become 
widely available, as the University of Waikato requires that a digital copy of a Doctoral 
thesis be lodged permanently in the University’s digital repository: Research Commons 
― a link will be sent to you on completion of my thesis 
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Please do not hesitate to contact me in relation to any further queries related to this 
research study. Alternatively, you may contact Associate Professor Jayne White 
whiteej@waikato.ac.nz; or Dr Carol Murphy carolmm@waikato.ac.nz). 
If you agree, please sign the attached consent form by the 5th February, 2016. 
 
Yours truly,   
 
 
Bridgette Redder 
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Appendix 10 
Teacher pedagogy as an answerable act in dialogic encounters with 
infants.  
A self-study of teacher interactions as a moral imperative. 
This form invites you to give consent for your infant to participate in this PhD research 
study which explores my practice as an infant teacher and how it impacts on infants’ 
subjectivities and their relationships with people, places and things in an ECE context. It 
also invites you to give consent for any footage that you and/or any of your other 
children may be captured in when attending the centre, to be included as part of this 
PhD research study also.  
Please indicate your consent by ticking the box beside each relevant statement below, 
and signing the accompanying form by 5th February. In signing this sheet you are 
agreeing to the following statements: 
□ I have read the explanatory letter, which I have kept for my own information, and 
have had the opportunity to seek clarification on any issues. 
□ I understand that my infant may feature in the video recording of Bridgette’s practice 
with infants which will occur for 1 hour per week for 16 weeks over a period of 6 
months and that Bridgette will wear a video recording device. I also understand that 2 
tracking cameras will be located, 1 inside and 1 outside to video record Bridgette’s 
practice, from a different field of vision.  
□ If at any time during this video recording process my infant shows any signs of 
discomfort or distress, I understand that this will be monitored by Bridgette as the 
teacher-researcher in collaboration with the centre coordinator. In such cases, I am 
assured that filming will cease on that day. I understand that as my child’s parent or 
caregiver if I am concerned that my child is in discomfort or distress, I can notify 
Bridgette or the centre coordinator and filming will cease on that day.   
□ I understand that the footage will be analysed by Bridgette as the teacher-researcher 
and may be viewed by Bridgette’s supervisors: Associate Professor Jayne White, Dr 
Carol Murphy and Professor Bronwen Cowie. 
□ I understand that footage of a selection of events selected by Bridgette and related to 
Bridgette’s practice will be viewed by, reflected upon and discussed with other infant 
teachers from the centre at a monthly staff meeting for 4 months. 
□ I understand that I may feature in the video recording of Bridgette’s practice if I 
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attend the centre at times when video recording is taking place. 
□ I understand that any of my other children who are with me when I attend the centre 
may feature in the video recording of Bridgette’s practice if I attend the centre at times 
when video recording is taking place. 
□ I understand the research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, 
teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives will also be 
disseminated in my PhD thesis, downloadable publications including journals such as 
Video Journal of Education and Pedagogy and other video-based educational forum, at 
conferences and in other oral and visual presentations.  
□ I understand the research findings, including stills of footage, video footage excerpts, 
teacher reflexive discussions, transcripts and quotations/narratives could also be used 
for teaching purposes. 
□ I understand that an electronic copy of this PhD thesis will become widely available, 
as the University of Waikato requires that a digital copy of a Doctoral thesis be lodged 
permanently in the University’s digital repository: Research Commons. I understand 
that a link will be sent to me on completion of this PhD thesis. 
 □ I understand that I can ask that any images or other information about my infant or 
my other children or me are withdrawn at any point of the data collection ― at which 
time any footage containing images of my infant, my other children or me will be 
destroyed. 
□ I understand that, due to the visual nature of this PhD research study, my infant’s and 
my own anonymity and confidentiality cannot be assured. I also understand that due to 
the visual nature of this PhD research study, the anonymity and confidentiality cannot 
be assured of any other of my children that may be with me at the time of attending the 
centre. 
□ I agree/do not agree [please circle which applies] for my infant to take part in 
Bridgette’s PhD research study as described in the information letter.  
□ I agree/do not agree [please circle which applies] for any video recording of 
Bridgette’s practice that may feature me when I attend the centre to be included in this 
PhD research study, as described in the information letter. 
□ I agree/do not agree [please circle which applies] for any video recording of 
Bridgette’s practice that may feature my other children when I attend the centre to be 
included in this PhD research study, as described in the information letter. 
Name of Family Representative: ………………………………………. 
Name of Infant …………….…………………………………………… 
Please assign me a Pseudonym (Please tick yes or no):  □ Yes 
        □ No 
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Contact details ………………………………………………………….. 
Signature of family representative .……………………………………. 
Date ……………………………………………………………………… 
Thank you for completing this form. Please return it to me by 5th February 2016 
Bridgette Redder 
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Appendix 11 
Excerpt from analysis table 
